Essays in behavioral economics : research at the intersection of psychology and economics by Oud, Bastiaan
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2015
Essays in behavioral economics : research at the intersection of psychology
and economics
Oud, Bastiaan
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-138997
Published Version
Originally published at:
Oud, Bastiaan. Essays in behavioral economics : research at the intersection of psychology and economics.
2015, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Essays in Behavioral Economics
Research At the Intersection of Psychology and Economics
Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of Economics,
Business Administration and Information Technology
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. oec.
(corresponds to Doctor of Philosophy, PhD)
presented by
Bastiaan Oud
from Germany
approved in February 2015 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Ernst Fehr
Prof. Dr. Björn Bartling
The Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology of the Univer-
sity of Zurich hereby authorizes the printing of this dissertation, without indicating an opinion
of the views expressed in the work.
Zürich, February 11, 2015
Chairman of the Doctoral Board: Prof. Dr. Josef Zweimüller
i
Contents
Front Matter
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acronyms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
1 Introduction / Contents of this Thesis 1
2 Irrational Deliberation in Decision-Making 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Studies 1 and 2: Time intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Study 3: Response to incentive changes (or lack thereof) . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.1 Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3 Study 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Appendix I: Supplementary detailed documentation of methods . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.1 Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2 Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.3 Study 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6 Appendix II: Supplementary results and robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1 Detailed Regression tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.2 Study 3 robustness check: analysis based on means, with alternative treat-
ment of RT outliers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Avoiding Responsibility 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.1 Definitions: control, agency and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.2 The avoidance of responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.1 Basic design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.2 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.2 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.3 Assignment of roles to the participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.4 Description of the task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
ii
CONTENTS
3.4.5 Implementation of the four treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.1 Overall, there was a positive WTP to randomize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.2 Treatment effects on the WTP for randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5.3 Further results and robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7.1 Additional results and robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7.2 Game tree for the UNINFORMED condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.7.3 Detailed payment schedule for all treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7.4 z-Tree Screenshots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7.5 Original instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7.6 Comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4 A Comment on Comparing Apples and Oranges 91
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2 Apples and oranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 Extension to other sensory modalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5 First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior 96
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.1.1 Organization of the rest of this article . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2 Motivation and theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.1 Are faces used to infer trustworthiness? What is it about the faces? . . . . 99
5.2.2 Does it help to view the faces of counterparts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3 Generating our stimuli (obtaining facial pictures and choices) . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3.1 Obtaining pre-recorded trust game behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3.2 Obtaining facial pictures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Do people make systematic use of facial information in trust games? . . . . . . . 105
5.4.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.2 Results for first-movers (trustors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5 The validity of beliefs based on faces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5.1 Did seeing photos help trustors earn more? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5.2 Motivation for experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.5.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6.1 (In-)ability to identify the morphing condition of photos . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6.2 Was there something artificial about the morphed photos that was not
present in the un-morphed ones? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.8.1 Results for second-movers (trustees) who played against photos of trustors.135
5.8.2 Screenshots: experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.8.3 Screenshots: experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.8.4 Stimulus group: original instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.8.5 Stimulus group: comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.8.6 Stimulus group: solutions to comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.8.7 Experiment 1: original instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
iii
CONTENTS
5.8.8 Experiment 1: comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.8.9 Experiment 1: solutions to comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.8.10 Experiment 2: original instructions (CROPPED sessions) . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.8.11 Experiment 2: comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.8.12 Experiment 2: solutions to comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.8.13 Experiment 2: original instructions (NO CROP sessions) . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.8.14 Modification guessing: original instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.8.15 Modification guessing: comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
5.8.16 Modification guessing: comprehension questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
References 196
Chapter 1: Irrational Deliberation in Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Chapter 2: Avoiding Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Chapter 3: A Comment on Comparing Apples and Oranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Chapter 4: First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Curriculum Vitae 205
iv
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Ernst Fehr for his guidance and for generously providing the resources
without which none of the research reported here would have been possible.
v
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronyms and Abbreviations
BDM Becker-deGroot-Marshak (1964) — an incentive
compatible method for eliciting WTP
ITI Inter-trial interval – the time that elapses after
the end of one trial and before the next begins
PANAS Positive and negative affect schedule (a survey)
RT Response time
TOSCA Test of Self-Conscious Affect (a survey)
WTP Willingness to pay
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction / Contents of this
Thesis
In this dissertation, I report the results of four projects that substantially differ in their thematic
content, to the extent that it makes little sense to look for over-arching themes that unite them.
Here, I therefore give a very brief overview of the four projects and invite the reader to progress
directly to the relevant chapters, which each contain separate introductions, discussions and
conclusions specific to the topics at hand, and place the findings into the context of related
work.
Chapter 2: Irrational Deliberation in Decision-Making
This chapter investigates how people allocate their time across multiple decisions, when they
are time constrained. We find that people behave sub-optimally in such contexts, because they
spend too much time, relatively speaking, on the choices that matter the least – i.e. the choices
with the smallest expected impact on earnings or subjective valuation. We demonstrate this
sub-optimality by showing that the outcome of decisions can be improved with the simple
intervention of imposing a time limit on each choice. This cuts decisions short, causing a re-
distribution of decision time that results in higher earnings / higher subjective valuation. Thus
we simultaneously point out an inefficiency, and one possible way of addressing it.
Chapter 3: Avoiding Responsibility
Previous empirical research has shown that decision-makers may value authority and the re-
tention of decision rights beyond their instrumental usefulness. Here, we discuss situations
1
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in which the opposite may be the case, i.e. situations in which a decision-maker may in fact
be willing to pay in order to avoid making a choice that affects third parties. For example, a
doctor may prefer not to decide which of two sick children receives a single indivisible dose of
a curing medication, or a professor may prefer not to decide which of two equally deserving
students receives an indivisible prize. We exposed decision-makers to an economic analogy of
such situations, in which a fixed lump-sum stake had to be allocated to one of two recipients.
Decision-makers could either retain control and make the choice between recipients themselves,
or else delegate the choice to a random computer move, thus abandoning control. We elicited
the compensating payment that made the decision-makers indifferent between the two options.
As experimental conditions, we varied the stake size, which could be positive or negative, and
varied whether recipients were informed about who made the allocation. We find that (1) there
was a positive willingness to pay for randomizing (i.e. to avoid making the choice), (2) this
WTP was higher when the stakes were losses, and (3) it was higher when recipients were in-
formed about the agency of the decision-maker. We discuss how this fits in with the motive of
responsibility aversion.
Chapter 4: A Comment on Comparing Apples and Oranges
This chapter is a short commentary on some neuroscientific work that asks how the brain makes
decisions when the options are from different domains of choice. For example, if you are
deciding whether to go for dinner or go see a movie, the objects you are comparing are quite
different in nature. The question is whether the brain operates by computing a value for each
option and then comparing these values in a single circuit. In this commentary, we point out
that the methodology used in such studies, so far, represents stimuli only visually, although a
truly integrated subjective value comparison circuit should be able to deal with inputs across
multiple different sensory domains.
Chapter 5: First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
This chapter is concerned with whether, how and why people use their counterparts’ faces
when making the decision to trust or not trust strangers. This is motivated by the fact that in
economic research, much work has been done on how reputation forms across time, and how
this reputation can feed beliefs about future behavior – yet in many settings, potential transaction
partners have no observable history. First, we ask whether trustors do in fact use faces when
making their decisions in the trust game. We find that they do. We then ask in what manner
people use the faces. To do this, we establish that a certain set of facial features psychological
research (e.g. Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008) has described as prototypically trustworthy / un-
trustworthy do indeed systematically bias trusting behavior in the predicted directions. The
2
effect appears to be driven mainly by gender effects and the perceived emotional expression that
is contained in the photos. Having found that the information in faces is systematically used
by participants, we then ask whether it is actually helpful for trustors to use faces. We do not
find any evidence that this is the case. First, participants who viewed photos did not earn more
than participants who did not – such that there is no indication that the photos helped them to
identify and selectively trust trustworthy transaction partners. Furthermore, it turns out that
participants would have fared better, had they completely ignored the photographs and never
made a transfer to any of the trustees. Second, we asked a separate group of participants to
guess the behavior of the persons in the photos, but find no correlation whatsoever between
actual behavior and the guesses. The chapter then discusses the puzzle of why we observe such
a systematic reaction to an essentially useless stimulus.
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Chapter 2
Irrational Deliberation in
Decision-Making
An experimental study on the (sub-)optimality
of time allocation
This chapter is joint work with Ian Krajbich, Kevin Miller, Jin Hyun Cheong, Matthew Botvinick
and Ernst Fehr.
Author contributions: B.O., I.K. and E.F. designed study 1. B.O. and I.K. conducted study 1.
B.O. analyzed data of studies 1, 2 and 3. K.M., J.C., M.B. and I.K. designed study 2. K.M. and
M.B. designed study 3. K.M. and J.C conducted studies 2 and 3. B.O., I.K., E.F., K.M., J.C. and
M.B. wrote the article.
In the form presented here, it has not yet been published elsewhere. An article that also uses
some of the data reported here in Study 1 has been published as Ian Krajbich, Bastiaan Oud,
and Ernst Fehr (2014). “Benefits of Neuroeconomic Modeling: New Policy Interventions and
Predictors of Preference”. In: American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 104.5, pp. 501–
506.
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Introduction
Abstract
Time is an extremely valuable resource but little is known about the efficiency of time allocation
in decision making. Empirical evidence suggests that in many ecologically relevant situations,
decision difficulty and the reward from making a correct choice are inversely linked, implying
that it is optimal to use relatively less time for difficult choice problems. This applies, in
particular, to value-based choices, in which the benefit from choosing the higher-valued item
shrinks as the values of the options get closer together and more difficult to discriminate.
Here, we experimentally show that people behave sub-optimally in such contexts. They do
not respond to incentives that favor the allocation of time to high-reward choice problems and
instead spend too much time on problems that yield low benefits. We demonstrate this by
showing that it is possible to improve subjects’ time allocation with a simple intervention that
cuts them off when their decisions take too long. Thus we provide a novel form of evidence that
people systematically spend their valuable time in an inefficient way, and simultaneously offer
a potential solution to the problem.
2.1 Introduction
We all know the phrase “time is money”, and yet at some point or another we’ve all caught
ourselves agonizing too long over an unimportant decision. Naturally the question arises
whether this phenomenon is simply an occasional unlucky outcome of an optimal decision-
making process, or whether the process itself is sub-optimal. Despite the importance of this
issue, little is known about how people allocate their time while making decisions.
The problem arises due to the well-known speed-accuracy tradeoff, where more time invested
into a decision yields a more accurate response (Pachella, 1974; Wickelgren, 1977) (Pachella,
1974; Wickelgren, 1977). This occurs due to the way the brain gradually accumulates noisy
evidence for the different choice options, up to predetermined thresholds. Theoretical work has
shown how speed-accuracy tradeoffs can optimally be resolved (Bogacz, 2007; Frazier and Yu,
2008; Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988) For example, when choice difficulty and the benefit of
a correct response are held constant, the drift-diffusion model (DDM) is known to be optimal
(Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff, 1978). By optimal we mean that for a desired accuracy
rate the DDM minimizes the expected response time (RT) (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948). Recent
years have seen much research showing that organisms (e.g. bees, rats, primates, humans) use
evidence accumulation processes (like the DDM) to make decisions, and that they do respond to
speed or accuracy constraints (Balci et al., 2011; Brunton, Botvinick, and Brody, 2013; Forstmann
5
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et al., 2010; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Seeley et al., 2012; Starns and Ratcliff, 2012; Starns and
Ratcliff, 2010; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wenzlaff et al., 2011). Moreover, these models apply
not only to perceptual decisions, where there is an objectively correct response, but also to value-
based decisions, where the correct answer is based on subjective preference (Busemeyer, 1985;
Cavanagh et al., 2014; De Martino et al., 2013; Dickhaut, Rustichini, and Smith, 2009; Diederich,
1997; Hunt et al., 2012; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005; Krajbich, Oud, and Fehr, 2014; Krajbich,
Armel, and Rangel, 2010; Krajbich et al., 2012; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Milosavljevic, Koch,
and Rangel, 2011; Rodriguez, Turner, and McClure, 2014; Roe, Busemeyer, and Townsend, 2001;
Towal, Mormann, and Koch, 2013).
This literature on the optimality of decisions has mainly focused on the simple case where
difficulty and the reward for a correct response are both held constant, but in the real world
these can vary (Pais et al., 2013; Pirrone, Stafford, and Marshall, 2014). One point that has
not – to our knowledge – been widely acknowledged, is that in many ecologically important
situations, difficulty and reward are in fact linked. In particular, in value-based (economic)
decisions where the individual receives the item that he chooses, the benefit of making the
correct decision decreases as the options get closer together in subjective value. Yet, as this
occurs the items become harder to distinguish, and we know from the DDM literature that
mean decision time increases. As a result, more ‘difficult’ choices generally take longer, even
though the correct choice yields only a minor increase in benefit over the incorrect choice.
In settings like these, the optimization problem becomes more complex and there is no clear way
to determine whether decision makers are behaving efficiently, though previous work suggests
that it is efficient for the decision thresholds to decrease over time (Bogacz et al., 2006; Cisek,
Puskas, and El-Murr, 2009; Edwards, 1965; Frazier and Yu, 2008; Hanks et al., 2011). It is
critical to note that all these models nevertheless predict that decisions between similar options
will on average take more time than between dissimilar options, and so the observation of RT
differences between such decisions is not by itself sufficient to establish the sub-optimality of
time allocation. Here we tackle this issue by developing a novel empirical method for testing
the optimality of behavior.
Normatively, when time is scarce, it should be invested where it entails the largest expected ben-
efit. In economic terminology, time spent on each decision problem represents an ‘opportunity
cost’, namely a lost opportunity to earn other rewards (Rustichini, 2009). Spending too much
time on gaining a high level of certainty for comparatively low-reward decisions can be seen
as irrational, in the sense that more could be earned with an alternate investment of this time.
Thus, when the benefit of making the correct choice differs across choice problems, the decision
maker should allocate less time to those problems where the rewards are small and more time
to the problems where the rewards are large.
Here we report the results of three experimental studies designed to empirically test whether
human decision-making in fact displays this adaptive behavior. We begin with an economic task
6
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and then also investigate a perceptual decision making task that builds in the difficulty-reward
connection that one finds in economic choice. In each task, subjects made a series of choices
where time was both scarce and valuable.
The experiments clearly demonstrate that subjects misallocate their time. We establish this by
introducing a simple intervention that improves subjects’ performance on both decision tasks,
using only information that they themselves had available (Studies 1 and 2). Importantly,
subjects seem to learn from our intervention and so some of the benefits remain even in the
subsequent absence of the intervention. Thus we not only show that people sometimes waste
their valuable time, but that it is possible to use simple training to help them improve. We
additionally show that subjects do not respond to changes in the relationship between the
similarity of the options and the benefit of being correct (Study 3).
2.2 Results
We report the results of three separate decision-making studies, one using an economic value-
based food choice task, and two using a perceptual choice task. In each study, subjects faced a
fixed amount of time to make as many decisions as possible.
2.2.1 Studies 1 and 2: Time intervention
In the value-based food choice task (Study 1), subjects had to decide which of two food items
they would prefer to eat at the end of the experiment. Images of the two food items were
presented on the left and right side of the computer screen, and the items changed from trial
to trial (Figure 2.1A). In each block there were more decisions (100) than could be made in the
time available. Any remaining decisions at the end of the time-limit were made randomly by
the computer. At the end of the experiment subjects received the chosen food item from one
randomly chosen trial. Crucially, the trial randomly chosen for payment could be a self-made
or computer-made decision. Thus the subjects had an incentive to make as many of their own
choices as possible, to reduce the chance of receiving a randomly-chosen food item.
In the twinkling-stars task (Study 2), subjects had to decide which side of the computer screen
contained more dots. The dots disappeared and reappeared at random, giving the appearance
of twinkling stars (Figure 2.1B), but the number of stars on each side of the screen remained
approximately constant throughout a trial. From trial to trial we varied the difficulty of the task
by changing the difference in the number of stars between the two sides of the screen. Subjects
earned points for each correct response and lost points for each incorrect response (1000 points
= $1).
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Choose&now&
A" B"Study 1! Studies 2, 3!
Figure 2.1: Task design (A) Example screen from the value-based food-choice task from Study 1. Subjects
simply chose the item that they would prefer to consume at the end of the study. To improve readability,
we increased the font and dot size for both panels of this figure. (B) Example screens from the perceptual
“twinkling stars” task from Studies 2 and 3. The white dots randomly appeared and disappeared, so that
at any given point in time only ~80% of them were visible. Subjects had to decide which of the two fields
had more stars.
In order to quantify the value of choices in Study 1, we measured how much each subject
was willing to pay for the different food items in a separate incentive-compatible task, prior to
the value-based choice task (see Methods). This enabled us to construct, for each participant,
trials in which the valuation difference was large (easy trials), and trials in which the valuation
difference was small (hard trials).
An analogous negative link between choice difficulty and potential reward is also induced in
Study 2. Here, participants received points according to the difference in the number of stars
between the two sides of the screen. For example, if there were 55 stars on the left and 45 stars
on the right, the stakes were 10 points. For a correct answer, the subject gained the stake. For an
incorrect answer, the stake was subtracted from the cumulative total score. As a result, difficult
trials (small star differences) entailed small potential rewards/losses, while easy trials (large star
differences) entailed large potential rewards/losses.
Crucially, in both Studies 1 and 2, there is more to be gained from making the right choice in
easy trials than in hard trials. By construction, the high-stakes trials are both easier to answer
accurately and have a larger impact on the expected payoff, thus constituting a better investment
of time than the low-stakes trials.
Despite this reasoning, we found that subjects spent significantly more time on low-stakes trials
than they did on high-stakes trials in both the food-choice task (Figure 2.2A on page 9) and the
twinkling-stars task (Figure 2.2B). In the twinkling-stars task, the average, across individuals,
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Figure 2.2: RT vs. Difficulty. Mea RTs, (black dots with standard error bars) as a function of (A) the
difference in willingness to pay (WTP) betwe n the two food items in Study 1 (n = 49 subjects), and (B)
the difference in the number of stars in Study 2 (n = 40 subjects). Choice problems with a low absolute
difference in the number of stars or WTP are more difficult and yield lower benefits from a correct decision.
Although difficult choices yield lower benefits, subjects spend more time on them, which reduces their
earnings.
of median RT in hard trials was 1.02s, compared to 0.58s in the easy trials. A nonparametric
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test rejects the hypothesis that these two values are equal
at p < 0.0001. In the food-choice task, there is a clear association between the absolute difference
in willingness to pay (|∆WTP|) and RT. We see that a CHF 1 increase in |∆WTP| corresponded,
on average, to a decrease in log(RT) by 0.218 units (p < 0.001, mixed-effects regression, see Table
2.1 in the appendix on page 36).
The RT pattern displayed in Figure 2.2A,B is suggestive that subjects may have wasted precious
time, and lost money/value, by making slow decisions in the low-stakes trials. For instance, if
the subjects could have quickly identified the low-stakes trials and flipped a (mental) coin in
those cases, it is possible that they could have earned substantially more. However, to truly
identify whether behavior is sub-optimal, more direct evidence is needed.
To convincingly demonstrate the sub-optimality of this pattern, it is sufficient to demonstrate
that unrestricted performance can be improved upon without using any additional information.
Specifically, we hypothesized that it might be possible to improve subjects’ performance in these
tasks by simply making use of decision times. We reasoned that by imposing a per-trial deadline
on decision-making, we would mostly cut off the slow low-stakes decisions and help subjects
reach more of the rapid high-stakes choices.
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Thus Studies 1 and 2 were designed (1) to test the expected time allocation pattern, (2) to
investigate the beneficial effects of deadlines on performance, and (3) to thereby directly establish
the sub-optimality of unrestricted behavior.
In both studies, subjects were informed that there would be five blocks of decisions and that
each block was time-limited. They were also told that in some blocks there would be within-
trial deadlines, after which the computer would make the decision randomly for them in the
food-choice task, or they would earn 0 points in the twinkling-stars task, respectively. Either
way, this was the same consequence as for trials that were not reached, aside from the lost time.
In both studies, subjects were warned 0.5s before the deadline, either by the stars disappearing
in the twinkling-stars task, or by an onscreen message to “Choose Now” in the food-choice task.
In what follows, we will refer to the blocks with deadlines as intervention blocks (I), and those
without as non-intervention blocks (N). In both studies the first of the five blocks (T) was always
a non-intervention block, and in the twinkling-stars task it was unpaid. For each subject the RT
distribution in the first block was used to construct the deadlines for the intervention blocks.
Specifically, the mean deadline was set such that it would have cut off the slowest 30% of
responses in the first block. The exact timing of the deadline was jittered from trial to trial (see
Methods).
To measure the effect of the deadline, we quantified subjects’ performance. In the twinkling-
stars task, a subject’s performance was simply measured by the number of points they earned
in each block. In the food-choice task, we used the independently measured WTP for each item
to calculate the value gained or lost from each decision (measured in Swiss Francs (CHF) and
denoted as choice surplus; see Methods).
Comparing the performance on the intervention blocks to the non-intervention blocks (excluding
the first blocks), we found that the effect of the intervention was beneficial for the vast majority
of participants in both tasks. Although there were a few participants who did not benefit from
the intervention, the gains of those that did clearly outweighed the losses. The intervention
helped subjects earn significantly more points in the twinkling-stars task (t(39) = −2.2215, p =
0.016, paired, one-sided) and significantly more value in the food-choice task(t(48) = −4.1973,
p = 0.0001, paired, one-sided).
Since we have repeated measures, and each subject went through a total of five blocks, it is
possible that gaining experience with the task improved performance. To rule out this possible
confound, blocks 2-5 were run either in sequence N-I-N-I or in sequence I-N-I-N. Figure 2.3
(on page 11) shows mean task performance block by block for Studies 1 (panel A) and 2 (panel
B). To analyze the benefit of the intervention while statistically controlling for the sequence of
blocks, we regressed blockwise performance from blocks 2-5 on both a dummy variable for the
intervention blocks, as well as an integer variable (2-5) that encoded the block number. The
mixed-effects regression results (see Table 2.3 in the appendix (page 37)) show that, all else being
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Figure 2.3: Choice performance by block. (A) Choice surplus earned by n=49 subjects in each of the
five blocks. (B) Points earned by n = 40 subjects in each of the five blocks. All subjects began with
a nonintervention block (first block T). In the second block, subjects either experienced another non-
intervention (N) block (left half-panels) or an intervention (I) block (right half-panels). After that, the
blocks alternated between I and N. To better reflect the within-subjects nature of the design, the data were
individually de-meaned by subtracting, for each subject, the mean of blocks 2-5. Thus a positive bar means
that in this block, on average, participants did better than the average from blocks 2-5, and vice versa for
negative bars. Performance in I is always higher than in the previous N trials. The higher performance in
I trials also holds when we control for experience.
equal, with each additional block, earnings increased by 61.86 points (z = 5.90, p < 0.001) in the
twinkling stars task. In the food-choice task, value per block increased by CHF 1.33 (z = 6.69,
p < 0.001) (if all the trials had been realized; in reality only one trial was realized since we could
not give a subject 500 food items to eat). However, the positive effect of the intervention remains
significant when we control for experience, with subjects earning an average of 76.28 points
more in an intervention block of the twinkling-stars task (z = −2.11, p < 0.035) and a value of
CHF 1.69 more in an intervention block of the food-choice task (z = −3.75, p < 0.001).
Finally, we investigated whether subjects learned from the intervention and so improved in
subsequent non-intervention blocks. In order to test for this, while controlling for the ef-
fects of experience, we ran a mixed-effects regression (see Methods and Table 2.3 on page
37, specifications 2 and 5) that included a block-number regressor, as well as dummy vari-
ables for intervention blocks and for pre-intervention blocks. The regression results show that
performance in post-intervention non-intervention blocks was higher than in pre-intervention
blocks, though the effect was only significant in the food-choice task. In the twinkling-stars
task, pre-intervention blocks fared 26.32 points worse than the non-intervention blocks that
followed (z = −0.40, p < 0.68), while in the food-choice task, pre-intervention blocks fared the
11
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equivalent of CHF 3.55 worse (if every trial had been realized) than the post-intervention ones
(z = −4.20, p < 0.001). While intervention blocks continued to outperform post-intervention
non-intervention blocks (see Methods and Table 2.3 on page 37, specifications 3 and 6), this
effect was only marginally significant, with a remaining performance increase of 69.58 points
per block in the twinkling-stars task (z = 1.64, p < 0.051, one-tailed) and CHF 0.75 per block in
the food-choice task (z = 1.33, p < 0.093, one-tailed).
2.2.2 Study 3: Response to incentive changes (or lack thereof)
Studies 1 and 2 conclusively showed that subjects did not optimize their allocation of time in
either perceptual or value-based decision making. Instead they appeared to deliberate for too
long on low-stakes decisions. Having established that subjects do not use an efficient decision
strategy in time-constrained settings, we next sought to address an even more basic question:
Do subjects at least allocate their time differently when there is or isn’t a link between choice
difficulty and the amount at stake? Study 3 was designed to answer this question.
Subjects were informed that there were two payment conditions in the experiment. In the fixed
pay (F) condition, the amount to be gained or lost was 25 points on every trial, regardless of the
number of stars. In contrast, in the difference-based pay (D) condition, the stakes corresponded
to the difference in the number of stars between the two sides of the screen, like in Study 2.
Since subjects did not know the number of stars on the screen, they had to infer the stake size.
We designed this D condition to mirror the link between difficulty and reward in value-based
choice in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.
Thus, in both conditions, easy trials, which could be answered more rapidly, offered higher
earnings per unit of time than the hard trials. However, in the D condition, the difference between
easy and hard trials was magnified, because in addition, stake size differed by difficulty: easy
trials now offered a larger reward for a correct response than hard trials. Thus we predicted that
our subjects would adapt by investing relatively less time into the hard trials in the D condition
than in the F condition.
After an initial unpaid trial block T, subjects progressed through four more blocks, either in
sequence D-D-F-F or F-F-D-D. If we restrict our attention to only the first two blocks (akin to a
between-subjects design), we find that the ratio (median rt in hard trials)/(median rt in easy trials)
is not significantly different in the D vs. F treatments (p = 0.4657, two-sample rank-sum Mann-
Whitney test).
Next, we investigated whether this null finding persisted in our within-subjects data, by ana-
lyzing all four paid blocks. Figure 2.4 shows, for each subject individually, the change in the
ratio (median rt in hard trials)/(median rt in easy trials) across conditions. Approximately half of
the subjects (22/42) shifted in the predicted direction, while the rest (20/42) shifted in the opposite
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Figure 2.4: Study 3 results. Change in the ratio of (median rt in hard)/(median rt in easy) trials for the
difference-based (D) pay condition minus the fixed (F) pay condition. Each bar represents one subject
(n = 42 subjects). A positive bar indicates a subject who spent relatively more time on hard trials in the
D condition (compared to F), while a negative bar indicates the opposite. If subjects were responding
optimally to the incentives in the D condition, they should have spent less time on the hard decisions and
more time on the easy decisions, i.e. the ratio depicted in the figure should be negative.
direction. Visually, the magnitudes of the changes were approximately symmetric around zero.
To investigate this statistically, we first ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distri-
bution functions on the distribution of median response times on hard trials, in the D vs. F
condition, which was not significant (exact p-value 0.346). In addition, we ran a mixed-effects
regression, in which we regressed log(RT) on binary variables for trial difficulty and payment
scheme to capture main effects, as well as an interaction term between the two (see Table 2.2 in
the appendix, page 36). Importantly, the coefficient of this interaction term was not significantly
different from zero (z = 0.79, p = 0.430), so we have no evidence that subjects responded to the
change in payment scheme. Only the coefficient for trial difficulty was significantly different
from zero (z = −8.85, p < 0.001), indicating that subjects completed easy trials more rapidly than
hard trials. Analogous tests using mean RTs (rather than median RTs) yield even less significant
results, but they require careful treatment of outlier trials and so are presented in the appendix
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(see page 38).
We also investigated subjects’ accuracy across trial difficulty and condition. Using a mixed-
effects logit model, we regressed accuracy on binary variables for trial difficulty and payment
condition, as well as an interaction between the two. We find that in the D condition, subjects’
accuracy did not differ significantly on easy trials (z = 1.29, p = 0.198), and was smaller in the
hard trials (z = −1.97, p = 0.049), compared to the F condition. The lack of RT effects is thus
even more surprising since subjects should devote even less time to lower accuracy hard trials.
Thus, taken together, we find no evidence that subjects adapted their time allocation behavior
to the incentive changes in the task. This “null” result does not, on its own, provide conclusive
evidence of sub-optimality, but building on the results from Studies 1 & 2, it is consistent with
the hypothesis that time misallocation is a pervasive problem.
2.3 Discussion
Here we have shown that human decision makers are consistently sub-optimal at investing
scarce decision time, but that this can be mitigated using a simple intervention. We observed
behavior that failed to maximize material benefit in both perceptual and value-based decision
tasks, in which subjects had to decide how to allocate their time across many binary choices.
In Study 1 we investigated value-based choices where subjects had to choose which of two snack
foods to eat, and found that we were able to boost their performance with a simple intervention
where we imposed a deadline each trial. In Study 2 we extended these findings to perceptual
choices where subjects had to decide which side of the screen contained more flickering dots.
Once again, we were able to improve subjects’ earnings with the simple deadline intervention.
Finally, in Study 3 we again looked at perceptual choices and did not observe any adjustment of
time allocation to reflect changing reward schemes. We compared two conditions, one where the
points at stake were tied to the difficulty of the task, and one where the stakes were independent
of the difficulty level. Yet we found no difference in the fraction of time subjects allocated to
hard decisions. These three studies tell a consistent story, in which people spend more time on
low-stakes decisions than they should.
These findings are economically counter-intuitive because we find that imposing an additional
constraint (a deadline) onto individual decisions actually improves the overall outcome. Theo-
retically, since the same constraints could have been self-imposed by the subjects, our interven-
tion should not have been able to improve upon optimal performance. This exposes the fact
that behavior was not optimized to maximize earnings in these settings.
While our intention in this study was to provide an empirical test for suboptimal time allocation,
the fact that our intervention helped to improve subjects’ material benefit may also lead to a
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normative discussion of whether such an intervention is desirable or not. We would like
to emphasize that our results do not warrant the conclusion that heavy-handed paternalism
is normatively beneficial. First, in both Studies 1 and 2, we purposefully implemented our
intervention soft-handedly. In Study 1 participants were given a cue to “choose now” 0.5
seconds before the actual deadline applied, and in Study 2, the screen went black 0.5 seconds
before the deadline. This was designed to enable participants to retain agency and avoid being
cut off by the computer. Being cut off rarely occurred (1.60% and 2.14% of intervention block
trials, in Studies 1 and 2, respectively), so the intervention worked primarily by informing
subjects when they should make a decision and move on.
Second, while the data show that the intervention enhanced the material benefit of the subjects,
it is beyond the scope of the current research to evaluate its subjective benefits, all things
considered. For example, it is possible that subjects also assign an intrinsic value to being correct
(Starns and Ratcliff, 2012). If this intrinsic value was higher for hard problems, as research on
achievement motivation indeed suggests (e.g. Matsui, Okada, and Mizuguchi, 1981), this could
explain why subjects might allocate more time to them. However, note that this cannot explain
why subjects’ behavior improved post-intervention, nor can it explain the lack of a difference
between payment schemes documented in Study 3.
Another possibility is that people may dislike the looming threat of being cut short, which
could potentially outweigh the material gains, because they intrinsically like making their own
choices. On the other hand, conceptually, it is not clear whether the time limit actually ought
to reduce the experience of self-determination, since cutting one trial short implies that subjects
have more time for other trials. Limitation of control thus occurred only in the sense that a
restriction was put on the freedom to self-allocate decision time, but not in the sense that a
smaller number of potential choices were made. In fact, in intervention blocks, participants
made more choices themselves than without the intervention.
It is also worth noting again that subjects did seem to respond positively to the intervention,
improving their performance in subsequent non-intervention blocks. More research is needed
to fully address this issue and whether there might be other interventions that achieve similar
or even better outcomes.
As always in empirical work, there remains the question of generalizability. A first qualification
is that the drift diffusion model is known to predict well for comparatively rapid decisions, i.e.
decisions that can be made within a few seconds. However, one would not necessarily expect
these results to generalize to settings where people employ slower algorithmic problem solving.
Also, as a proof-of-concept we deliberately imposed a heavy opportunity cost of time. How this
compares with opportunity costs in everyday scenarios is an open question. Further research is
needed to establish the boundaries of applicability.
Taken together, our research here demonstrates a new, simple way to test theoretical predictions
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about optimal behavior. Rather than taking the traditional modeling approach to derive what
optimal behavior might look like, we instead used experimental manipulations and behavioral
interventions to show that subjects’ unrestricted behavior is not payoff maximizing. Of course, it
was the modeling literature that first suggested to us that such inefficiency might exist. We thus
close with the hope that our work here highlights the important complementarities between
theory, modeling, and experiments.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Study 1
49 subjects provided informed consent and were paid a flat fee of CHF 30 for their participation,
plus possible additional cash of up to CHF 2.50 from the first part of the study. Subjects first
indicated their willingness to pay (WTP) for 100 different snack foods, using a Becker-deGroot-
Marshak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al. 1964), which has the property that it is in subjects’
best interest to reveal their true WTP (see details below). For each trial, subjects saw a color
photograph of the item and a slider bar (with a random starting location) that they could use
to select a WTP from CHF 0 to 2.50, in steps of CHF 0.25. Subjects used the “left” and “right”
arrow keys to move the slider and the “up” arrow key to confirm their choice.
Subjects then proceeded through five blocks of binary decisions between pairs of these items.
Using these WTPs, we constructed choice pairs with known valuation differences between the
two items. Each block contained 100 trials, half of which were constructed as “high stakes”
choices (large valuation difference), and half “low stakes” (small valuation difference). It was
impossible to reach every trial in any given block, since each block’s duration was 150s, with
1.5s inter-trial interval (ITI). Subjects indicated their decision by pressing the “left” or “right”
arrow keys on the keyboard.
Critically, subjects were informed that the computer would randomly make any uncompleted
choices at the end of the 150s. This scarcity of time meant that subjects faced a problem of how
much decision time to allocate to any particular trial. Since the computer was going to make
choices randomly and not according to the subjects’ preferences, there was relatively a lot more
to be gained by making the high-stakes choices oneself, compared to the low-stakes ones.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were rewarded for one random trial. This trial could be
a BDM trial (p = 16 ) or a binary choice trial (p =
5
6 ). For a choice trial, subjects simply received
the item that they, or the computer, chose on that trial. For a BDM trial, the computer generated
a random price between CHF 0 and 2.50. If the random price was equal to or less than the
subject’s WTP for that item, then the subject received the food and paid the random price (out
of an endowment of CHF 2.50). If the random price was above the subject’s WTP for that item,
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then the subject did not receive the food and kept the endowment of CHF 2.50. In addition to
these earnings, all subjects earned CHF 30 for their participation in the study.
The first of the five blocks (T) was used to obtain an individual empirical distribution function for
the response times in the task. Four more blocks followed. Two of these were nonintervention
blocks (N), which were constructed identically to the first block, but with different choice pairs.
The other two blocks were intervention blocks (I), in which subjects were reminded on screen
to “choose now” after a pre-specified amount of time had passed. If they did not make a
choice within 0.5s of the message, the choice was randomly made for them, and the next trial
commenced (after the ITI). The mean deadline was defined for each subject separately, such that
it would have cut off the slowest 30% of their decisions in the T block. The four intervention and
non-intervention blocks were run in alternation. For each subject, there was a 50% chance that
they would experience the sequence T-I-N-I-N, and a 50% chance that they would experience
the sequence T-N-I-N-I.
To assess performance on the task, we created a measure of surplus that captures the subjective
value generated through making choices, and is analogous to the points earned in Study 2. To
do this, we used each individual subject’s WTPs to create the following measure:
choice surplus =
(vchosen − vL) −
1
2 (vH − vL) for human choices
0 for computer choices
Here, vchosen is the WTP for the chosen item, vL is the lower of the two WTPs, and vH is the higher
of the two WTPs. Thus, choice surplus represents the degree to which the surplus from actual
human choices outperforms chance. Computer choices were treated as performing at chance
level (zero by construction), regardless of their actual random realization, to reduce artificial
noise in the measure.
2.4.2 Study 2
42 subjects were recruited through a Princeton University online subject recruitment system
and provided informed consent to participate in this study. Two subjects were excluded from
analysis due to outlier behavior, because they scored more than three standard deviations away
from the mean for one of the two conditions. This left us with an analyzed sample size of 40
subjects. The minimum payment in this study was set to $12, and the average payment was
$18.29.
The experiment was conducted using Matlab Psychophysics Toolbox. The instructions were
provided verbally, and redundantly on screen for subjects to follow along. Subjects were
informed that they would be paid $1 for every 1000 points they earned during the study,
rounded down to the nearest dollar. For example, a subject with a score of 17232 points would
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receive $17.00. The minimum payment was set at $12 and the average payment was $12.95 (all
results still hold if we exclude the subset of subjects who scored under 12000 points).
The experimenter stayed with the subjects while they read the instructions, in order to answer
any questions. Afterwards, the experimenter left the room and the main part of the experiment
began. The task was to indicate, using the keyboard, which side of the computer screen contained
more dots. The dots would appear and disappear, giving the appearance of twinkling stars (see
screenshot in Figure 2.1). The difference in the number of stars between the two sides of the
screen was either 10 (hard trials) or 80 (easy trials), with the mean number of stars equal to 100
(e.g., a “hard” trial had 95 vs. 105 stars, and an “easy” trial had 60 vs. 140 stars).
The study was divided into five blocks. The first of the five blocks was a 5-minute unpaid
trial block (T) to familiarize subjects with the task, with an ITI of 0.5 seconds separating trials.
The four remaining blocks each took 10 minutes, with subjects earning points that were later
converted to cash. On each trial in these blocks, participants could either gain or lose a specific
number of points, which we refer to as the “stake” for that trial. Subjects were self paced and
continued to make decisions until the block time was up. The ITI in the paid blocks was 2s, plus
the time needed to prepare the next trial, resulting in an average empirical ITI of ~2.2s.
Subjects were informed that the stakes corresponded to half the difference in the number of stars
between the two sides of the screen. For example, if there were 105 stars on the left and 95 stars
on the right, the stakes were 5 (since 105 − 95 = 10). Since subjects did not know the number of
dots in advance, on every trial they had to infer the stakes based on the on-screen stimuli.
As in Study 1, there were two within-subject experimental conditions: intervention blocks
and non-intervention blocks, which will be described in more detail below. Participants were
introduced to the two experimental conditions in the following way:
“On some runs [blocks], there will be a deadline. If you do not respond by the deadline, the trial will be
aborted, and you will earn no points. A short time before the deadline, the stars will disappear - respond
quickly when this happens!”
The first of the five blocks was used to establish a response time profile for each participant.
This distribution of response times was used to construct the deadlines for the intervention
blocks. Specifically, the mean deadline was set such that it would have cut off the slowest 30%
of responses in the T block. Each trial, the deadline was drawn uniformly from within 50ms of
the mean deadline.
2.4.3 Study 3
42 subjects were recruited through a Princeton University online subject recruitment system and
provided informed consent to participate in this study. Study 3 employed the same task as in
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Study 2, but with some notable differences.
The most important difference was that two different payment schemes were used. Subjects
were informed that in the fixed pay (F) condition, the amount to be gained or lost was 25 points
on every trial, regardless of how many stars there were. In contrast, in the difference-based pay
(D) condition, the stakes corresponded to the difference in the number of stars between the two
sides of the screen. For example, if there were 55 stars on the left and 45 stars on the right, the
stakes were 10 (since 55-45=10). Since subjects did not know the number of dots in advance, on
every trial they had to infer the stakes based on the on-screen stimuli. For half of the subjects,
the block-type sequence was TFFDD, for the others it was TDDFF.
Other changes from Study 2 include the fact that the difference in the number of stars between
the two sides of the screen was either 10 (hard trials) or 24 (easy trials), with the mean number of
stars equal to 100 (i.e., a “hard” trial had 95 vs. 105 stars, and an “easy” trial had 88 vs. 112 stars).
The points earned corresponded to the difference in the number of stars (i.e. 10 or 24 points
per trial). This was motivated by the desire to keep overall payments per subject approximately
the same in studies 2 and 3. Finally, the ITI in the paid blocks was 1s, plus the time needed to
prepare the next trial, resulting in an average empirical ITI of ~1.1s.
As in Study 2, participants were informed that the study consisted of five blocks of decisions,
each of which lasted for ten minutes, and that each block was limited by time, not by number
of trials.
2.4.4 Analysis
The mixed-effects regressions reported for Studies 1 and 2 use the following model:
y = βxi j + vi + i j
Here, β is a vector of coefficients, xi j is the vector of regressors in trial j of individual i, vi is
an individual-specific noise term, and i j is a general noise term. For Study 2 (Table 2.3 in the
supplement (page 37), columns 4-6), the dependent variable y is cumulative surplus per block,
in points, since every trial was paid in full (1000 points = 1 USD). For Study 1 (Table 2.3, columns
1-3), the dependent variable y is the blockwise mean surplus, in CHF per trial. Since there were
100 trials per block, conversion to the block level requires multiplying by 100. Before regressing,
the data was first collapsed to obtain blockwise mean surplus for each participant, resulting in
four data points per participant (representing blocks 2-5).
The mixed-effects regression reported in the results for Study 3 employed the following model:
log(rti j) = β0 + β1easyi j + β2conditioni j + β3easyi j ∗ conditioni j + vi + i j
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Here, j is an index for the trial, vi is an individual-specific noise term of individual i, and i j is
a general noise term. The mixed-effects regression models for all three studies were estimated
using maximum likelihood. Standard errors were clustered at the individual level. The first
(trial) block was excluded from all analyses.
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2.5 Appendix I: Supplementary detailed documentation of meth-
ods
2.5.1 Study 1
Overview
49 participants first indicated their willingness to pay for 100 different simple snack items, and
then proceeded through five blocks of binary decisions between pairs of these items. Each
block contained 100 trials, half of which were constructed as “easy” choices (large valuation
difference), and half “hard” (small valuation difference). It was virtually impossible to reach
all trials in any given block, since each block lasted for only 150 seconds, with 1.5 second
intervals between trials, and any choice not made by the decision-maker was instead made by
the computer at random. This means that time spent on any particular trial entailed a cost of
reducing the number of future trials the individual could reach. Furthermore, after block 1, we
implemented a simple intervention in which we imposed a per-trial time limit on half of the
four subsequent blocks, based on the prediction that this ought again to cut off predominantly
such trials on which a decision-maker dwelled too long on an essentially meaningless choice.
Sample
We recruited N = 49 (23 male, 26 female) participants from the University of Zurich’s participant
pool (using ORSEE, Greiner (2004)). In order to increase the chance that choices between snack
items carried meaning for our participants, our invitations asked participants not to participate
if they disliked snack items, and asked them not to eat for four hours before the experimental
session. To enhance compliance, all sessions were conducted at 5 pm, i.e. four hours after
typical Swiss lunch hours end, but before dinner time. Participants were paid a flat fee of 30
CHF for their participation, plus possible additional cash of up to CHF 2.50 from the first part
of the study. Each participant gave written informed consent. The study was conducted from
December 2012 to January 2013 in the computer laboratory of the Social and Neural Systems
laboratory (SNS-Lab) of the University of Zurich. Ethics approval for Study 1 was obtained
from the IRB at the faculty of economics, business administration and computer science of the
University of Zurich.
Part 1: Obtaining WTP
In the first part of the study, we recorded participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a large
number of snack items, using a Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, Degroot,
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and Marschak, 1964). This method has the advantage that it is in the participants’ best interest
to neither under- nor overstate their WTP. The WTP were later used to construct easy and hard
choice pairs, and to establish the potential surplus associated with each choice.
After completing informed consent forms, participants received detailed written instructions
(refer to the appendix for a copy), which informed them that at the end of the study, there was
going to be a 30-minute waiting phase, during which they were required to stay in the lab, or
else they would forego their payment. During this time, they were going to be served any snack
item that they may have won during the study. They could either consume it during the 30
minute waiting phase or take it home. The full 30 minute waiting phase applied whether or
not one had obtained a snack item. This mandatory 30-minute wait served to further motivate
participants to acquire a snack item, as well as give them occasion to consume said item on site.
The measurement of WTP was operationalized as follows. Participants obtained a budget of
2.50 CHF per trial, of which they could bid any amount that they liked for a snack item. For
each of 100 snack items, photographs of were displayed one by one on the computer screen. On
each screen, participants had to indicate how much they were maximally willing to pay for that
item, on a graphical scale from 0 CHF to 2.50 CHF, in intervals of 0.25 CHF, by moving a cursor
to the appropriate place using the keyboard. The initial location of the cursor was randomized
in each trial, in order to avoid systematic anchoring effects. For a sample screenshot, refer to
Figure 2.1 of the main article (page 8). Participants were informed in the instructions that at the
end of the study, one trial was going to be drawn and implemented. If this random trial was
from part 1 of the study, a random price was determined for the item shown in that trial. If the
random price exceeded the stated maximal WTP, then they did not purchase the item, and kept
the full 2.50 CHF. If the random price was at or below the stated maximal WTP, they purchased
the item at the random price, and retained whatever was left of the 2.50 CHF budget after the
purchase. The BDM mechanism is a standard tool for eliciting WTP in economics, because it
has the advantage that truth telling is a dominant strategy – i.e. it is always in the participants’
best interest to state their true willingness to pay. In particular, it is neither advantageous for a
participant to under-, nor to over-state their maximal WTP. The written instructions explained
the BDM mechanism in detail, emphasizing that neither under- nor overbidding was in the
participant’s best interest (see below for a copy of the original instructions).
Participants knew that only one of the trials from either this part of the study or the next was
going to be implemented. This served two purposes. First, it meant that at most one snack item
could be obtained, and thus ensured that potential interdependencies between different snack
items played no role. Second, it served to make participants consider each trial seriously, as
each had the potential to be the only one that counted.
Comprehension of the instructions was verified using a series of multiple choice questions that
participants filled in after reading the instructions, which had to be correctly answered before
beginning the computerized part of the study (see below).
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In part 1 of the study, participants moved at their own pace and could take as much time as they
liked for each of these evaluations.
Part 2: Five blocks of binary choices
Participants received the instructions for the binary choice phase of the study only after having
completed part 1 of the study. The instructions informed them that there were going to be five
blocks, each containing 100 decisions between pairs of snack items. They were also informed
that the overall time for each block was limited, so it was possible that they were not going to
be able to make all 100 choices in each block.
The overall time limit for each block of 100 choices was 150 seconds. In addition, a fixation cross
was displayed for 1.25 seconds between any two trials, further reducing the amount of time
available for making the choices. Together, this made it virtually impossible for participants to
make all 100 decisions in a block.
Critically, participants were informed that any choices they did not themselves make were going
to instead be made randomly by the computer, so that in the end all 100 decisions in each block
were ultimately going to be made, no matter how many trials participants actually reached.
This scarcity of time meant that participants faced a problem of how much decision time to
allocate to any particular trial. Since the computer was going to make choices randomly and not
according to participants’ preferences, there was a high expected gain in choice surplus from
making choices oneself in trials where participants have strong preferences between the two
items (“easy trials”). In contrast, for trials in which participants are nearly indifferent between
the items (“hard trials”), it was going to make little difference which of the two they chose. If
they realized that a trial is of low importance, the surplus-maximizing act would be therefore be
to quickly randomize and move on, in order to reach more of the important trials. However, the
DDM predicts that participants will spend more time on these comparatively irrelevant trials,
because they do not have instantaneous access to their latent valuations of the items, and it
hence takes them a while to realize that they are close to indifference.
To investigate the effect of hard vs. easy trials, the binary choice pairs were constructed in
the following way. Based on the BDM valuations, an algorithm constructed half of the pairs
such that the BDM valuations were as far apart as possible (“easy” pairs). The other half were
constructed such that the BDM valuations were as close to each other as possible (“hard” pairs).
These choice pairs were grouped into blocks of 100 trials (50 easy and 50 hard). The sequence
of pairs within each block was pseudo-randomized to minimize repeat trials and to ensure
a roughly equal fraction of easy and hard decisions across blocks. Participants received no
information on how the choice pairs were constructed.
Participants were reminded that one of the trials from the study (either from part 1 or from part
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2) was going to be implemented at the end of the experiment, so that they should treat each
choice situation as if it were the only one that counted.
Experimental conditions
As in Study 2, the first of the five blocks was used to obtain an individual empirical distribution
function for the response times in the task. Four more blocks followed. Two of these were
nonintervention (N) blocks, which were constructed identically to the first block, but with
different choice pairs. The other two blocks were intervention (I) blocks, in which participants
were reminded on screen to “choose now” after a pre-specified time had passed. If they made
no choice within half a second upon seeing the reminder, the choice was randomly made for
them, and participants moved on to the next trial. The intervention was thus closely analogous
to the intervention in Study 2.
In the intervention blocks, the mean deadline was determined separately for each individual,
based on their response times from the first block. As in Study 2, it was defined such that it
would have cut off the slowest 30% of their decisions.1 The actual trial-by-trial deadlines were
slightly jittered on a trial-by-trial basis, resulting in a range of cutoff times, which was equivalent
to the slowest 17.5-42.5 percent of their first-block response times. The “choose now” reminder
on each trial was timed to appear 0.5 seconds before that trial’s deadline.
As in Study 2, the four intervention- and non-intervention blocks were run alternatingly. The
sequence was randomly assigned to participants. Thus, for any given participant, there was
a 50% chance that they were going to experience the blocks in sequence T-I-N-I-N, and a 50%
chance that they would experience them in sequence T-N-I-N-I.
1This heuristic threshold was originally determined based on the analysis of the distribution of response times in
easy vs. hard trials in the first block in our pilot sessions, with the goal that the cutoff affect primarily hard trials, but
not easy trials.
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Instructions  
 
Thank you for participating in today’s study.  
 
Please carefully read the material on the following pages to understand 
• The rules 
• The decisions you will be making today 
 
After you have read the instructions, there will be a few test questions to make sure 
you have understood them well. 
 
If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the experiment, 
please raise your hand quietly and someone will come and assist you. 
 
 
The rules: 
• Please remain silent during the entire study, remain seated at your place, and 
refrain from communicating with anyone.  
• Please check now to ensure that your mobile phone is switched off. It must 
remain switched off for the entire duration of the study.  
• After the study, there will be a 30 minute waiting period. Depending on your 
choices during the study today, you will be able to eat food that you have 
purchased during the study during this time. However, even if you do not acquire 
any food, you must remain in the laboratory during this time and will not be paid 
before the 30 minutes are over. 
• If you choose to leave early, you are free to do so, but then you will not receive a 
payment for today’s study. 
 
Failure to comply with these rules may result in exclusion from the experiment without 
pay and removal from our list of participants for future experiments. 
 
 
About today’s study: 
 
Today you will be making a series of choices about different foods. The study will have 
several parts. You will receive instructions for each of these parts as we move through 
the study. 
 
At the end of the experiment,  
• We will randomly select one of the parts of the study. One of the choices from 
that part will count. You will then receive additional money and/or a food item 
to eat, depending on your choice in that round.   
• You will be required to stay in the laboratory for 30 minutes, during which time 
you can consume any food that you might have received in the payment round.   
• Even if you did not get any food item, or do not consume the food item, you will 
be required to remain in the laboratory for the entire 30 minutes. If you choose 
to leave early, you are free to do so, but then you will not receive a payment for 
today’s study. 
Please continue to read on the next page. 
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Note:  It is impossible for us to ensure that every food item is always available.  If we do 
not currently have your selected food item, then we will randomly choose another 
payment round in which the relevant food item is available.  
 
 
Part 1: Willingness-to-pay for different food items:  
For the first part of the study, you will be shown a series of different foods, one by one.  
Each food will be displayed on the screen for 2 seconds.  You will receive a budget of 
2.50 CHF that you can use to buy food. Then you will be asked how much you would be 
willing to pay to eat that food during the waiting time after the experiment.  
 
To make your choice, use the left and right arrow keys to select your desired willingness-
to-pay and then press the up arrow key to enter your decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remember, only one choice from the whole study will be chosen at the end for payment so you 
do not need to worry about spreading your money over the different food items.  You 
should treat each choice as if it is the only that counts. 
 
Also, you will receive the 2.50 CHF budget only if a round from part 1 is selected at the 
end of the study. If a choice from a later part of the study is randomly selected, then you 
will not receive the 2.50 CHF. 
 
Move the cursor to your 
willingness-to-pay.  
Use the left and right keys to 
move the cursor.  
Please continue to read on the next page. 
Use the up key to 
confirm and move 
to the next screen.  
Irrational Deliberation in Decision-Making
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This part of the study is designed so that it is always in your best interest to tell us 
your true willingness-to-pay for each food item.  Below we describe why this is the 
case. 
 
If one of these rounds is selected at the end for payment, we will pick a random price for 
the chosen food item, from 0 to 2.50 CHF.   
• If the price is less than (or equal to) the willingness-to-pay you gave, then you will 
buy the food item from us at that price and keep whatever money is left.  
• If the price is more than your chosen willingness-to-pay then you will not buy the 
item and you will keep all 2.50 CHF. 
 
Why should you tell us your true willingness-to-pay? 
 
The thing to notice is that you cannot affect the price that you pay for the food.  You can only 
say whether you would be willing to buy the food item at a price that the computer 
randomly chooses.  The price that you pay is the random number and NOT your 
willingness-to-pay.  By lowering your willingness-to-pay you will not be able to affect the 
price that you pay, but might end up losing the opportunity to buy the item at a good 
price.  You should also never raise your willingness-to-pay above your true willingness-
to-pay, since then you could end up paying more for the item than you would want to. 
 
For example, suppose that a food item is worth 2 CHF to you.  If you reveal your true 
value, you will get the item if the random price is 0-2 CHF and pay that lower price. In 
particular, if you had indicated a lower willingness-to-pay, then you would not have paid 
less. You will not get the food item if the price is more than the 2 CHF you indicated. 
 
Thus, it can never improve your situation if you state a willingness-to-pay that is above 
or below your true willingness-to-pay. 
 
 
Later parts of the study 
You will receive separate instructions for the other parts of the study at a later point. 
 
Please note that between the different parts of the study, you will notice your screen 
changing, and may see your computer returning to the Windows desktop briefly. This is 
normal. In these cases, please wait for the study to continue. 
Payment 
Your payment will consist of two parts:  
• A fixed fee of 30CHF for participating in today’s study.  
• Any amount of the 2.50 CHF budget that is left, if a round of part 1 is drawn for 
payment. 
 
 
 
 
Now, please do the comprehension questions on the next page. 
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Comprehension questions  
 
Please answer the following comprehension questions and raise your hand when you are done. We will 
then come by your seat and check your answers, and answer any questions you may still have. 
 
When can you leave after the computerized part of the experiment? 
1. I can leave right away. In this case I will receive the payment, but no food. 
2. I must stay 30 minutes only if I purchase food during the study. 
3. I must stay 30 minutes, no matter whether I purchase food or not, if I want the 
payment.  
 
 
Which of your decisions will count for payment? 
1. Every decision counts. 
2. One of the rounds from part 1 is randomly selected for payment. 
3. One of the rounds from one of the parts of the study will be randomly selected 
for payment.  
 
 
Which of the following statements about part 1 is correct? 
1. If I bid nothing on every round in part 1, I will receive 2.50 CHF guaranteed. 
2. If a decision from a later part of the study is selected for payment, I will receive 
2.50 CHF for part 1. 
3. The 2.50 CHF budget applies only to decisions in part 1 of the study. If a 
different part of the study is selected, I do not receive this budget. 
 
 
Which of the following statements about part 1 are correct?  
Note: There may be more than one correct answer. 
 
1. If I indicate less than my true willingness-to-pay, I might get lucky and get a better 
price than if I indicate my real willingness-to-pay. 
2. If I indicate less than my true willingness-to-pay, this cannot influence how much I 
will pay if I get the item. This is because the price is determined randomly, no 
matter what willingness-to-pay I indicate. I only pay this random price if it is less 
than my willingness-to-pay. 
3. If I indicate less than my true willingness-to-pay, it could be that the random price 
is above what I indicated, but below my true willingness-to-pay. This means I will 
not get the item, even though I could have gotten it for a price below my true 
willingness-to-pay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please raise your hand when you are done with these questions. 
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Instructions for Part 2: Left-or-right choices 
 
Part 2 of the study is divided into 5 blocks. 
 
Each block contains 100 rounds of choice situations, each on a different screen. On each 
screen, you will see two food items. Your task is to choose which of these foods you would like to 
eat at the end of the experiment.  You can choose either the item on the left or on the right, 
by hitting the left arrow key (for the left option) or the right arrow key (for the right 
option).  A white box will appear around your chosen item and then the next round will 
begin.  
 
In some blocks the computer will sometimes display the message “Choose now”. Once 
this message has been displayed, you should make your choice immediately. If you do 
not make your choice within a half-second after the message, the computer will intervene 
and make a choice for you. You will notice this because one of the items will be selected 
without you having pressed a key yourself, and then the next round will begin.  
 
Importantly, you do not need to wait until you see a message saying “Choose now”. You 
can make your choice anytime and as early as you like, even if you have not seen this 
message. However, if the message is displayed, you have only 0.5 seconds left. 
 
Remember that at the end of the study, only one of the choices, which can either be 
from part 1, or from part 2 of the study, will be selected and implemented, and you will 
receive the chosen item during the 30 minute waiting period before the payments are 
made. This means you should carefully consider each choice, and make each choice independently, 
because it may be the only round that matters in the end. 
 
Each block will last 150 seconds. Because the time per block is not unlimited, it is 
possible that you will not have time to reach all 100 decision screens in a block. In this 
case, the computer will help you by making random choices for the rounds that remain. 
This ensures that you will receive a food item even if, in the end, a round is chosen that 
you did not reach. Between choice screens you will briefly see a waiting screen with 
information on how many trials you have completed, and how much time has passed. 
 
When you are done with all 5 blocks, the computer will randomly choose a payment 
round and display your chosen outcome.  When this happens, please raise your hand and 
an experimenter will come and assist you. 
 
Practice Rounds: 
Before the first block begins, there will be 5 practice rounds, so that you can become 
familiar with the way that the program works.  
 
When you have finished reading these instructions, please raise your hand so that we know you are done. 
We will come to your seat and answer any questions you may have. When everyone is done, we will start 
part 2 of the study on your computer. 
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2.5.2 Study 2
Overview
Study 2 mirrors the payoff structure of Study 1, but with a different task.
Participants
42 subjects were recruited to participate in this study, using the online subject recruitment system
of Princeton University’s Psychology Department (“SONA”). Participants were members of
the Princeton community, mostly Princeton University students. The description provided to
participants at sign up was: “You will be asked to make decisions on stimuli presented on
screen. Bonus reward based on performance available.” All procedures were approved by the
Princeton University Institutional Review Board.
Procedure
Participants arrived individually. They were provided consent forms and participant infor-
mation forms to sign, and were then escorted to the experiment room. The instructions were
provided verbally, and redundantly on screen for participants to follow along. Participants
were informed that they were going to be paid $1 for every 1000 points they earned during
the study. For example, a participant with a score of 17232 points would receive 17.00 $.2 The
experimenter stayed with participants while they read the instructions, in order to answer any
questions. Once participants reported they had no further questions, the experimenter left the
room and the main part of the experiment began. After participants had completed the com-
puterized study, they returned to the experimenter’s office to receive their payment, based on
the final score that was displayed on the screen at the end of the experiment.
Task
Each decision screen showed two black areas, in which dots appeared and disappeared in
random locations, much resembling two black fields with twinkling stars. The participants’
task was to identify which of the two fields displayed more of the twinkling stars.
The payment in each trial could be either positive (for correct responses) or negative (for incorrect
responses), with the magnitude of the payment corresponding to half of the difference (left vs.
right) in the number of stars displayed during that trial. Thus, by construction, randomizing
2Due to binding university regulations on minimum participant compensation, we had to ensure that minimum
earnings of 12.00 $ per hour were guaranteed. This meant that subjects earned 12 $ per hour even if they earned less
than 12,000 points.
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produced an expected payoff of zero on any given trial. Due to a typo in the instructions subjects
were actually told that they would receive one point for each star, rather than 0.5 points, but
note that this should not have had any bearing on subjects’ behavior or our analyses, nor did
any subjects report noticing the discrepancy. The star difference could be either 10 (hard trials)
or 80 stars (easy trials). As a result, the expected gain from correctly responding on an easy trial
was higher than the expected gain from getting a hard trial right. Participants earned points
cumulatively for each trial they completed, and these points were later converted to USD at a
rate of 1000 points = 1$.3
Since overall time was limited, and each trial was equally likely to be easy or hard, a sophisticated
participant should treat the duration of their own decision as informative. The longer it takes
to reach a decision, the less likely it is that the current trial is an easy/high stakes trial. Thus if it
is not immediately obvious which side has more stars, a maximizer of expected material benefit
should be willing to move on before reaching certainty. By accepting a more uncertain, but also
more rapid decision, participants would move on to the next trial more quickly, where chances
were 50% that this would be an easy and more lucrative high-stakes trial.
Between any two trials, there was an inter-trial time interval (ITI) of 2 seconds, plus the compu-
tation time required to prepare the next trial.
Experimental conditions
There were two within-subject experimental conditions: intervention blocks and non-intervention
blocks, which will be described in more detail below.
Participants were informed that the study consisted of five blocks of decisions, each of which
lasted for ten minutes, and that each block was limited by time, not by number of trials.
Participants were introduced to the two experimental conditions in the following way:
“On some runs [blocks], there will be a deadline. If you do not respond by the deadline, the
trial will be aborted, and you will earn no points. A short time before the deadline, the stars
will disappear - respond quickly when this happens!”
Between any two blocks there was a mandatory break of at least 60 seconds, though participants
were free to break for longer if they liked.
In what follows, we will refer to the blocks with deadlines as intervention blocks (I), and
those without as non-intervention blocks (N). The non-intervention blocks were structurally
identical to the difference-based pay blocks from Study 3, the only difference being that only
star differences of 10 or 80 occurred. The first of the five blocks was an unpaid trial block (T),
3Payments were rounded down to full Dollar amounts, and could not be lower than 12$, due to university regu-
lations. This gives a payoff function of Payoff = max{b points1000 c, 12}. No participant scored less than 12,000 points, and all
participants finished the experiment within one hour, such that this restriction was never binding.
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and again served to familiarize participants with the task, and was always a non-intervention
block. Its second function was to establish a response time profile for each participant. This
distribution of response times was used to construct the deadlines for the intervention blocks.
Specifically, the mean deadline was set such that it would have cut off the slowest 30% of
responses in the first block. Trial-by-trial deadlines were drawn uniformly from within 50ms of
the mean deadline.
As alluded to above, the intervention was designed to harness the informative nature of response
times themselves. We hypothesized that by cutting off longer trials, the intervention should
affect primarily the hard trials, where it matters least what is chosen, since the subject is close
to indifference between them. This should free up decision time, which can then be used to
reach more of the easy trials, where it matters more what is chosen. Thus, we reasoned that the
intervention should incur only a comparatively small cost on the hard trials, which should be
outweighed by the benefit of reaching more of the lucrative easy trials.
To disentangle the effects of the intervention from the effects of mere task experience, the four
intervention and non-intervention blocks were run alternatingly, and their sequence was coun-
terbalanced across participants. Thus, a random half of participants experienced the blocks in
the sequence T-I-N-I-N, while the other half experienced them in a sequence T-N-I-N-I. Further-
more, since the design also featured non-intervention blocks that followed intervention blocks,
it was possible to measure possible spill-over effects of having experienced the intervention in
the past, on subsequent non-intervention blocks.
On-screen instructions
Participants were given the following set of instructions on-screen. After each line of instruc-
tions, participants had to press a key on the keyboard to see the next set of instructions. The
instructions were the following:
You will gain and lose points based on your responses. At the end of the experiment, you will receive one
dollar for each 1,000 points. If you earn fewer than 12,000 points, however, you will still receive $12.”
“The number of points at stake is equal to the difference between the sides. For example, if there are 55
stars on the left and 45 stars on the right, you will gain 10 points for pressing “a” and lose 10 points for
pressing “l” (since 55 − 45 = 10). If there are 49 and 51 stars, you would gain or lose only 2 points.”
“The experiment will consist of 5 runs, each lasting 10 minutes. Each run is limited by time, not by
number of trials. The faster you respond, the more trials you will see, and the more money you may earn.”
“On some runs, there will be a deadline. If you do not respond by the deadline, the trial will be aborted,
and you will earn no points. A short time before the deadline, the stars will disappear - respond quickly
when this happens!”
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Between runs, there will be a break. You are encouraged to take as long a break as you like, but you must
take at least 60 seconds.”
“If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now.”
2.5.3 Study 3
Overview
Study 3 uses the same task as Study 2, with some small alterations, and with an additional con-
dition that featured a different incentive structure. This study was thus designed to investigate
whether subjects would respond to changes in the incentive structure that modify how lucrative
it is, comparatively speaking, to invest time into easy vs. hard trials.
Participants
42 subjects were recruited through a Princeton University online subject-recruitment system
called the Psych Paid Studies blog. The description provided to subjects at sign up was:
“You will be asked to make decisions on stimuli presented on screen. Bonus reward based
on performance available.” This study was run at Green Hall and the Princeton Neuroscience
Institute at Princeton University, in July 2013 and January 2014. All procedures were approved
by the Princeton University Institutional Review Board.
Procedure
Participants arrived individually. They were provided consent forms and participant infor-
mation forms to sign, and were then escorted to the experiment room. The instructions were
provided verbally, and redundantly on screen for participants to follow along. Participants
were informed that they were going to be paid $1 for every 1000 points they earned during the
study. For example, a participant with a score of 17232 points would receive 17.00 USD.4 On
average, participants earned 12.95 USD. The experimenter stayed with participants while they
read the instructions, in order to answer any questions. Once participants reported they had no
further questions, the experimenter left the room and the main part of the experiment began.
After participants had completed the computerized study, they returned to the experimenter’s
4Due to binding university regulations on minimum participant compensation, we had to ensure that minimum
earnings of 12.00 USD per hour were guaranteed. This meant that subjects earned 12 USD per hour even if they earned
less than 12,000 points.
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office to receive their payment, based on the final score that was displayed on the screen at the
end of the experiment.
Task
The computerized part of the study was programmed using Psychtoolbox / MATLAB running
on iMac computers. The source code is available upon request from the authors. The experiment
was divided into five blocks. In each block, there was a fixed overall amount of time (10 minutes),
during which participants were free to spend as much time as they liked on any particular trial.
On each trial, the screen was black, except for two circular areas in which white dots randomly
appeared and disappeared, giving a resemblance of “twinkling stars” (see screenshot in Figure
1 of the main article).
Possible star locations within each field were drawn randomly, under the constraint that no
two stars could overlap. During each 50ms timestep, each star was either lit or unlit. An unlit
location had a 40% chance of becoming lit in the subsequent timestep, while a lit location has
a 10% chance of becoming unlit. This means that the stimulus was inherently noisy, and on
average 80% of the stars would be lit at a time.
Participants’ task was to indicate whether they thought the left or the right side of the screen
contained more stars, using two buttons on the computer keyboard. As soon as they had hit one
of these buttons, the trial ended. Between any two trials, there was an inter-trial time interval
(ITI) of 1 second, plus the computation time required to prepare the next trial.
Experimental conditions
After the instructions had been read on screen and all questions had been answered, an unpaid
trial block (T) began, in order for participants to familiarize with the task. Four paid blocks
followed. As alluded to above, there were two types of blocks – those with fixed (F) or difference-
based (D) payment schedules. For half of participants, the block-type sequence was TFFDD, for
the others it was TDDFF.
On each trial, participants could either gain or lose a specific number of points, which we will
call the “stake” for that trial. Participants were informed that in the F condition, the stake to be
gained or lost was 25 points on every trial, regardless of how many stars there were. In contrast,
in the D condition, the stake corresponded to the difference in the number of stars on the left vs.
right side of the screen of the current trial. For example, if there were 55 stars on the left and
45 stars on the right, the participant would gain 10 points for pressing the key corresponding
to the left and lose 10 points for pressing the key corresponding to the right (since 55-45=10).
Since participants did not know the number of dots in advance, on every trial, they had to infer
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these stakes based on the stimuli on screen. The difference in the number of stars displayed in
the left. vs. right half of the screen in Study 3 could be either 10 or 24.
On-screen instructions
Participants were given the following set of instructions on-screen. After each line of instruc-
tions, participants had to press a key on the keyboard to see the next set of instructions. The
instructions were the following:
“In each trial, press “a” if there are more stars on the left, and “l” if there are more stars on the right.
Press any key to see a sample now.” (This was followed by an example stimulus that lasted until the
subject pressed a key).
“You will gain and lose points based on your responses. At the end of the experiment, you will receive one
dollar for each 1,000 points. If you earn fewer than 12,000 points, however, you will still receive $12”
“The experiment will consist of 5 runs, each lasting 10 minutes. The first run is for practice and is not
worth any points. In the remaining runs, you will receive points in a way that will be explained.”
“Between runs, there will be a break. You are encouraged to take as long a break as you like, but you must
take at least 30 seconds.”
The following instruction was provided prior to the fixed payment blocks: “In this part of the
experiment, you will receive 25 for each correct response, and lose -25 points for each incorrect response.”
For the difference-based payment blocks, the following instruction was provided: “In this part
of the experiment, the number of points at stake is equal to the difference between the sides. For example,
if there are 55 stars on the left and 45 stars on the right, you will gain 10 points for pressing “a” and lose
10 points for pressing “l” (since 55-45=10). If there are 49 and 51 stars, you would gain or lose only 2
points.”
“If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now.”
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2.6 Appendix II: Supplementary results and robustness checks
2.6.1 Detailed Regression tables
Supplementary Information  Oud, Krajbich, Miller, Cheong, Botvinick and Fehr (2014) 
 
 
 
2 Supplementary results and robustness checks 
2.1 Detailed Regression tables  
 
 log(RT) 
Abs. difference in WTP 
between choice options -0.218*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 2735 
 
Number of clusters  
(= number of subjects) 
49 
 
Regression constant 
included 
 
Yes 
Table S1: Regressions of response times on WTP difference in Study 1. Mixed-effects regression, estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Model: !"# !"!" = !! + !!(∆!)!" + !! + !!", where ! is an index for the trial, !! is an 
individual-specific noise term of individual !, and !!" is a general noise term. Standard errors clustered at the 
subject level. One observation is one trial of one participant (only human choices). p-values in parentheses * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
Table 2.1: Regressions of response times on WTP difference in Study 1. Mixed-effects regression, est mat d
by maximum likelihood. Model: log(rti j) = β0 + β1(∆ v)i j + ηi + i j where j is an index for the t ial, ηi is
an individual-specific noise term of individual i, and i j is a ge eral noise term. St ndard errors clustered
at the subject level. One observation is one trial of one particip nt ( ly human choices). p-values in
parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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 Study 3: log(RT) 
easy trial (d) -0.117
*** ! 
(0.000) 
  
Difference-based pay (d) -0.0291 ! (0.501) 
  
Interaction: easy X 
Difference-based pay (d) 
0.00848 ! 
(0.430) 
Observations 42198 
Number of clusters  
(= number of subjects) 42 
Regression constant 
included Yes 
Table S3: Mixed-effects regression capturing how log response times respond to condition and trial difficulty in 
Study 3. Model: !"# !"!" = !! + !!!"#$!" + !!!"#$%&%"#!" + !!!"#$!" ∗ !"#$%&%"#!" + !! + !!", where ! 
is an index for the trial, !! is an individual-specific noise term of individual !, and !!" is a general noise term. 
Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. First block excluded from 
analysis. p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.2: Mixed-effects regression capturing how log response times respond to condition and trial
difficulty in Study 3. Model: log(rti j) = β0 + β1easyi j + β2condition + β3easyi jconditioni j + vi + i j, where j
is an index for the trial, vi is an individual-specific noise term of individual i, and i j is a general noise
term. Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. First block
excluded from analysis. p-values in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. (d) signifies binary
(dummy) variables.
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Studies 1 and 2: Mixed-effects regressions of material benefit on intervention.  
 
 Study 1: CHF per trial  Study 2: points per block 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Block number: 
integer (2 to 5) 
capturing when 
block was shown 
0.0133*** ! 
(0.000) 
0.00736*** 
(0.002) 
0.00736*** !(0.
002) 
 
61.86*** !(0
.000) 
57.78*** ! 
(0.000) 
57.78*** ! 
(0.000) 
        
Nonintervention 
block (d), 
excluding block 1 
-0.0169*** ! 
(0.000) ! ! 
 -
76.28** !(0.
035) 
! ! 
        
Nonintervention 
block, pre 
intervention (d), 
excluding block 1 
! -0.0430
*** ! 
(0.000) 
-0.0355*** ! 
(0.000) 
 
! -95.90
* ! 
(0.081) 
-26.32 ! 
(0.685) 
        
Nonintervention 
block, post 
intervention (d) 
! -0.00747 ! (0.185) ! 
 
! -69.58 ! (0.102) ! 
        
intervention 
block (d) ! ! 
0.00747 ! 
(0.185) 
 ! ! 69.58 ! (0.102) 
        
Observations 196 196 196  160 160 160 
Number of 
clusters 
(=number of 
participants) 
49 49 49 
 
40 40 40 
Regression 
constant included Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table S2: Mixed-effects model: ! = !!!" + !! + !!", where ! is a vector of coefficients, !!" is the vector of 
regressors in trial ! of individual !, !!  is an individual-specific noise term, and !!"  is a general noise term. 
Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. First block excluded from 
analysis. For Study 1 (cols 1-3), the dependent variable ! is the blockwise mean surplus, in CHF per trial. Since 
there were 100 trials per block, conversion to the block level requires multiplying by 100. For study 2 (cols 4-6), 
the dependent variable ! is cumulative surplus per block, in points, since every trial was paid in full (1000 points = 
1 USD). Before regressing, the data was first collapsed to obtain blockwise mean surplus for each participant, 
resulting in four data points per participant (representing blocks 2-5). P-values in parentheses. These p-values 
relate to two-sided tests of the null hypothesis that the respective coefficient is zero. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01. (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables.  
  
Table 2.3: ixed-effects model: y = βxi j + vi + i j, where β is a vector of coefficients, xi j is the vector
of regressors in trial j of individual i, vi is an individual-specific noise term, and i j is a general noise
term. Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. First block
excluded from analysis. For Study 1 (cols 1-3), the dependent variable y is the blockwise mean surplus,
in CHF per trial. Since there were 100 trials per block, conversion to the block level requires multiplying
by 100. For study 2 (cols 4-6), the depe dent variable y is cumulative surplus per block, in points, since
every trial was paid in full (1000 points = 1 USD). Before regre sing, the dat first collapsed to btain
blockwise mean surplus for ach participant, resulting in four data points per participant (re resenti g
blocks 2-5). P-values in parentheses. These p-values relate to two-sided tests of the null hypothesis that
the respective coefficient is zero. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables.
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2.6.2 Study 3 robustness check: analysis based on means, with alternative
treatment of RT outliers.
In Study 3, we observed a few trials in which participants’ response times were very large –
e.g. one participant had a response time of >90s on one of the trials. Since such rare and
dramatic outliers are likely caused by distractions or other interruptions of the task, rather than
the nature of the task itself, we used a median-based analysis in the main article (as medians
are less sensitive to extreme outliers). Alternatively, one might analyze the means of the data.
In this case, an alternative way to deal with outliers could be to exclude all data from trials in
which response times are >3sd larger than the overall mean. Since the mean (sd) of response
times was 1.286s (1.755s), this would affect all trials with RTs larger than 6.551s, resulting in an
exclusion of 469/42198 trials (1.11% of the data).
The mean-based analogy to the median-based analysis performed in the main article then yields
the following results.
If we restrict our attention to only the first two blocks (akin to a between-subjects design), we
find that the ratio (mean rt in hard trials)/(mean rt in easy trials) is 1.156 (n = 21, sd = 0.1071) in
the F treatment, and 1.147 (n = 21, d = 0.0974) in the D treatment. To account for the possible
non-normality of the distribution of this ratio, we performed a nonparametric equivalent of the
t-test (a two-sample Mann-Whitney rank-sum test), which failed to reject the null hypothesis
that the ratios were equal across the two conditions (z = −0.566, p=0.5714).
Next, we investigated whether this null finding persisted in our within-subject data, by analyz-
ing all four paid blocks. Figure 2.5 (page 40) shows, for each subject individually, the change
in the ratio (mean rt in hard trials)/(mean rt in easy trials), across conditions. Precisely half of the
subjects (21/42) shifted in the predicted direction, while the other half shifted in the opposite
direction. Visually, the magnitudes of the changes were also symmetric around zero.
To investigate this statistically, we ran a mixed-effects regression, in which we regressed log(RT)
on binary variables for trial difficulty and payment scheme to capture main effects, as well as
an interaction term between the two (Table 2.4, page 39). Importantly, the coefficient of this
interaction term was not significantly different from zero (p = 0.744), so we have no evidence
that subjects responded to the change in payment scheme. Only the coefficient for trial difficulty
was significantly different from zero (p < 0.001), indicating that subjects completed easy trials
more rapidly than hard trials.
This complementary mean-based analysis thus closely mirrors the results obtained in the
median-based analysis that is reported in the main article.
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Figure S1: Change in the ratio of mean hard / mean easy RTs for the difference-based (D) pay condition minus the 
fixed (F) pay condition.  Each bar represents one subject. A positive bar indicates a subject who spent relatively 
more time on hard trials in the D condition (compared to F), while a negative bar indicates the opposite. Note that 
trials with RTs > 3sd larger than the overall mean RT were removed as outliers. 
 
 
 Study 3: log(rt) 
  
easy trial (d) -0.103
*** ! 
(0.000) 
  
Difference-based 
pay (d) 
-0.0231 ! 
(0.584) 
  
Interaction:  
easy X Difference-
based pay (d) 
0.00338 ! 
(0.744) 
 
Observations 
 
41729 
Number of clusters  
(=number of 
participants) 
42 
Regression constant 
included Yes 
  
Table S4 Study 3: Mixed-effects regression capturing how log response times respond to condition and trial 
difficulty, with outliers excluded. Mixed-effects model: !"# !"!" = !! + !!!"#$!" + !!!"#$%&%"#!" +!!!"#$!" ∗ !"#$%&%"#!" + !! + !!", where ! is in index for the trial, !! is an individual-specific noise term of 
individual !, and !!" is a general noise term. Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level. First block excluded from analysis. p-values in parentheses. Excludes trials where !" >! "#$(!") !+ !!"# as outliers. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables. 
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Each bar represents one participant
Change in the ratio rt_hard/rt_easy, for D minus F condition
Response of rt allocation to conditions
Table 2.4: Study 3: Mixed-effects regression capturing how log r sponse times respond to condition and
trial difficulty, with outliers excluded. Mixed-effects model: log(rti j) = β0 +β1easyi j +β2conditioni j +β3easyi j ∗
conditioni j + vi + i j where j is in index for the trial, vi is an individual-specific noise term of individual
i, and i j is a general noise term. Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at
the individual level. First block excluded from analysis. p-values in parentheses. Excludes tr als wher
rt > mean(rt) + 3sd as outliers. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables.
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Figure S1: Change in the ratio of mean hard / mean easy RTs for the difference-based (D) pay condition minus the 
fixed (F) pay condition.  Each bar represents one subject. A positive bar indicates a subject who spent relatively 
more time on hard trials in the D condition (compared to F), while a negative bar indicates the opposite. Note that 
trials with RTs > 3sd larger than the overall mean RT were removed as outliers. 
 
 
 Study 3: log(rt) 
  
easy trial (d) -0.103
*** ! 
(0.000) 
  
Difference-based 
pay (d) 
-0.0231 ! 
(0.584) 
  
Interaction:  
easy X Difference-
based pay (d) 
0.00338 ! 
(0.744) 
 
Observations 
 
41729 
Number of clusters  
(=number of 
participants) 
42 
Regression constant 
included Yes 
  
Table S4 Study 3: Mixed-effects regression capturing how log response times respond to condition and trial 
difficulty, with outliers excluded. Mixed-effects model: !"# !"!" = !! + !!!"#$!" + !!!"#$%&%"#!" +!!!"#$!" ∗ !"#$%&%"#!" + !! + !!", where ! is in index for the trial, !! is an individual-specific noise term of 
individual !, and !!" is a general noise term. Estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level. First block excluded from analysis. p-values in parentheses. Excludes trials where !" >! "#$(!") !+ !!"# as outliers. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables. 
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Figure 2.5: Change in the ratio of mean hard / mean easy RTs for the diff rence-based (D) pay condition
minus the fixed (F) pay condition. Each bar repre ents one subject. A positive bar indicates a subject who
spent relatively more time on hard trials in the D condition (compared to F), while a negative bar indicates
the opposite. Note that trials with RTs > 3sd larger than the overall mean RT were removed as outliers.
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Chapter 3
Avoiding Responsibility
An experimental investigation of the (dis-)utility
associated with making allocative decisions
which affect third parties.
This chapter was written by myself. The research reported in this chapter was designed jointly
with Ernst Fehr. I would like to thank Lynna Jirpongopas for her assistance in conducting the
experiment.
This chapter has not been published elsewhere.
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Abstract
People in positions of power make decisions that affect more than just their own payoff. In
hierarchical organizations, executives make decisions that affect the fortunes of their subordi-
nates, politicians make decisions that affect their constituents, and parents make decisions that
strongly determine the lives of their children. Recent research has suggested that decision-
makers may attach intrinsic utility to the retention of authority in decisions that affect third
parties, in addition to the decision-maker. Here, we investigate a possible countervailing mo-
tive: responsibility aversion. This is a desire to avoid being seen as causal for outcomes that
affect third parties. We present evidence from an experimental study in which decision-makers
have the power to make decisions that affect which of two recipients receives a fixed stake in a
zero-sum game. Alternatively, the decision-maker can relinquish control and let the decision be
made by a random device. We find a positive willingness to pay for randomizing, thus implying
a disutility associated with exerting active control over the recipients’ payoffs. This aversion
to control is increased when the zero-sum game involves the allocation of a loss (rather than a
gain), and when recipients are informed (vs. not informed) about whether the allocation was
the result of a decision-maker or a computer decision. This suggests that there is a responsibility
aversion motive at work that may (depending on circumstances) counteract the intrinsic utility
associated with authority.
3.1 Introduction
The essence of power is the ability to influence the allocation of resources in society. While there
are obvious instrumental motives for valuing the ownership of decision rights, recent research
has demonstrated that in addition, decision-makers assign a positive non-instrumental value to
the retention of decision rights (see e.g. Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2013) and Bartling, Fehr,
and Herz (2014)). Since the attainment of power can enable access to resources in the future in
as-yet unpredictable ways, it makes intuitive sense that the human motivational system may
value, as a rule of thumb, the acquisition of power even in circumstances where direct material
benefits of obtaining this power are not clear.1
While there is good evidence that the acquisition and retention of decision-rights can be intrin-
1Refer to Bartling, Fehr, and Herz, 2014 and references therein, who in their introduction enumerate psychological
and philosophical theories arguing that power and the retention of decision rights may be a basic human need, such
as motivation theory (e.g. McClelland, 1975), and conduct an experiment to incentive-compatibly measure a non-
instrumental valuation for retaining decision rights.
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sically motivating, there may also be a flipside, because, to borrow the immortally insightful
words of Stan Lee’s Spider-Man,2 “with great power comes great responsibility”. Put differently:
to the extent that someone’s decisions are causal for an outcome, they must also deal with
the attribution of responsibility for them — and in some contexts this responsibility may be
experienced as aversive (Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann, 2011).
In the present work, we investigate this aversion to responsibility experimentally. We exposed
decision-makers to a situation in which they could either directly choose which of two passive
recipients received a given stake (the other’s payoffs remaining unaffected), or otherwise avoid
making the choice by delegating to a random mechanism. Consistently with the existence of a
responsibility aversion motive (Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann, 2011), our decision-makers
exhibited a positive willingness to pay (WTP) for delegating to the random mechanism, thus
avoiding direct agency in the choice. This strongly suggests that decision-makers experienced
aversion to retaining agency in the context of our study. We further found that this WTP
significantly increased when losses, rather than gains were allocated, and that it was significantly
higher when the recipients knew whether the allocation was due to randomization, or the
decision-maker’s active choice. Thus, the magnitude of responsibility aversion depended on
both the consequences for those affected, and the degree to which those affected were able to
attribute the consequences to the decision-maker.
These results do not question previous empirical findings that people typically like power and
frequently seek to retain decision rights. However, responsibility aversion may coexist and
sometimes act as a countervailing motive — particularly in contexts where decisions hurt third
parties, and they are able to attribute these consequences to the decision-maker.
3.1.1 Definitions: control, agency and responsibility
To pre-empt a semantic quagmire, some brief definitions are in order. By the term responsibility,
I mean the attribution of control to an actor, which of course raises the question as to what is meant
by control. By control, I mean how much of a difference it makes for the outcome, what the principal
does. Control, in this sense, can thus be measured as the degree of conditionality of an outcome
on a principal’s actions. That is, control is how much more likely it is that an outcome x will
result if the principal performs action a, than if the principal does not perform a:3
Degree of Control = p(outcome x|action a) − p(outcome x|not action a)
2Among other places, this quotation appears in the 2002 movie adaptation Spider-Man (Raimi, 2002), though similar
sayings have of course been around for much longer. Refer to Genter, 2007 for a brief historical discussion.
3This definition of control is based on how Dahl (1957) formalizes the concept of power. The difference between
power and control is essentially not a formal difference, but pertains to what kind of things x the control is over. Power is
essentially control over the actions of others.
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Although for many purposes subtle semantic distinctions between terms such as agency, control
and causality may be of paramount importance, these distinctions will add little to our inves-
tigation here, and so I will permit myself the luxury of using them interchangeably.4 Thus, for
the purpose of this article, the degree of agency will be treated as the same thing as the degree
of control.
3.1.2 The avoidance of responsibility
Having thus defined responsibility as the attributed degree of control for an outcome, we return
to the question of whether there might be cases where decision-makers might seek to avoid
it. For straightforward reasons, this is particularly plausible in cases where the outcomes are
likely to be unpopular. There is indeed evidence that decision-makers strategically introduce
intermediaries (Paharia et al. (2009) call them secondary agents) in such situations, in order to
reduce their perceived responsibility for a given outcome, while still retaining the benefits
inherent therein. For example, Paharia et al. (2009) report on a case where Merck, a large
pharmaceutical company, rather than increasing the price for two of their drugs themselves,
sold the right to market them to a smaller and less well-known company, who subsequently
increased the price, conjecturing that “Merck presumably profited from the increased price to
consumers, either through its sale price to Ovation or its revenues from manufacturing the
drugs.” (p. 134). Although we can only speculate on the precise motives, it is at least possible
that Merck did this strategically, in order to retain the profit from an unpopular price hike, while
avoiding the perception of direct responsibility, by engaging an intermediary.
Do such exercises in “blame-shifting” actually work? In line with this, experimental research by
Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) shows that principals indeed anticipate repercussions of self-
serving decisions that come at the expense of others, and will sometimes strategically delegate
such decisions to an intermediary agent. Indeed, Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) find that this
behavior can result in a substantial portion of the blame for negative outcomes being attributed
to the intermediary agent, rather than the principal – suggesting that responsibility may in fact
be diffused5 through this form of indirect agency.
Bartling and Fischbacher (2012)’s measure of blame attribution consists of the amount of (finan-
cial) punishment that the affected third parties administer to the principal, vs. the agent. This
results in a clear (instrumental) pecuniary incentive to shift the blame in the context of their
study. We ask here whether additional nonpecuniary motives such as guilt or shame aversion
4Also, for a review of the psychological literature on the related concept of accountability, see Lerner and Tetlock
(1999). Accountability is there defined as “the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s
beliefs, feelings and actions to others” (page 225). See also Scott and Lyman, 1968. Thus accountability may or may not
be a consequence of perceived responsibility, but the two concepts are not identical, since one may feel responsible even
in the absence of a potentially judging third party.
5The term “diffusion of responsibility” is famously also used in Darley and Latane’s 1968 discussion of the “bystander
effect”.
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might exist that could have produced similar blame-avoiding behavior even in the absence of retal-
iatory options for the affected parties. These motives are of course not mutually exclusive and can
coexist, reinforcing each other. For example, principals may intrinsically dislike being perceived
as responsible for the negative outcome by third parties (shame), or perhaps more subtly, may
intrinsically dislike perceiving themselves as being responsible even if this responsibility remains
unknown to others (guilt).6 The experiment reported here investigates such situations that lack
the feature of explicit retaliatory options for those affected.7
For a hypothetical example that illustrates such dilemmas, consider a situation in which there
are two mortally ill children, both of which will die for sure without medication.8 Suppose
there is only one indivisible dose of a medication that cures the illness, and a decision must
be made as to which of the children should receive it. This decision could be made actively
by a doctor, who would then retain full agency for the choice, or the doctor could delegate the
decision to another person, or to a random device of some sort (such as flipping a coin). Here,
relinquishing direct agency in favor of a coin flip may afford the doctor some dispersion of the
perceived responsibility for the choice – which may otherwise have been attributed to him either
by third parties who observe his choice (potentially triggering shame), or by the doctor to himself
(potentially triggering guilt).
Stated choice in a battery of hypothetical dilemma scenarios much like this are investigated
by Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann (2011) in a series of survey-based studies.9 They find
that “As hypothesized, in each scenario, uncertain options leading to outcomes determined by
chance were preferred over certain options leading to outcomes determined by choice, despite
the uncertain options lacking the possibility of lessening the loss.” (page 408). A separate group
of participants was invited to rate how they would feel if they chose the certain vs. uncertain
options presented in the dilemma scenarios. Participants stated that they would feel more
accountable and guilty, and that they would blame themselves more if they chose the certain
option than the uncertain option. The authors surmise that this suggests that the recipients
experienced a stronger feeling of responsibility for the outcome when actively determining the
certain outcome, as opposed to randomizing, and that what they call responsibility aversion may
hence underlie the stated preference for choosing options that are less certain. To the extent that
such a motive plays a measurable role also in non-hypothetical choices, with real stakes, this
6I use the terms shame and guilt in accordance with the anthropological convention that “shame is a more ‘public’
emotion than guilt.” (this quotation is from Tangney and Dearing, 2004, p. 14, though also see the discussion of shame
and guilt as emotions that follows, and documents that there is controversy about the best way to characterize these
two emotions.)
7Of course, it is possible that participants later retaliate outside of the context of the study. We mitigate this by
recording which of the participants already knew eachother from outside of the study. All results reported in this article
fully hold when excluding all observations where the interaction involves people who know each other.
8This example is based on the similar, though slightly more complex example of “Dr. Chang’s problem”, as it is
discussed in Sen (1997), page 985.
9For example, participants are presented with the following hypothetical choice (Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann
(2011), p. 408): Missile problem. “A nuclear missile has malfunctioned over a region in the USA. You have two options. You can
push Button A and the missile will fall to the ground killing residents of Town S. Or you can push Button B and the missile will
fall to the ground killing residents of Town R or H, you cannot be sure which. Which button do you push?”
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may constitute a motive that may reduce the proclivity to exert direct agency in certain contexts.
The present research picks up on this point, and differs from Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann’s
(2011) study in several respects. First, the decisions in our experiment are non-hypothetical —
that is, we use real financial incentives for both the decision-makers and those affected by their
decisions. Second, we use this to develop a direct and incentive-compatible monetary measure for the
magnitude of the preference — namely the willingness to pay for randomizing. Third, in order
to better understand what determines this preference, we experimentally vary two dimensions:
(1) whether recipients are informed about the agency of the decision-maker, and (2) the sign and
magnitude of the stakes that a decision-maker is allocating among the recipients.
We find that the willingness to pay for randomization was clearly positive in the context of our
experiment (which will be described in more detail below). We also find that both treatment
dimensions mattered significantly.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 3.2 conceptually introduces the ex-
perimental design and develops hypotheses. The methods for implementing this design are
discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the results. Finally, section 3.6 concludes, points
out open questions and discusses some possible follow-up work.
3.2 Design
3.2.1 Basic design
In our experiment, there were two types of participants: decision-makers and recipients, the
decision-makers being the ones whose behavior we were interested in.
In each trial, the decision-maker D was randomly matched with two recipients A and B. One of
these two recipients was going to receive a given stake x, while the other was going to receive
zero. The decision-maker could now either actively decide which of the two participants
received a given stake x for that round (thus retaining full control for the outcome), or delegate
that decision to a random mechanism (thus avoiding direct control over the outcome). The
decision-maker’s payment yD was independent of which recipient the stake was allocated
to, but depended on whether the decision-maker actively made the allocation (in which case
yD = z > x), or randomized (in which case yD = z > x + c). The decision-maker’s payments for
choosing vs. randomizing hence differed by c, which we call the agency price. The recipients A
and B remained completely passive, simply observing the outcome of the choices. The game
tree in Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic setup and payoffs.
Note that by construction the degree of control, in the sense defined above, is 1 if the decision-
maker decides to choose himself, while it is zero if the decision-maker randomizes in at his first
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Figure 3.1: The game that was used to elicit the WTP for control.
decision node.10
Key measure of interest
Our design intended to identify the agency price that made the decision-maker indifferent
between actively choosing and randomizing. We call this point of indifference the willingess to
pay for control WTPcontrol.
Definition 1. Willingess to pay for control / for randomization
The willingess to pay for control is defined as the value c∗ that makes the decision-maker in-
different between choosing or not choosing. That is, if the decision-maker’s utility is modeled as
UD(yD, yA, yB|degree of control), where yD is the decision-maker’s material income, yA is the income
10Since strategies must contain a full specification for each information set, we must specify both what
the decision-maker does in his agency-decision node, and in the left decision node. We therefore obtain:
p(A|retain control, choose A if the left decision node is reached)− p(A|retain control, choose B if the left decision node is reached) =
1−0, and p(A|randomize, choose A if the left decision node is reached)−p(A|randomize, choose B if the left decision node is reached) =
0.5 − 0.5 = 0.
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of participant A and yB is the income of participant B, then c∗ satisfies the following:
WTPcontrol = c∗ such that
UD(z, yA, yB)|retain control) = UD(z + c∗, yA, yB)|let computer randomize)
For convenience, we also define the willingess to pay for randomization, which is the same thing, but
with a flipped sign.
WTPrand = (−1) ×WTPcontrol
3.2.2 Treatments
We will compare WTPrand across 2x2 factorial within-participants treatments, in which the two
independent variables were “payoff sign” and “disclosure of control”. Table 3.1 illustrates the
four resulting treatments.
These dimensions can be interpreted as follows. The first treatment dimension, payoff sign,
captures whether the decision-maker is allocating a gain or a loss. In the GAINS condition, a
positive stake x > 0 will be allocated. Thus, one of the two recipients will receive a positive stake,
while the other will receive zero. In the LOSSES condition, the stake will be negative (x < 0).
Thus, one of the two recipients will lose a given amount, while the other will not.
The second dimension, disclosure of control, captures whether the recipients are informed about
the decision-maker’s agency, i.e. about whether the allocation was chosen directly by the
decision-maker, or by randomization. In the INFORMED condition the recipients will not only
be informed whether they received / lost the stake, but also whether this was the result of a direct
decision-maker choice, or of a random computer decision. In the UNINFORMED condition,
the recipients will also be informed about whether they received / lost the stake. They will,
however, not be informed about whether the decision-maker made this choice, or whether it
was a random computer decision.11
11Note that the game from figure 3.1 accurately represents only the INFORMED treatment. Figure 3.7 on page 76
illustrates the ambiguity faced by the recipients in this case by grouping identical outcomes into the same information
set (members of the same information set are connected by a dashed line).
48
Hypotheses
GAINS
positive stakes x > 0
LOSSES
negative stakes x > 0
INFORMED
recipients informed
about agency
9 trials,
varying stake
sizes
9 trials,
varying stake
sizes
UNINFORMED
recipients not informed
about agency
9 trials,
varying stake
sizes
9 trials,
varying stake
sizes
Table 3.1: Overview of the four within-participant treatments.
3.3 Hypotheses
In our setting, the decision-maker could not influence the height of the payment that was
allocated to either one or the other participant, but only allocated a fixed stake x to one or the
other recipient. An unequal outcome was thus necessarily going to result, irrespective of the
decision-maker’s or the computer’s choice. Thus, absent any other information about income
differences between the recipients A and B, inequality aversion in the sense defined by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) should not play a role for a decision-maker’s allocative decision between A and
B, for any fixed level of the decision-maker’s payment.
The decision-maker could, however, condition his agency decision on the agency price c, and
thereby impact his own material benefit. Straightforwardly, a selfish material income maximizer
would therefore be indifferent at c = 0, prefer to randomize if c > 0, and prefer to make the
allocation choice himself if c < 0. Since the sum of payments for recipients A and B is kept
constant regardless of the decision-maker’s control, the same choice rule would apply for a
decision-maker who intends to maximize efficiency (i.e. the overall sum of payments). decision-
makers with inequality aversion should follow the same choice rule, provided their utility is
still monotonic in their own outcome even in cases of advantageous inequality, as is the case
in the standard empirical calibration of the parameters (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Thus, for a
narrowly bracketing decision-maker, all of the above models predict that c∗ = 0.
Work by Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2013) may also be used to generate alternative hypotheses,
though their work does not translate 1:1 into our setting, since it concerns authority, rather
than control per se. In the context of an experimental study in which a principal can decide
to either retain decision rights or delegate them to a third party, Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening
(2013) found that principals tended to retain the decision right even when this was not in their
material interest. They interpret this to signify that authority entails a nonpecuniary component
to decision-makers’ utility. If this valuation of authority were based exclusively on a positive
valuation of control per se, one would expect that WTPcontrol > 0. However, it is important
to point out that there are some conceptual differences between authority, as used in Fehr,
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Herz, and Wilkening (2013), versus control, as we define it in our study, which make such
an extrapolation difficult. First, in their authority-delegation game, the delegation of decision
rights was to another human counterpart, whereas in our case, the abandoned decision rights
are “delegated” to an impersonal random mechanism, implemented by the computer. Thus,
in our setting, no other person simultaneously gains the decision rights that are abandoned.
Therefore, if principals intrinsically dislike it when other people gain the decision rights that the
principal abandons, then this will add to the valuation of authority in their setting, but not affect
WTPcontrol in ours. Second, the payment structure in their authority-delegation game entailed
a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, in that there is one outcome that is
best for the principal, while another is best for the agent. Since we are interested in control vs.
chance, our random “agent” here is impersonal, such that the conflict of interest is purposefully
absent in our design. To the extent that incentive conflicts increased the dislike of delegating
authority, they represent a positive impact on the valuation of authority, but not on WTPcontrol
in our setting. Based on this, one would expect the intrinsic valuation of control in the narrow
sense we use here to be just one of several possible components that might affect the intrinsic
valuation of the broader concept of authority.
In contrast, based on the theory of responsibility aversion (Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann, 2011),
one would expect that WTPcontrol < 0, or equivalently, WTPrand > 0. Since we expect that our
incentivized decision situations most closely resemble those presented, albeit hypothetically, by
Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann (2011), we expected this outcome to be most likely. Further,
we expected that the motives underlying responsibility aversion would be heightened if the
decision-maker is making a decision with unpopular consequences – such that WTPrand would
be higher when allocating a loss, than when allocating a gain. Further, since the consequence
is unambiguously attributable to the decision-maker only in the INFORMED condition, we
expected that WTPrand would be higher in this condition, than in the UNINFORMED condition.
Finally, since the emotion of shame (unlike guilt) hinges on the observability of one’s own actions
by third parties, we expected the difference between the INFORMED and UNINFORMED
conditions to be stronger for participants who were particularly shame-prone.
Thus, in summary, we formed the following hypotheses:
1. The overall WTP to retain control will be negative — i.e. there will be a positive WTP to
randomize.
2. The WTP to randomize will be larger when the stakes are negative (i.e. the decision-maker
is allocating a loss to one of the participants) than when the stakes are positive (i.e. the
decision-maker is allocating a gain to one of the participants).
3. The observability of control will increase the decision-makers’ willingness to pay for
randomization, relative to the case where their control is not observable.
4. A high degree of shame-proneness will exacerbate the effect of observability.
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Figure 3.2: This figure describes the sequence of events participants encountered in the study.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Participants
102 participants (56 male, 46 female, average age 25) were recruited from a participant pool
maintained by the “University Registration Center for Study Participants” at the University of
Zurich, Switzerland. This pool is comprised primarily of students attending the University of
Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. The use of this system precludes
multiple participations in any given study by the same person. The study was run at the BLU
Lab at the University of Zurich, across four sessions in August 2013. The sample size was
determined endogenously by the number of participants that showed up for the four sessions
for which we had approved funding.
3.4.2 Procedure
Figure 3.2 gives an overview of the sequence of events to which participants were exposed
during the study.
Participants were randomly assigned to seat numbers, which were used throughout the study
to identify participants. They received written instructions (see appendix, page 85) detailing the
procedures and rules for the study, and gave written informed consent for participating in the
study. Participants then had to complete a multiple choice comprehension test (see appendix,
page 89). An assistant checked their answers and answered any remaining questions until
all comprehension questions were responded to correctly. Once consent had been provided
and they had correctly completed the comprehension test, we took a facial photograph of the
participants, in which the seat number could be seen, for later matching purposes. Participants
learned from the instructions that these photographs were going to be used in the study to
represent them. The computerized part of the study, implemented using Z-Tree (Fischbacher,
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2007), then began, during which decision-makers made their decisions and recipients passively
observed the results of these decisions decisions (details below).
After 36 rounds of decision-making, each participant saw a picture of each other participant in
the session, and had to indicate whether they had ever seen the other participant before outside of
the context of the study. They then filled in the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3, Tangney
et al., 2000) survey, which measures guilt and shame-proneness. Finally, they completed a
survey measuring positive and negative affect (PANAS, Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988),
and filled in a simple sociodemographic questionnaire (which records general variables such as
age, gender, etc.).
3.4.3 Assignment of roles to the participants
As mentioned above, there were two possible roles: decision-makers and recipients. The written
instructions described both roles that the participants might be assigned to. When the comput-
erized part of the study began, the computer randomly assigned roles (either decision-maker or
recipient) to the participants. Once assigned, this role remained the same for the entire study.
One third of the participants (n1 = 34) were randomly chosen as decision-makers and two-thirds
as recipients (n2 = 102).
3.4.4 Description of the task
Written instructions12 made the following information public knowledge.
The decision-makers’ task
Every round, each decision-maker was randomly matched with two other participants, who
were in the role of recipient. It was possible that the decision-maker saw the same recipients
multiple times, as the matching was fully random. decision-makers knew who these recipients
were because they saw their photographs displayed on their screen. The recipients were called
Recipient A and Recipient B on the screen. Decision-makers were made aware that Recipients A
and B would also see a photo of the decision-maker on their screen (for details, see instructions
in the appendix, in particular page 88, and screenshots 11 and 12 on page 83).
In each round, there was a payment, measured in points (1 point = 0.5 CHF ≈ 0.65 USD), that
only one of the two recipients was going to receive.13
12For a complete copy of the original instructions, please refer to the appendix of this chapter, page 85.
13We measured the payment in points, rather than CHF, to discourage comparisons between the decision-maker’s
payment and the payment allocated to recipients.
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The instructions introduced the task of the decision-maker14 as follows:
There is a decision to make which of the two [recipients] should receive the points. As a choice-maker, you
have two options:
• either you can choose yourself who will receive the payment
• or, you can let the computer randomly decide who receives the payment.
• Your own payment may also depend on whether you choose yourself, or whether you let the computer
decide randomly (the screenshot below will explain this in more detail).
In each round, your decision screen will tell you the amount of points that will go to one of the two
recipients. On some rounds, the payment received by one of the recipients will be positive (i.e. you can
decide which of the two recipients receives a positive amount of points), and on some it will negative (i.e.
you can decide which of the two recipients incurs a loss in points).
In some rounds, recipients will be informed whether you chose yourself or let the computer randomly
select the recipient. On other rounds, they will not be informed whether you chose yourself or whether
you let the computer decide. Your decision screen will tell you in each round, whether the recipients will
be informed about this or not.
Screenshots 3-6 (see pages 79–80) contain the sequence of decision screens faced by decision-
makers.
In the beginning of each period, decision-makers saw the conditional agency-decision screen
(screenshot 3 on page 79), which contained the following items:
• Photographs of the two potential recipients A and B. We decided to use photographs
because if the recipients had been anonymous, choosing A or B would in effect have
resulted in an allocation to an unknown, and hence effectively random, participant. This
would have made it meaningless whether the decision-maker had chosen to retain control
or let the computer randomize.
• Stake size x: The payment that was being allocated to one of the participants in this trial.
In the GAINS treatment, this varied trial by trial in the range from 6 to 14 points. In the
LOSSES treatment, the range was -6 to -14 points. The points were later converted to cash
at an exchange rate of 1 point = 0.5 CHF. For example, in the trial depicted in screenshot
3 (on page 79), one of the two depicted recipients was going to gain 7 points = 3.50 CHF,
the other gaining zero.15
14Note: Decision-makers were called “choice-makers” in the instructions and on the computer screen.
15We purposefully measured the payments for recipients in points, rather than in cash, in order to discourage
comparisons of the decision-maker’s payment to the recipients’ payment. However, note overall inequality within any
given trial is not affected by which of the recipients receives the stake, since there is always one recipient that will receive
zero and another who will receives the stake.
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• Information condition: decision-makers were told on screen whether or not the recipients
were going to be informed whether it was the decision-maker or the computer who made
the choice in that trial.
• Conditional decision table: A table in which the decision maker could make a conditional
decision on whether to retain control (i.e. choose who receives the stake) or not.
· Retaining control meant that the decision-maker would select him/herself which of the
recipients was going to receive the stake. Doing this gave a fixed payment for the
decision-maker, which varied only across trials.16
· Randomizing meant that the computer was going to randomly select which recipient
gets the stake. The payment for randomizing, however, was not yet certain, and could
be anywhere in the range +/- 2.00 CHF around the fixed payment for choosing, in
increments of 0.40 CHF. The table thus gave an entire menu of possible payments for
randomizing, and the decision-maker made a choice in each row. One of the rows
was going to be randomly drawn for implementation after the decision-maker had
made a choice for each row.
Thus, the decision-maker’s choices were recorded for an array of possible payments represented
in the table, using the strategy method. In each row of the table, the decision-maker made a
choice by clicking a button for “choose myself” or a button for “don’t choose”.
Decision-makers learned in the written instructions that for any given trial, although they were
effectively making a choice for each row, only one of the rows was going to count. At the
time of their choice, the decision-makers were not yet going to know which of the rows was
actually going to matter. After they had made their choice, the computer was going to inform
the decision-makers which of the rows mattered on that round (see screenshot 4 on page 79).
If, in that row, the decision-maker had selected “choose myself”, they were going to move on to
a new screen that permitted them to choose which of the two recipients they wanted to allocate
the gain/loss to (see screenshot 6 on page 80). Otherwise, the computer was going to randomly
select one of the two recipients and inform the decision-maker which it was, and the decision-
maker had to click a button to confirm that they had seen the choice and move on (see screenshot
5 on page 80). This confirmation screen was introduced to ensure that the number of stages and
clicks that are necessary if they chose themselves was identical to the number of clicks that are
necessary if they let the computer randomize. We did this to rule out that effort-minimizing
participants would always select “don’t choose” out of a desire to move through the study more
quickly.
Note that the payment difference in any given row implies a willingness to pay (WTP) for
whatever choice mechanism results in the lower pay for the decision-maker in that row. We intend
16To keep things interesting, this fixed payment for retaining control varied across trials, in the range from 10.00 to
18.00 CHF. See table 3.9 for details.
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to use the implied WTP at the participants’ indifference point between choosing / randomizing.
Note that this procedure in effect implements a method similar to a sealed-bid second price
auction, in which it is incentive-compatible to indicate true WTP (in analogy to Becker, Degroot,
and Marschak, 1964).
To prevent ambiguity regarding the indifference point between choosing and randomizing, we
programmed the agency choice screen (see screenshot 3 on page 80) in a way that prevented
the issue of multiple switching points. If the decision-maker clicked don’t choose for a particular
payment, all smaller payments for don’t choose were automatically also marked as don’t choose
(i.e. the computer ticked the boxes in these rows automatically), and vice versa for clicking choose
myself (the computer then ticked all boxes in the higher rows automatically). This method of
preventing multiple switching points is motivated by the assumption of that conditional on
the agency decision, preferences are monotonic in money, in the sense that if a decision-maker
chooses to randomize if that earns them x CHF, then they will also be willing to randomize if
that yields x + , for any  > 0.
Of course, because the payment levels in our table differed discretely, rather than continuously,
and because the choice tables were by construction bounded, the true indifference point can be
determined only approximately from our data. Since the first row where “choose” was clicked
implied that all rows beneath were also marked as “choose”, and all previous rows were marked
as “don’t choose”, the indifference point must lie somewhere between that first “choose” row
and the previous row. We thus linearly interpolated between the WTP implied by these two
rows, in the following way. Let i be the first row of the choice table where “choose” is clicked
by the decision-maker, Yic be the payment in row i in case of choosing, and Yir be the payment
in row i in case of randomizing / not choosing. Then the inferred willingness to pay for for
control was computed as:17
WTPcontrol =
(
(Yic − Yir) + (Yi−1c − Yi−1r )
)
2
(3.1)
The willingess to pay for randomizing is the same thing, but with a flipped sign:
WTPrand ≡ (−1) ×WTPcontrol (3.2)
These two measures constitute our key dependent measures.
While for a single trial this delivers only an approximation of exact WTP, we maintain that
17Since the choice screen operated with tables, which had a bounded set of rows, it was possible that participants’
indifference point was at or beyond the boundaries covered by the table, thus resulting in a click on one of the “extreme”
choice boxes. This necessitates special treatment of boundary cases. We implemented this in the following way. If the
participant never clicked “choose”, then we created fictional payments for a hypothetical row 12 by linear extrapolation
and assumed that that row was chosen. If the participant always clicked “choose” then we created fictional payments
for a hypothetical row zero by linear extrapolation. This extrapolation is then plugged into the same formula as all other
choice data. Reassuringly, boundary cases occurred only in a very small percentage of trials (<1.6%).
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the method we used represents a good balance of feasibility, simplicity and precision, and that
aggregating the measure across trials yields a value that is indeed meaningful, as the results will
show.
The instructions informed participants that in the end, the outcome from only one of the 36
rounds was going to be used to determine everybody’s payments, and suggested to them that
this means that “[...] each one of your decisions could be the only one that counts, so you should think
about every decision separately and carefully.”18
In summary, the total payments for the decision-makers consisted of a fixed fee of 30 CHF for
participating in the study, plus an additional payment, as determined by their choice in the
random row that counted, in the randomly selected round.
The recipients’ task
As mentioned above, in each round, each recipient was paired with a random decision-maker,
as well as another recipient, and a random decision-maker. Participants were told in the written
instructions that
If your role is recipient. . .
• You will not be informed who the other recipient is, but it will be a random other recipient who is
here in the lab today.
• The choice-maker will then decide whether to choose him/herself which of you gets the points, or
whether to let the computer randomly select one of you. During this time, you will be asked to wait.
• At the end of each round, you will be informed whether you or the other recipient received/lost the
points in that round.
• In some rounds, you will be informed whether the choice-maker chose themselves, or whether they
let the computer randomly select one of you. In other rounds, you will not receive this information.
Screenshots 11 and 12 (see page 83) illustrate the information that was made available to recipi-
ents at the end of each of the 36 periods, depending on the treatment. The feedback screen always
included a picture of the decision-maker and information on the outcome of the allocation (i.e.
who got the stake and how large the stake was). In the INFORMED treatment, the screen also
told participants whether the allocation was determined by the decision-maker, or whether it
was randomly determined by the computer. In the UNINFORMED treatment, this information
was not given. All participants were made aware of this screen setup via a screenshot in the
written instructions (reprinted in the appendix).
18Again, see the appendix to this chapter for a complete copy of the instructions.
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The payments for recipients consisted of a fixed compensation of 35 CHF, plus or minus the pay-
ment resulting from either the decision-maker’s active choice, or the computer’s randomization,
in the random round that counted. Each point was worth 0.50 CHF. For example, if a recipient
ended up with −10 points in the round that counted, then they received 35 − 0.5 ∗ 10 = 30 CHF.
3.4.5 Implementation of the four treatments
The four resulting treatments occurred in blockwise fashion, each block consisting of nine
periods. In each trial within a treatment, the stake size varied slightly. Apart from the recipients
being different, each decision-maker ultimately faced the same set of decision situations, in
terms of payoffs (refer to table 3.9 on page 77 for details). The order of the four blocks, as well as
the order of the choice situations was randomized for each decision-maker, in order to mitigate
potential sequence effects.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Overall, there was a positive WTP to randomize
Figure 3.3 displays a histogram of WTPrand. Our first main finding is immediately apparent:
mean WTPrand was not zero. In fact, mean WTPrand was positive (mean ≈ 0.24 CHF). First col-
lapsing the data to generate the mean WTP for each decision-maker (resulting in one statistically
independent observation per decision-maker), and then performing a Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, we find that the null hypothesis that WTPrand < 0 is clearly rejected (z =
-4.2722, p < .0001). On average, our participants thus displayed a significantly positive WTP to
randomize.
Figure 3.4 shows that mean WTPrand was positive for each treatment separately. To test whether
this is statistically significant, we first collapsed the data, to obtain each decision-maker’s mean
treatmentwise WTPrand, thus obtaining, for each treatment, one statistically independent obser-
vation per decision-maker, i.e. 34 independent observations per treatment. For each treatment
separately, we then performed a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test of the hypothesis
that WTPrand = 0. In each case, the hypothesis was rejected at p < 0.001 (see Table 3.3 for detailed
statistical results).19
We summarize this finding in the following result:
19We are performing four separate tests here, but the p-values are clearly sufficiently small to survive a Bonferroni
correction for multiple testing and remain jointly significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of the WTP for randomizing. On average, WTPrand was positive. Contains data
from N = 34 decision-makers. Each datapoint summarized here represents one trial of one decision-maker,
for a total of 1224 datapoints.
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Figure 3.4: Mean WTP for rando izing, by treatment. WTPrand was significantly positive for each
condition. Full dataset, N = 34 decision-makers. Error bars denote SE of the mean. For the computation
of standard errors, we first collapsed the data to obtain one independent observation per decision-maker
(i.e., one datapoint is one decision-maker’s mean for that treatment).
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Result 1. Mean willingess to pay for randomizing was significantly positive in each of the four treatments.
3.5.2 Treatment effects on the WTP for randomization
From Figure 3.4, it is immediately visually apparent that WTPrand was higher when recipients
were informed, and higher for losses than for gains.
Nonparametric testing of treatment effects
We begin with simple nonparametric testing of the treatment effects, which shows that the
results that are visually apparent in Figure 3.4 are indeed statistically significant.
Collapsing the data to obtain, for each decision-maker, mean WTPrand when in the INFORMED
vs. UNINFORMED treatments, we obtain two (dependent) data points per decision-maker. We
then use a nonparametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test
H0 : WTPrand(INFORMED) = WTPrand(UNINFORMED)
This is rejected significantly (z = −2.705, p < 0.0068, two-sided). Hence, it made a clear difference
for decision-makers’ willingness to randomize whether recipients were informed about their
agency or not. It also makes a significant difference whether gains or losses were at stake for
recipients. Testing this in an analogous fashion to the process above yields the result that
H0 : WTPrand(GAINS) = WTPrand(LOSSES)
is rejected at a similar level of significance (z = −2.639, p < 0.0083, two-sided).
Parametric testing of treatment effects
The nonparametric results reported above require a relatively coarse handling and partitioning
of our data. First, the tests used necessitate collapsing the data to obtain just one pair of ob-
servations per decision-maker, although each decision-maker in fact played 36 rounds. Second,
we group all negative stakes x < 0 into the LOSSES treatment and all positive stakes x > 0
into the GAINS treatment, thus ignoring some potentially important variance in one of our two
treatment dimensions.
Figure 3.5 shows a more fine-grained split of the data, in which the different possible stakes are
shown separately, and suggests visually that the coarser results reported above are retained in
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this more detailed setting: when recipients are informed, and when the stakes are negative, the
willingness to pay for randomization was higher.
To test this statistically, in order to make full use of the multiple observations we had per
decision-maker, as well as the more fine-grained variation of x, while simultaneously taking
into account the dependency properties of the data, we estimated the impact of our treatments
using the following mixed-effects regression model:
(WTPrand)i j = β0 + β1stakesi j + β2informedi j + β3interactioni j︸                                                     ︷︷                                                     ︸
fixed effects (across all decision-makers)
+ u0i + u1istakesi j + u2iinformedi j + u3iinteractioni j︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
random effects (at the decision-maker level)
+ ei j︸︷︷︸
error term
To account for the dependency properties of the multiple observations per decision-maker, we
both introduced individual random effects into this model, and clustered standard errors ex post
to correct significance levels for differences in variance between decision-makers. The results of
this regression are reported in table 3.2 (page 62).
In short, all treatment effects found non-parametrically show up as significant in the more
fine-grained approach taken here as well.
In analogy to above, we find that WTPrand decreased significantly in the payment allocated
to recipients (p < 0.025). Ceteris paribus, for the 20 CHF increase in recipient payment that
occurred between the mean LOSSES vs. mean GAINS treatment, the coefficient implies that
mean WTPrand decreased by approximately 0.11 CHF. We summarize this in the following result:
Result 2. When decision-makers allocated losses, their WTPrand was higher than when they allocated
gains.
The regression results also mirror the above result that WTPrand was higher in the INFORMED
treatment than in the UNINFORMED treatment. Ceteris paribus, the knowledge that recipients
were going to be informed about agency increased mean WTPrand by approximately 0.17 CHF
(p < 0.001).
Result 3. When recipients were informed about agency, decision-makers’ WTPrand was higher than when
they were not.
Finally, the regression results show that there is no statistically significant evidence for an
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interaction effect between the two treatment dimensions – that is, we find no evidence that
informing recipients enhanced the effect of gains vs. losses or vice versa.
Table 3.2: Treatment effects: Mixed-effects MLE regression
Dependent variable:
WTP for randomizing, in Swiss Francs
Payment allocated to recipients (Swiss Francs)
-0.00549∗∗
(0.025)
Dummy: recipients informed == 1
0.173∗∗∗
(0.001)
Interaction: recipients’ payment X participants informed
-0.00513
(0.221)
Regression constant included Yes
Sample full sample
Observations 1224
SE clustered at the participant level yes
Number of clusters (=number of decision-makers) 34
BIC 1333.0
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.5.3 Further results and robustness checks
In this section, we report further analyses designed to test the robustness of the results reported
above, and to identify possible other influences on behavior.
Robustness to alternate model specifications / estimation techniques
Importantly, none of the results reported above are artifacts of the mixed-effects specification we
chose to report here – neither in their approiximate magnitude nor in their levels of significance.
The same results are obtained almost identically when using equivalent fixed-effects, random-
effects GLS, or OLS regressions with a dummy for each participant to filter out individual
means. See specifications 1-5 from table 3.5 on page 73 for detailed results obtained using these
alternate specifications. The mixed-effects specification reported here was chosen because it
appears plausible that there might be individual differences between participants, which are
adequately captured by the model. Further, it yields the best fit among all models reported in
table 3.5, according to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
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Survey measures for guilt and shame
After all decisions had been made in the study, we asked participants to fill in the TOSCA-3 (Test
of Self-Conscious Affect) survey. Among other things, this measures the traits of guilt-proneness
and shame-proneness. The goal of this was to investigate whether guilt- or shame-proneness
played a role for the willingness to pay for randomizing. If shame plays a role for motivating
responsibility avoidance, then WTPrand should be higher for people who are more shame-prone.
In particular, since shame (unlike guilt) applies when third parties observe something unpleasant
about oneself, one would expect the contrast between the INFORMED and UNINFORMED
treatments to be larger for particularly shame-prone individuals.
Unfortunately, since shame- and guilt-proneness are trait measures, we of course have only
one observation per participant, such that we do not have the same kind of within-participant
power that we get for our analysis of treatment differences — and since we have only 34
decision-makers in total, we have comparatively little power to identify between-participants
effects. Therefore, although we report the results of including these survey measures, for each
individual, in our regression analysis, we caution against over-interpreting their significance –
a larger sample size would be desirable.
We first did a median split of the TOSCA-3 shame and guilt scores, thus categorizing each
individual as either below median or above median on shame-proneneness. We then included
these two values, as well as their interaction term, as individual-level regressors into our mixed-
effects regression model (table 3.6, specification 1, on page 74). We further ran an expanded
specification that additionally included interaction terms with our treatment variables (table 3.6,
specification 2). Note that this considerably increases the number of explanatory variables in
our model, which reduces our confidence in the results, given the small number of independent
observations.
That being said, consistently with our hypotheses, we found that the two-way interaction
INFORMED ∗ (Dummy: shamescore >= median) was significantly positive. Thus, particularly
shame-prone individuals did indeed respond more strongly to whether or not the recipients
were informed.
We further find that all treatment effects reported in the main results section are robust to the
inclusion of these control measures. The coefficient of the dummy encoding for the INFORMED
condition remained positive and at least marginally significant (p-values of 0.025 and 0.098,
respectively), and the coefficient of the continuous regressor encoding the stakes remained
(at least marginally) significantly negative in both specifications (p-values 0.025 and 0.098 in
specifications 1 and 2).
We summarize this as:
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Result 4. Individuals who were particularly shame-prone responded more strongly to whether or not
the recipients were informed. All treatment effects reported in the main results persist when including
shame- and guilt-proneness into the regression.
Knowing a recipient
It is conceivable that some of the participants who participated in our study knew eachother from
outside the context of our study. Due to the fact that interaction was not anonymous, reputational
concerns cannot fully be excluded, and so this could conceivably have influenced the behavior
of decision-makers. Note that due to the random matching algorithm we employed, and the
fact that our treatments were within participant, one would expect this not to systematically
bias our results, if the sample size is sufficiently large. We nevertheless decided to control for
the possibility of failed randomization on this dimension.
We find that this does not explain away any of our main results. This result was obtained in the
following way.
After participants had made all of their decisions, we showed them a photograph of each other
participant in the session, and asked them to indicate whether they knew the person in the
picture. Analyzing this data yielded that in a small fraction (8.1%) of trials, it occurred that at
least one of the recipients was not a complete stranger to the decision-maker.
To be sure our results are not driven by these trials, we re-ran all analyses reported above while
excluding all trials in which the decision-maker knew at least one of the recipients. Reassuringly,
neither the qualitative results, nor the magnitude, nor the significance of the results reported in
the main results section are much impacted by omitting these trials (see table 3.4 in the appendix,
page 72).
Another approach to controlling for the effects of decision-makers knowing recipients is to
include additional regressors in the main model, and run this on the full sample. In this vein,
we added the following regressors to the existing regression model: (1) a regressor that captured
the number of recipients known by the decision-maker in a given trial (i.e. this could take the
values zero, one or two), (2) interaction terms of all three treatment dimension regressors (from
the regression reported in the main results section) with a dummy that took the value 1 if the
dictator knew any recipient this trial (reported in the appendix in table 3.5, page 73, specification
6). We summarize our findings in the following result.
Result 5. All results reported in the main results section persist when controlling for whether decision-
makers knew any of the recipients, both in terms of approximate magnitude, and in terms of statistical
significance.
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Gender effects?
Since decision-makers and recipients saw photographs of each-other, they could identify each
other’s gender. While we have no clear hypothesis regarding how gender effects might matter,
we decided to analyze it exploratively.
In short, we find only weak evidence that the gender of the recipients mattered to decision-
makers, and no evidence that their inclusion mitigates the treatment effects reported in the main
results section.
To arrive at this conclusion, we proceeded with an analysis in two steps, because gender
preferences may, in principle, matter at either of the two possible decision nodes of the decision-
makers (first, when deciding whether to retain control, and second, when allocating, conditional
on retaining control).
1. Does the recipients’ gender influence WTPrand?
In essence, we find only weak evidence that the gender of recipients may matter – when
both recipients are male, decision-makers had marginally smaller WTPrand. We further
find that the significant effects reported in the main results section survive the inclusion
of gender terms into the regression.
In order to determine this, we included dummy variables that encoded for the gender of
the recipients, as well as the main treatment dimensions, into a joint regression (see table
3.7 in the appendix, on page 74). We find that WTPrand is, ceteris paribus, about 0.04 CHF
smaller on trials where both recipients are male, than on trials where the recipients are of
mixed genders (one male, one female). However, this effect is not statistically significant
(p = 0.126) when run on the whole sample (specification 1). When running the same
regression only for the subsample of decision-makers who were female (specification 3),
the effect becomes more pronounced (ceteris paribus, 0.07 CHF smaller than on mixed
gender trials), though this difference is still only marginally significant (p = 0.085).
Reassuringly, regardless of specification, the results reported in the main results section are
qualitatively retained (i.e. higher WTPrand when the stakes are losses and when recipients
are informed), and they remain statistically significant at at least the 5% level in each
specification that is run on the full dataset.
We summarize this as follows:
Result 6. There is only weak evidence that decision-makers’ WTPrand was lower (i.e. decision-
makers were more willing to influence the allocation of the stake) when both recipients were male.
This result was driven mainly by female decision-makers. The inclusion of gender terms does not
mitigate the results reported in the main results section.
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Error bars denote 95% CI. For their computation, each choice maker's mean fraction of choices is treated as one observation.
Omits random computer choices. Omits trials where choice maker knew at least one recipient.
Omits choice makers who did not make least one self-determined choice in each the gains and losses treatments.
Observation count: N_female = 12, N_male = 19.
Fraction of trials in which stakes were allocated to
a member of their own gender
Figure 3.6: Gender effects. Although on average, cond tion l on retai ing agency, both male and female
decision-makers tended to slightly favor their own gender (allocating more than 50% of gains to them but
less than 50% of losses), the effects were significant only for male decision-makers, and not significant when
tested in a joint probit regression. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. For the computation of the
error bars, each decision-maker’s mean fraction of choices was treated as one independent observation.
Human choices only (omits random computer choices). Omits trials where decision-maker knew any of
the recipients. Remaining decision-maker counts: Nfemale = 12, Nmale = 19.
2. Conditional on the dictator retaining agency and allocating the payment, does the recipients’ gender
matter for how they allocate the payment?
Briefly, we find that we find weak evidence that yes, it matters, in that decision-makers
appear to make choices that favor their own gender, when they face mixed-recipient-
gender allocation decisions.
In order to analyze this, we restricted our attention to trials where three conditions were
simultaneously fulfilled:
(a) Mixed-gender recipients: one of the recipients was female and the other was male.
This is to ensure that there is a meaningful choice at all between the genders within
each analyzed trial.
(b) The decision-maker wound up making the allocation decision him/herself (after the
BDM realization). This is to ensure that we do not include computer random “choices”
in the analysis.
(c) The decision-maker did not know any of the recipients. This is to ensure that “gender”
preferences are not merely misattributed preferences for friends who happened to
come along (as it is possible that e.g. females will know more of the other females
and males will know more of the other males, or vice versa).
These three conditions were simultaneously fulfilled in 240/1224 ≈ 19.6% of trials, thus
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somewhat limiting our statistical confidence. Figure 3.6 (page 66) shows that on average,
both males and females tended to allocate the stake to members of their own gender more
than half of the time if they were allocating gains and less than half of the time if they were
allocating losses, which seems to suggest that they were each favoring their own gender.
When nonparametrically testing this separately for male vs. female decision-makers, a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test found that males allocate significantly more frequently to males
when administering gains than losses (2 matched observations for each of 19 male decision-
makers, z = 2.277, p = 0.0228). The difference was, however, not significant for women
(2 matched observations for each of 12 female decision-makers, z = 1.606, p = 0.1082).20
However, we found no significant effects when testing this in a different method, using a
probit regression (reported in full in the appendix, in table 3.8 on page 75). We regressed a
dummy variable that equaled 1 if a decision-maker allocated the stake to their own gender
on a constant, as well as a dummy for the decision-maker’s gender (male = 1), a dummy
for whether gains or losses were allocated (gains = 1), and an interaction term between the
two. This regression yielded no coefficients that were significantly different from zero.21
We summarize this in the following result.
Result 7. We find on average, that both male and female decision-makers displayed decision-patterns that
favored recipients of their own gender, when they made allocative decisions in trials where one possible
recipient was male and the other was female. However, these effects were statistically significant only for
male decision-makers. Further, this result was not robust to alternate statistical testing methods.
3.6 Discussion
We ran an experiment in which participants were randomly allocated into one of two roles:
(passive) recipients and (active) decision-makers. In each trial, decision-makers then saw two
potential recipients, and a given stake had to be allocated to one of these recipients. The
decision-maker could either retain control and make this decision, or alternatively have the
computer make a random choice. The decision-makers’ payment was unaffected by which of
the two recipients received the stake, but depended on whether they retained control or let the
computer randomize. We incentive compatibly elicited the compensating payment c∗ that made
the decision-maker indifferent between choosing and randomizing. Depending on its sign, c∗
can be interpreted as either a willingness to pay for either retaining control, or for randomizing.
The 2x2 experimental conditions varied the stake size (GAINS or LOSSES conditions), as well as
20Remark: The numbers 12+19 do not add up to the full 34 decision-makers, because not all decision-makers had
trials in which all three conditions were simultaneously fulfilled.
21Note: as always, standard errors were clustered by decision-maker. A mixed-effects regression that allows random
effects for each of the coefficients gives qualitatively the same results.
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whether recipients were informed of whether the allocation was decided upon by the decision-
maker or by a random device (INFORMED vs UNINFORMED condition).
The results were in line with what one would expect based on the theory of responsibility
aversion (Leonhardt, Keller, and Pechmann, 2011). In our setting, there was a significantly
positive willingness to pay for randomizing — decision-makers tended to require financial
compensation for retaining control and making a direct choice between the two recipients. Note
that this result is predicted neither by classical homo-oeconomicus models, nor by Fehr-Schmidt
(1999) type outcome-based inequality aversion. Furthermore, if the non-instrumental preference
for authority identified by Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2013) were driven exclusively by a
motivation to retain decision rights per se, one would predict that WTPcontrol > 0⇔WTPrand < 0.
This clearly is not the case here, suggesting that there is more to the valuation of authority than
a mere desire to maximize one’s decision rights.
Further, we found that the WTPrand was higher in the LOSSES than in the GAINS treatment.
While all of our decisions exposed decision-makers to a choice problem in which there was no
fair outcome, allocating (unfair) losses presumably is more unpopular than allocating (unfair)
gains. If so, then our observation is consistent with the belief that responsibility aversion is
pronounced if the decision at hand is particularly harmful to third parties.
We further find that WTPrand is higher in the INFORMED than in the UNINFORMED condition.
Thus it mattered to decision-makers whether recipients could unambiguously causally link the
outcomes they observed to the decision-makers’ choices or not. This is consistent with a shame
motive playing a role for responsibility aversion. Further evidence that shame matters is given
by the fact that this treatment effect was more pronounced for more strongly shame prone
individuals.
These results are remarkably robust. They are obtained regardless of the particular statistical
technique and specification employed, and they are not explained away by the inclusion of
potential alternate explanatory variables, such as decision-makers knowing particular recipients
or gender effects. One may be tempted to think that unmeasured risk preferences may introduce
a bias, since retaining agency implied both a certain payment for the decision-maker, as well as a
certainly determined allocation between the two recipients, while randomizing entailed risk on
both of these dimensions. However, note that this would bias risk averse individuals towards
retaining control, rather than towards randomizing. Since we find the opposite, if anything,
controlling for risk aversion would likely have strengthened our result that WTPrand > 0.
Overall, this work thus contributes to the investigation of the motives underlying decision-
making by deciders who are in positions of power. While previous experimental economic work
(Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening, 2013; Bartling, Fehr, and Herz, 2014) has focused on how decision-
makers might seek to retain decision-rights, here we investigate an opposing motive, and some
of the forces that shape it. Our study advances the conceptual groundwork by Leonhardt,
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Keller, and Pechmann (2011) by employing incentive-compatible methods and showing that
the phenomena discovered in self-report-based hypothetical studies persist even with non-
hypothetical choice and real monetary consequences. If anything, our findings here are also
in line with the behavioral findings in Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), in that decision-makers
chose to avoid direct agency also in our context. However, in our case the delegation was not to a
human agent, but to an a-personal random device. Furthermore, this delegation occurred in the
absence of any financial incentive to the decision-maker, and without the threat of punishment
within the context of the experiment.
Having discussed our findings, we like also to point out potential caveats of the design, leading to
opportunities for possible future work. First, note that in order to conclusively be able to identify
the role of attributability of choice, without co-varying the observability of the decision-maker’s
identity, their photo was always visible to recipients (also in the UNINFORMED condition).
Thus, even though we controlled for whether recipients and dictator’s had ever before seen
each-other outside of the context of the study, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that
they might interact in the future, hence posing the possibility that reputational concerns may
have played a role (though note that this does not call into question the treatment effects we
document!). As a second step, it would therefore be an interesting extension of the design
to include an additional condition in which decision-makers enjoy full anonymity, to better
identify whether the result that WTPrand > 0 persists in this case. If so, shame could not possibly
be at play, since shame requires observability. Guilt, however, is a possible motive that does
not require such observability. We thus encourage future work that runs such an additional
condition. Second, our sample size is comparatively small (n = 34 decision-makers). While this
gives us decent statistical power for within-participants treatment effects, power is relatively
low for between-participants analyses. We would thus encourage replication of these results.22
In conclusion, our work here shows that there is much to be learnt about the motives of decision-
makers in positions of power, and how they might use these both strategically, in anticipation
of the consequences of their behavior for how others evaluate them, and for their self image.
We thus close with the hope that this work encourages further research in this direction!
22The z-Tree code and materials for conducting the study (instructions etc) are available upon request from the
authors.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Additional results and robustness checks
decision-maker
allocating
Recipients
informed
Indep. Obs
(= #decision-makers)
mean
WTPrand
z-value
(Wilcoxon)
p-value
(Wilcoxon)
gains (x > 0) no N = 34 0.103 z = 3.571678 p = .000355
gains (x > 0) yes N = 34 0.216 z = 3.449354 p = .000561
losses (x < 0) no N = 34 0.201 z = 4.305061 p = .000017
losses (x < 0) yes N = 34 0.434 z = 4.061971 p = .000017
Table 3.3: Sign of WTPrand, by treatment. Detailed results: Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests, by
treatment, of H0 : WTPrand = 0 (two-sided).
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Regressions: robustness of results to exclusion of trials where a recipient is 
known by decision-maker. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand 
     
STAKE: 
Payment 
allocated to 
recipients 
(Swiss Francs) 
-0.00475** ! 
(0.048) 
-0.00519* ! 
(0.050) 
-0.00517** 
!(0.042) 
-0.00519* ! 
(0.053) 
     
INFORMED 
Dummy: 
recipients 
informed == 1 
0.158*** ! 
(0.002) 
0.156*** ! 
(0.007) 
0.155*** ! 
(0.004) 
0.156*** ! 
(0.008) 
     
Interaction: 
STAKE X 
INFORMED 
-0.00595! 
(0.167) 
-0.00580! 
(0.184) 
-0.00581! 
(0.174) 
-0.00580! 
(0.190) 
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 
Sample 
excludes 
known 
recipients 
excludes 
known 
recipients 
excludes 
known 
recipients 
excludes 
known 
recipients 
Type of 
Regression 
Mixed Effects 
MLE Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects GLS OLS 
SE clustered at 
the subject 
level 
yes yes yes yes 
Number of 
clusters 
(=number of 
decision- 
makers) 
34 34 34 34 
Regression 
constant 
included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subject 
Dummies N/A N/A N/A Yes 
BIC 1201.9 1280.0 . 1280.0 
 
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Excludes trials where at least one recipient was known to the dictator from outside of the context 
of the study. 
Table 3.4: Robustness to knowing recipients. These regressions use the same regression model as
reported in the main results, but omit all trials in which the decision-maker knew at least one recipient. All
of the qualitative results obtained in the main regression analysis continue to hold, remaining significant.
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Full regression results (robustness to specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand 
       
STAKE: Payment 
allocated to 
recipients (Swiss 
Francs) 
-0.00522** 
!(0.033) 
-0.00515** ! 
(0.039) 
-0.00516** ! 
(0.031) 
-0.00515** 
!(0.042) 
-0.00549** ! 
(0.025) 
-0.00484** ! 
(0.047) 
       
INFORMED: 
Dummy: recipients 
informed == 1 
0.178*** ! 
(0.001) 
0.176*** 
!(0.002) 
0.176*** ! 
(0.001) 
0.176*** ! 
(0.003) 
0.173*** ! 
(0.001) 
0.161*** ! 
(0.002) 
       
Interaction: STAKE 
X INFORMED 
-0.00557 ! 
(0.170) 
-0.00563 ! 
(0.177) 
-0.00560 
!(0.169) 
-0.00563 ! 
(0.183) 
-0.00513 
!(0.221) 
-0.00609 
!(0.141) 
       
NUMKNOWN: 
Number of 
recipients known by 
decision-maker this 
trial 
-0.161 
!(0.151) 
-0.167 ! 
(0.185) 
-0.160 
!(0.209) 
-0.167 
!(0.191) ! 
-0.284 ! 
(0.146) 
       
Interaction: 
(NUMKNOWN>=1) 
X STAKE 
No No No No No Yes 
       
Interaction: 
(NUMKNOWN>=1) 
X INFORMED 
No No No No No Yes 
       
Three-way 
interaction 
(NUMKNOWN>=1) 
X STAKE  
X INFORMED 
No No No No No Yes 
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 
Sample full full full full full full 
Type of Regression 
Mixed 
Effects 
MLE 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
GLS 
OLS 
Mixed 
Effects 
MLE 
Mixed 
Effects 
MLE 
SE clustered at the 
subject level yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of clusters 
(=number of 
decision-makers) 
34 34 34 34 34 34 
Regression constant 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subject Dummies N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A 
BIC 1271.0 1454.4 . 1454.4 1333.0 1288.3 
  
Table 3.5: Robustness to specification. These regression results use different specifications and regression
types, to demonstrate that the results reported in the main text are not an artifact of the particular speci-
fication reported there. All of the qualitative results obtained in the main regression analysis continue to
hold, regardless of specification. p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Regressions: inclusion of TOSCA measures for shame and guilt. 
 (1) (2) 
  WTPrand WTPrand 
STAKE: Payment allocated to recipients (Swiss Francs) -0.00549** -0.00478* (0.025) (0.098) 
   
INFORMED Dummy:  
recipients informed == 1 
0.173*** 0.175*** 
(0.001) (0.004) 
   
Interaction:  
STAKE X INFORMED 
-0.00513 -0.00513 
(0.221) (0.221) 
   
Dummy: shamescore >= median 0.176 0.0778 (0.264) (0.539) 
   
Dummy: guiltscore >= median 0.100 0.00128 (0.129) (0.993) 
   Interaction:  
(shamescore >= median)  
X (guiltscore >= median) 
-0.0885 -0.0885 
(0.618) (0.620) 
   Interaction:  
(shamescore >= median)  
X INFORMED 
 0.187* 
 (0.095) 
   Interaction:  
(shamescore >= median)  
X STAKE 
 0.00379 
 (0.677) 
   Interaction:  
(shamescore >= median)  
X INFORMED  
X STAKE 
 -0.0169 
 (0.495) 
   Interaction:  
(guiltscore >= median)  
X INFORMED 
 -0.181 
 (0.108) 
   Interaction:  
(guiltscore >= median)  
X STAKE 
 0.0143 
 (0.108) 
   Interaction:  
(guiltscore >= median)  
X INFORMED  
X STAKE 
 -0.0224 
 (0.328) 
   
Regression constant included Yes Yes 
! ! !Sample full sample full sample 
Observations 1224 1224 
SE clustered at the subject level yes yes 
Number of clusters (=number of decision-makers) 34 34 
Type of Regression Mixed Effects MLE 
Mixed Effects 
MLE 
BIC 1350.0 1377.3 
 
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 3.6: Shame and guilt. Including the TOSCA-3 measures for shame- and guilt-proneness left
the qualitative results unchanged, although in the full specification that includes all interaction terms
(specification 2) the stake size is now only marginally significant. It is unclear whether this is an artifact of
the small sample size coinciding with a strongly inflated number of regressors in the second specification.
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Gender effects (1)  
Regression results: Effect of gender on WTP to randomize. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand WTPrand 
Label 
Full sample 
(with gender 
effects) 
Only male 
decision- 
makers 
Only female 
decision- 
makers 
Full sample 
(alternate 
specification) 
Full sample 
without 
gender 
effects 
LOSSES: 
dummy = 1 if 
stakes are 
losses 
0.0974** ! 
(0.047) 
0.0273 ! 
(0.465) 
0.199* ! 
(0.053) 
0.0973** ! 
(0.048) 
0.0980** ! 
(0.046) 
      
INFORMED: 
dummy = 1 if 
recipients 
informed 
0.109** ! 
(0.038) 
0.106 ! 
(0.106) 
0.114 ! 
(0.212) 
0.111** ! 
(0.033) 
0.112** ! 
(0.031) 
      
Interaction: 
INFORMED * 
LOSSES 
0.121 ! 
(0.158) 
0.120 ! 
(0.346) 
0.122 ! 
(0.259) 
0.121 ! 
(0.154) 
0.120 ! 
(0.155) 
      
Both recipients 
male (dummy) 
-0.0428 ! 
(0.126) 
-0.0178 ! 
(0.622) 
-0.0742* ! 
(0.085) ! ! 
      
Both recipients 
female 
0.0184 ! 
(0.575) 
0.0314 ! 
(0.483) 
0.00167 ! 
(0.972) ! ! 
      
Both recipients 
decision- 
maker’s 
gender 
! ! ! -0.0120 ! (0.676)  
     ! 
Both recipients 
other gender ! ! ! 
-0.0207 ! 
(0.525) ! 
Observations 1224 720 504 1224 1224 
Sample full sample 
only male 
decision- 
makers 
only female 
decision- 
makers 
full full 
Type of 
Regression 
Mixed Effects 
MLE 
Mixed Effects 
MLE 
Mixed Effects 
MLE 
Mixed Effects 
MLE 
Mixed Effects 
MLE 
SE clustered at 
the subject 
level 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of 
clusters 
(=number of 
decision- 
makers) 
34 20 14 34 34 
Regression 
constant 
included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BIC 1329.0 641.4 694.6 1332.5 1318.9 
Table 3.7: Gender effects (1). There is weak evidence that decision-makers’ WTPrand was lower (i.e. they
were less disinclined to retain control) when both recipients were male. In specifications 1-4, the omitted
category of recipient constellations is mixed gender recipients (i.e. trials with one male and one female
recipient). Specifications 1, 2 and 3 are identical, but specification 1 is run on the full dataset, whereas
specifications 2 (3) are run only on the male (female) subset of decision-makers. Specification 4 is also run
on the full dataset but uses an alternate categorization of gender. Specification 5 is included for comparison
only – here, no gender effects are included. p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Gender effects (2)  
Probit regression: Effect of gender on likelihood of allocating  
to own gender, conditional on retaining agency 
 
 (1) 
 
Dependent variable: 
dummy = 1 if dictator 
chose a recipient of 
their own gender  
MALE:  
dummy = 1 if decision- 
maker is male 
0.0480 
(0.822) 
  
  
GAINS:  
dummy = 1 if stakes 
are gains 
-0.205 
(0.332) 
  
  
INTERACTION: 
MALE * GAINS -0.303 
 (0.356) 
Observations 240 
Sample relevant subset of  trials (see footnote) 
Type of Regression Probit Regression 
SE clustered at the 
subject level yes 
Number of clusters 
(=number of decision- 
makers) 
34 
Regression constant 
included Yes 
Subject Dummies No 
BIC 346.6 
 
 
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Omits trials in which computer made random choice.  
Includes only trials where one recipient was male and the other  
was female. Omits trials in which choice maker knew any of  
the recipients. 
Table 3.8: Gender effects (2). There were no significant evidence that decision-makers favored their
own or the opposite gender hen allocating the stakes. Probit regression. Dependent variable is a binary
variable called dictatorchoseowngender (=1 if the choicemaker chose a member of his own gender in a mixed-
recipient-gender trial). Includes only trials in which the decision-maker (1) happened to face mixed-gender
recipients, i.e. both a female and a male recipient, (2) wound up making the decision him/herself, and (3)
did not know any of the recipients. p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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3.7.2 Game tree for the UNINFORMED condition.
z+ c
0
x
!
"
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
pN 1− pN
z
0
x
!
"
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
yD
yRecipient A
yRecipient B
!
"
#
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
&
=
z
x
0
!
"
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
z+ c
x
0
!
"
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
Retain 
agency
 !
(active
ly !
choose
 recipie
nt)
Let computer!randomize
pN = 0.5
z > x
z+ c > x
GAINS : x > 0
LOSSES : x < 0
Decision-!
maker
All
oca
te s
tak
e
x to
 rec
ipi
ent
 A
Allocate stake
x to recipient B
Decision-maker Lottery
outcomes!indistinguishable!to recipients
outcomes!
indistingu
ishable!
to recipien
ts
Figure 3.7: In the UNINFORMED condition, recipients were not informed whether the outcome resulted
due to randomization or due to an allocative choice of the decision-maker.
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3.7.3 Detailed payment schedule for all treatments
Screen 
identifier (not 
indicative of 
sequence)
Treatment 
identifier 
(actual 
sequence 
randomized)
Payoff sign: 
dictator is 
allocating…
Dictator's 
agency 
disclosed to 
recipients
Round identifier 
within treatment 
(actual sequence 
randomized)
Stake size (points 
allocated to one of 
the two recipients)
Dictator's 
payment if 
dictator chooses 
the recipient 
(CHF)
Range for  dictator 
payments if 
dictator 
randomizes which 
recipient receives 
stake (CHF)
Dictator's 
payment 
increments 
between rows on 
dictator's decision 
screen (CHF)
1 T1 gains yes 1 6 10 [8,12] 0.40
2 T1 gains yes 2 7 11 [9,13] 0.40
3 T1 gains yes 3 8 12 [10,14] 0.40
4 T1 gains yes 4 9 13 [11,15] 0.40
5 T1 gains yes 5 10 14 [12,16] 0.40
6 T1 gains yes 6 11 15 [13,17] 0.40
7 T1 gains yes 7 12 16 [14,18] 0.40
8 T1 gains yes 8 13 17 [15,19] 0.40
9 T1 gains yes 9 14 18 [16,20] 0.40
10 T2 gains no 1 6 10 [8,12] 0.40
11 T2 gains no 2 7 11 [9,13] 0.40
12 T2 gains no 3 8 12 [10,14] 0.40
13 T2 gains no 4 9 13 [11,15] 0.40
14 T2 gains no 5 10 14 [12,16] 0.40
15 T2 gains no 6 11 15 [13,17] 0.40
16 T2 gains no 7 12 16 [14,18] 0.40
17 T2 gains no 8 13 17 [15,19] 0.40
18 T2 gains no 9 14 18 [16,20] 0.40
19 T3 losses yes 1 -6 10 [8,12] 0.40
20 T3 losses yes 2 -7 11 [9,13] 0.40
21 T3 losses yes 3 -8 12 [10,14] 0.40
22 T3 losses yes 4 -9 13 [11,15] 0.40
23 T3 losses yes 5 -10 14 [12,16] 0.40
24 T3 losses yes 6 -11 15 [13,17] 0.40
25 T3 losses yes 7 -12 16 [14,18] 0.40
26 T3 losses yes 8 -13 17 [15,19] 0.40
27 T3 losses yes 9 -14 18 [16,20] 0.40
28 T4 losses no 1 -6 10 [8,12] 0.40
29 T4 losses no 2 -7 11 [9,13] 0.40
30 T4 losses no 3 -8 12 [10,14] 0.40
31 T4 losses no 4 -9 13 [11,15] 0.40
32 T4 losses no 5 -10 14 [12,16] 0.40
33 T4 losses no 6 -11 15 [13,17] 0.40
34 T4 losses no 7 -12 16 [14,18] 0.40
35 T4 losses no 8 -13 17 [15,19] 0.40
36 T4 losses no 9 -14 18 [16,20] 0.40
Table 3.9: Payment schedules across treatments. Detailed documentation of the payoffs for decision-
makers and the stakes for the recipients in the four treatments. Note: we use the terms dictator and decision-
maker interchangeably. Each treatment was experienced en bloc for a given decision-maker. However, both
the order of treatments T1-T4, as well as the order of the screens within each treatment, were randomized.
The recipients’ payments are given in points, which were later converted to cash at an exchange rate of
1 point = 0.5 CHF. In addition to the variable payments resulting from one particular random period,
decision-makers (recipients) earned a fixed income of 30.00 CHF (35.00 CHF).
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Dictators were randomly selected by the computer and informed about their 
role at the beginning of the computerized part of the study.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot! Screenshot 1!
As a reminder, on-screen instructions were displayed in the beginning of the 
computerized part of the study.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot! Screenshot 2!
Avoiding Responsibility
3.7.4 z-Tree Screenshots
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At the beginning of each period, dictators saw a decision about control, in which they could decide, for an 
array of different payments, whether to retain control or not choose (! randomize).!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (note: photographs were not blurred in actual study)!
Informa(on)about)
stakes)and)about)
the)feedback)that)
recipients)will)
receive.)
In)each)row,)dictator)
makes)a)choice,)
condi(onal)on)
payments.))
)
Mul(ple)“switching)
points”)are)prevented)
by)automa(cally)ﬁlling)
in)“lower)boxes”)on)the)
leA)and)“higher)boxes”)
on)the)right.))
Screenshot 3!
After making their conditional agency choices, dictators received feedback about which random 
row counted in that period.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (note: photographs were not blurred in actual study)!
Feedback)about)
which)row)counts,)
and)resul(ng)
agency.)
Screenshot 4!
Appendix
Note: For printing purposes in this dissertation, the photographs have been converted to greyscale and
blurred to preserve anonymity. In the study, we used non-blurred color photographs.
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Source: z-Tree screenshot (note: photographs were not blurred in actual study)!
If row that counted implied randomization, dictators were shown the outcome of the computer’s random choice 
and had to click “ok”. This was to ensure the number of necessary clicks was the same, regardless of the dictator’s 
agency.!
Screenshot 5!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (note: photographs were not blurred in actual study)!
Dictator choice screen: if the random row that counted implied active dictator control, dictators saw 
a screen like this, and decided which recipient should receive the stake by clicking the appropriate 
button.!
Screenshot 6!
Avoiding Responsibility
Note: For printing purposes in this dissertation, the photographs have been converted to greyscale and
blurred to preserve anonymity. In the study, we used non-blurred color photographs.
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After all decisions were made, each dictator had to indicate, for each other 
participant, whether they knew them from outside the study.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (Note: photograph was not blurred in actual study).! Screenshot 7!
This is how recipients were informed about their role at the beginning of the 
study.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot! Screenshot 8!
Appendix
Note: For printing purposes in this dissertation, the photographs have been converted to greyscale and
blurred to preserve anonymity. In the study, we used non-blurred color photographs.
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Source: z-Tree screenshot.!
As a reminder, on-screen instructions were displayed in the beginning of the 
computerized part of the study.!
Screenshot 9!
In each period, while dictators were making their choices, recipients had to wait.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (Note: for illustration of screen setup only. Actual study had 36 
rounds, not 2 rounds).! Screenshot 10!
Avoiding Responsibility
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At the end of each period, recipients received feedback. "
In the informed condition, there was feedback about both the outcome and agency.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (Note: photograph was not blurred in actual study).!
“Informed”)
condi(on:)
recepients)learn)
about)agency.)
Screenshot 11!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (Note: photograph was not blurred in actual study).!
“Uninformed”)
condi(on:)no)
feedback)about)
agency.)
At the end of each period, recipients received feedback. "
In the uninformed condition, there was feedback about the outcome, but not about agency.!
Screenshot 12!
Appendix
Note: For printing purposes in this dissertation, the photographs have been converted to greyscale and
blurred to preserve anonymity. In the study, we used non-blurred color photographs.
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After all decisions were made, each recipient had to indicate, for each other 
participant, whether they knew them from outside the study.!
Source: z-Tree screenshot (Note: photograph was not blurred in actual study).! Screenshot 13!
Avoiding Responsibility
Note: For printing purposes in this dissertation, the photographs have been converted to greyscale and
blurred to preserve anonymity. In the study, we used non-blurred color photographs.
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Instructions  
 
Thank you for participating in today’s study.  
 
Before you read these instructions, please make sure you have carefully read and signed 
the informed consent form for this study. Then, please carefully read the material on the 
following pages, which will explain in greater detail what is going to happen during this 
study. After you have read the instructions, there will be some comprehension 
questions to make sure that you have understood them. 
 
If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the study, please raise 
your hand quietly and someone will come and assist you. 
 
While participants are reading these instructions, we will come to each participant’s seat 
and take a photo of each of you. This photo will be used to represent you in today’s 
study. You will see exactly how it will be used on the following pages. 
 
There are 2 parts in today’s study. 
Part 1 of the study: Decisions  
In the beginning of the study, the computer will randomly determine a role for each 
participant. There are two possible roles. 
• choice maker  
• recipient.  
The computer will inform you what role you have. This role will remain the same for the 
entire study.  
 
If your role is choi ce  maker : 
• Every round, you will be randomly matched with two other participants, who are 
in the role of recipient.  It is possible that you will see the same recipients 
multiple times, as the matching is fully random.  You will know who these 
recipients are because you will see their photographs displayed on your screen.  
They will be called Recipient A and Recipient B on the screen. 
• Recipients A and B will also see a photo of the choice maker on their screen (see 
screenshot below). 
• In each round, there is a payment, measured in points (1 point = 0.5 CHF), 
that only one of the two recipients will receive. 
• There is a decision to make which of the two should receive the points.  
As a choice maker, you have two options:  
o either you can choose yourself who will receive the payment 
o or, you can let the computer randomly decide who receives the 
payment. 
o Your own payment may also depend on whether you choose yourself, or 
whether you let the computer decide randomly (the screenshot below will 
explain this in more detail). 
 
Appendix
3.7.5 Original instructions
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• In each round, your decision screen will tell you the amount of points that will go 
to one of the two recipients. On some rounds, the payment received by one of 
the recipients will be positive (i.e. you can decide which of the two recipients 
receives a positive amount of points), and on some it will negative (i.e. you can 
decide which of the two recipients incurs a loss in points). 
• On some rounds, recipients will be informed whether you chose yourself or let 
the computer randomly select the recipient. On other rounds, they will not be 
informed whether you chose yourself or whether you let the computer decide. 
Your decision screen will tell you in each round, whether the recipients will be 
informed about this or not. 
 
This screenshot shows what your decision screen will look like: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the example above, one of the two depicted recipients will lose 12 points.  It is up to 
you whether you want to choose which of the two recipients will lose the 12 points, 
or whether you don’t want to choose who this will be.  
 
In each round, you need to make a decision for each of the 11 rows. However, only one 
of the rows will actually matter. In each round, the row that matters is randomly 
 
The gain or loss of points 
that will affect one of the 
two recipients this round.  
Tells you what information 
will be shown to the 
recipientsc. 
In each round, only one  
of these rows will 
count. You do not yet 
know which, so you 
need to treat each row 
as if it is the only one 
that matters.   
 
Be sure to indicate, for 
each row, whether you 
would prefer to choose 
yourself or not. 
For each row, how much 
you would earn if you 
decide to CHOOSE the 
recipient yourself. 
For each row, how 
much you would earn if 
you let the computer 
randomly select the 
recipient. 
For each row, indicate:  
if this row counts, would you rather  
• choose the recipient yourself, or  
• let the computer randomly 
determine the recipient. 
(the photos of recipients A 
and B will not be blurred in 
the actual study) 
Avoiding Responsibility
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determined. The computer will tell you, after your choice, which of the rows mattered on 
that round. 
 
If, in that row, you selected “choose myself”, you will get a screen that permits you to 
choose which of the two recipients you want to allocate the gain/loss to. Otherwise, the 
computer will randomly select one of the two recipients and inform you which it was. 
 
Note that each row represents a choice price.  In the above example, in row 1, you 
can either choose the recipient for a payment of 16 CHF, or you can select to not choose 
for a payment of 18 CHF. At the time of your choice, you do not yet know which of the 
rows will actually matter.   
 
Remember that in each round, only one of the 11 rows matters for the outcome of that 
round. In the end, the outcome from only one of the 36 rounds will be used to determine 
everybody’s payments. This means that each one of your decisions could be the only one that 
counts, so you should think about every decision separately and carefully. 
 
In summary, Your payment will consist of two parts:  
• A fixed fee of 30 CHF for participating in today’s study.  
• An additional payment, as determined in the row that counts in the randomly 
selected round. 
• For example, suppose that in the round that was randomly selected, you got 16 
CHF in the row that matters in that round. Then your final payoff would be 
30+16=46 CHF.  
If your role is Recipient :  
• In each round,  
o you will be randomly paired with another recipient, and a random choice 
maker.  
o You will not be informed who the other recipient is, but it will be a 
random other recipient who is here in the lab today. 
o The choice maker will then decide whether to choose him/herself, which 
of you gets the points, or whether to let the computer randomly select 
one of you. During this time, you will be asked to wait. 
o At the end of each round, you will be informed whether you or the other 
recipient received/lost the points in that round. 
o On some rounds, you will be informed whether the choice maker chose 
themselves, or whether they let the computer randomly select one of you.  
On other rounds, you will not receive this information. 
 
The screenshot on the next page shows what your screen will look like for the end of 
each round: 
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As a Recipient, your payments are as follows: 
• You will receive a fixed compensation of 35 CHF, plus or minus the payment 
resulting from either the decision maker’s active choice, or the computer’s 
randomization, in the round that counts.  
Each point is worth 0.50 CHF. 
• For example, if you end up with -10 points in the round that counts, then you 
will receive 35− 0.5 ∗ 10 = 30 CHF. 
 
Part 2 of the study: Questionnaire 
After all decisions have been made, you will be asked to answer a series of questions. 
This part of the study is the same for choice makers and recipients. Please read the 
questions carefully and answer truthfully. 
 
At the end of the experiment, please do not leave the room and quietly wait until you 
receive further instructions from us.   
 
Now, please do the comprehension questions on the next page. 
 
Information about the stakes for this 
round (how much either you or the other 
recipient was going to gain or lose) 
Who made the 
choice? 
 
 In some rounds, 
you will know 
whether it was the 
choice maker 
themselves, or 
whether they let 
the computer 
decide this. In 
other rounds, this 
will not be 
revealed. 
Who received the gain or loss listed 
above?  
 
In this example, the other participant was 
randomly chosen to lose 12 points. 
 
This is a photo of the choice 
maker you were matched with 
in this round (the photos in 
the study will not be blurred). 
Please click continue as soon as you have 
read the information, so that the study can 
continue without delay. 
 
Avoiding Responsibility
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Comprehension questions  
 
Please answer the following comprehension questions and raise your hand when you are done. We will 
then come by your seat and check your answers, and answer any questions you may still have. 
 
1) How is the decision maker get assigned to the 2 recipients? And how often does this 
happen? 
a. The assignment is done randomly, but only once at the beginning of the 
study. The groups stay fixed after that, so every round, the same choice 
maker will be paired with the same two recipients. 
b. The decision maker will get to select the 2 recipients they want to be matched 
with.  This happens at the beginning of the study. 
c. The assignment of the decision maker to the 2 recipients is done randomly at 
the beginning of each round.  Since there are 36 rounds, the random 
matching will be done 36 times.   
 
2) There will be 36 rounds. Which round will count for final payment? 
a. All 36 rounds matter for payment. 
b. The last of the 36 rounds will be selected for final payment. 
c. Only one of  the 36 rounds will randomly be selected for final payment. So I 
do not know which round will be used for final payment. 
 
3) If your role is recipient, what information will you receive at the end of every round? 
a. In each round, I will see  
• a photo of the choice maker assigned to me,  
• the stakes for that round (amount to be gained or lost) 
• whether I or the other recipient receives the gain or loss. 
• whether the choice maker decided themselves or let the computer 
decide. 
b. In each round, I will see  
• a photo of the choice maker assigned to me,  
• the stakes for that round.  
• whether I or the other recipient receives the gain or loss. 
In some rounds,  
• I will also be informed of whether the choice maker decided 
themselves, or let the computer decide who receives the gain/loss. In 
other rounds, I will not receive this information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please also answer the questions on the next page 
Appendix
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Please take a look at this screenshot and answer the following questions: 
 
 
4) From the perspective of the Choice Maker, please choose the correct description to 
the above example screenshot: 
a. In the round shown above, the 2 recipients will have to share the loss of 14 
points.  The choice maker will decide how this loss shall be distributed. 
b. In the round shown above, either recipient A or B will lose 14 points.  These 
recipients will not find out whether the Choice Maker or the computer made 
the selection. 
 
5) From the perspective of the Choice Maker, consider row number 9. What options 
does the choice maker have in that row?  
(There may be more than one correc t  answer here .  Please se l e c t  a l l  that apply . )  
a. Make sure nobody loses 14 CHF, by clicking “don’t choose”. 
b. Choose himself/herself which recipient (A or B) loses 14 points. In this case, 
the choice maker would get 18.00 CHF. 
c. By clicking “don’t choose”, let the computer randomly determine which 
recipient (A or B) loses 14 points. In this case, the choice maker would get 
16.80 CHF. 
 
6) How do you know which of the 11 rows will be implemented? 
a. I do not yet know which row will be implemented. One of the 11 rows of 
choice prices will be chosen randomly. 
b. The row in the middle will be implemented for sure. 
c. I will get to choose which row will be implemented. 
 
 
When you are done with these questions, or if you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
Avoiding Responsibility
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Chapter 4
A Comment on Comparing Apples
and Oranges
Extending the Study of Decision Values to Cases
Where Options Are Presented Using Different Sen-
sory Modalities
This chapter is joint work, in all aspects, with Géraldine Coppin.
A version of this chapter (without the abstract) has also been published as:
B. Oud and G. Coppin (2012). “Extending the Study of Decision Values to Cases Where Options
Are Presented Using Different Sensory Modalities”. In: Journal of Neuroscience (Journal Club)
32.7, pp. 2248–2249.
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Abstract
One of the key promises of neuroeconomics is its potential to transform the economic study
of decision-making from an as if approach, as advocated by e.g. Friedman (1953), to an as
is science, which describes decision-making as it is actually implemented in the brain, thus
integrating currently separate scientific domains into one. It is thus an important question how
the brain actually makes value-oriented decisions. Economic science has classically described
the outcome of decisionmaking to be as if decision-makers were assessing the subjective value
(utility) of each option, and then picking the option with the highest value. An increasing
amount of evidence from neuroscience suggests that the brain may indeed operate in this
fashion. However, most of this work demonstrates this only within a given class of choice objects,
e.g. when food is compared to other foods, but not to something qualitatively different, such
as money. Here we discuss the work of Levy and Glimcher (2011), who introduce a method
that enables experimentalists to establish whether different classes of rewards are compared
using the same neural circuitry, and point out that this method could also be fruitfully used
to investigate whether representation invariance holds – i.e. whether comparisons of objects
represented across different sensory modalities (not just visually) also converge in a single
circuit.
4.1 Introduction
Shall I go see a movie tonight, or rather buy some Chinese food? Obviously, such choices between
different classes of goods (“reward types”) are conceptually complex and methodologically
challenging to investigate. Yet, they occur frequently in everyday life. How, then, does the
brain solve such problems? The view that diverse behavioral acts and sensory stimuli may be
compared via a value signal that is computed on a common scale, much like an internal currency
(Montague and Berns, 2002), is gaining traction in decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics.
According to this notion, a decision value is computed for each option. These are then compared,
and the option with the highest decision value is most likely chosen. Such comparisons require
that decision values are on the same scale – which is what the notion of a common currency
captures.
The idea that choices can be described as the outcome of maximizing decision value (usually
called decision utility in economics) is not new: it is at the very core of how economic theory
describes consumer behavior. However, economic theory has been purposefully agnostic about
whether there is actually a neural correlate of decision value, or whether this is merely a math-
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ematically convenient description that predicts behavior well. When the groundwork for this
approach was laid in the first half of the 20th century, this agnosticism was motivated chiefly by
the assertion that valuation in the brain was practically inaccessible to direct measurement. The
development of “revealed preference theory” (Samuelson, 1938) hence inverted the deductive
chain and held that preferences (which imply decision values) can be inferred from choice, as
long as choices are sufficiently consistent. More recently, however, due to advances in brain
imaging technology, the question of whether this is actually how choices are implemented in
the brain has become directly testable.
A growing body of neuroscientific research addresses this question. Previous studies in this vein
have typically proceeded in two phases. In a first phase, decision values for choice options were
estimated behaviorally, for a variety of reward types (e.g., food, non-food trinkets, monetary
rewards). In a second phase, participants were exposed to the same choice options in an fMRI
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) scanner. For each reward type, the researchers then
identified regions in which neural activity correlated with the behaviorally estimated decision
values. Regions in which activity correlates with all reward types are deemed candidates for
common currency calculation.
4.2 Apples and oranges
Levy and Glimcher (2011) proceeded in a similar fashion. Participants were exposed to choice
situations in which they were asked to choose between options from three different reward
types: water, food, and money. In some trials, both options were from the same reward type
(e.g., a certain small amount of water vs a larger but stochastic amount of water). These
“same-type” trials permitted the authors to estimate decision values for each reward type and
participant, as in previous work. However, crucially, there were also “mixed” trials where the
two options that could be chosen were from different reward types. From these mixed trials, the
authors estimated “scaling factors,” which are a sort of behavioral exchange rate that makes it
possible to convert decision values for all three reward types to a common scale. While previous
work has shown that decision values for several different reward types are encoded in spatially
overlapping brain regions (Chib et al., 2009), this by itself did not permit the conclusion that
they are also encoded on the same scale, which is essential to the concept of common currency.
This gap is filled by the work of Levy and Glimcher (2011).
In a later session, participants were presented with a series of same-reward-type trials in an fMRI
scanner. The authors then identified brain regions whose blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) signal correlated with the common-scale decision values of the options presented. These
decision values were estimated from the choices in the behavioral sessions, and converted to a
common scale using the estimated scaling factors from the mixed trials.
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The fMRI analysis revealed regions that encoded decision values selectively for one of the two
reward types (posterior cingulate cortex for money and hypothalamic areas for food), as well
as a subregion of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that correlated with common-scale
decision values for both reward types. The authors interpret this as evidence that value signals
are likely first computed in several distinct reward-type-specific regions, and then converge in
the vmPFC, in which decision values are encoded on the same scale, enabling direct comparison.
The identification of vmPFC as a common currency decision value area is in line with what has
been proposed in previous work (Chib et al., 2009). It is further corroborated by a large body
of research that, while not targeting common currency per se, has investigated decision values
for a variety of other reward types (for an overview, refer to Fehr and Rangel (2011)). Examples
range from simple choices among foods or trinkets, to more complex choices, e.g., between
monetary gambles, delayed monetary rewards, or donations to charity. Together, there is thus
considerable evidence that vmPFC correlates with decision values for many different reward
types.
However, testing these correlations separately, one reward type at a time, is not sufficient
to establish the notion of a common currency. As Levy and Glimcher, 2011 point out, this
demonstrates a spatial overlap, but it does not follow that the neural decision value signal for
different reward types is also on the same scale. The method of using mixed-type trials to
estimate exchange rates (scaling factors) across different reward types allows the authors to test
this common scale property. The results support a fundamental tenet of the common currency
hypothesis, since it is precisely the common scale property that would enable the comparison
of decision values across reward types.
4.3 Extension to other sensory modalities
We note that the research reviewed here, as well as (to our knowledge) all previous work
undertaken on common currency for decision values, presents stimuli visually at the time of
decision. However, outside the laboratory, choices in which the options are experienced via
different sensory modalities occur frequently. For instance, at a restaurant, you may hear a
waiter describe some of the dishes available, yet prefer to order what you smell from the table
behind instead. A truly universal common currency area thus ought also to encode decision
values for options presented across different sensory modalities.
Surprisingly, this appears not yet to have been directly tested. Perhaps this is due to the
comparative ease of presenting stimuli visually in the scanner. However, with the increasing
spread of MRI-compatible olfactometers, gustatometers, and tactile stimulators, the required
technology is now more readily accessible than ever.
Levy and Glimcher, 2011’s approach of harnessing mixed-choice situations to establish common-
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scale encoding seems well suited for adaption to cases where options are presented using
gustatory, olfactory, or, perhaps most easily, auditory modalities. For instance, participants
might hear short acoustic samples of songs, before making their choice of which song(s) they
would like to receive as a full copy. In analogy to the method in Levy and Glimcher (2011), one
would combine such “same-modality” trials with “mixed-modality” trials, in which participants
decide between options presented via different modalities, e.g., where they decide between
music presented via the short auditory previews and music that is presented visually (using
album covers).
Varying modalities can in principle be combined with varying reward types. From an ex-
perimental point of view, one would want to vary these two dimensions as independently as
possible. This restricts what kinds of options can be offered in such an experiment, since some
rewards are not easy to identify across different sensory modalities. For instance, it is hard
to identify money by smell. Hence, to extend Levy and Glimcher (2011) design (using same-
and mixed-reward type trials) by this additional dimension (same- and mixed-modality trials),
one would have to present participants with options that can be identified easily across the
modalities used in the study.
It should be noted that although several studies (Plassmann et al., 2008; Valentin and O’Doherty,
2009) have delivered stimuli using modalities other than vision in the scanner, these studies were
designed to answer different questions and hence do not resolve the issue we raise here. First,
all stimuli within each of these studies were presented in the same way, i.e., there were no
mixed-modality choices of the sort we are proposing. Second, non-visual stimulus presentation
occurred not at the stage of decision value, but at later stages, designed to track outcome value
(upon consumption) or anticipated value (after decisions but before consumption).
To conclude, Levy and Glimcher’s (2011) study convincingly makes the case that vmPFC en-
codes decision values for food and monetary rewards on a common scale. We believe their
experimental design is well suited for an extension to choice situations where the options are
presented using different modalities.
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Chapter 5
First Impressions: Facial Cues and
Trusting Behavior
The research reported in this chapter was designed and conducted jointly with Tony Williams,
Jan Engelmann, Eva Krumhuber and Ernst Fehr. The text in this chapter was written by me. I
would like to thank Tony Williams, Jan Engelmann and Eva Krumhuber for helpful comments
on an earlier version of this paper, as well as literature recommendations.
This chapter, as included here, has not been published elsewhere, though Tony Williams has
also written a chapter based on the same data, which is now a part of his dissertation.
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Abstract
How are initial expectations of trustworthiness formed? When a history of past transactions is
known, reputational information can be used to estimate the likelihood of future trustworthiness.
However, in many important one-shot interactions, one does not have access to such a history.
Here, we report work that investigated whether participants use the faces of counterparts in the
context of a trust game. We further analyze what aspects of the faces participants responded to,
and analyze whether it was economically beneficial to do so.
In a first experiment, participants played trust games against a series of counterparts while
seeing their facial photographs. By contrasting responses to different versions of the same
photos, which were subtly morphed in shape, we show that participants did indeed use facial
features to guide their behavior, and that the patterns were systematic. In particular, participants
were more trusting of photos that expressed a more positive emotional state, and of photos that
were more feminine. Further, we asked whether participants benefited from viewing the photos.
To do this, we compared the earnings of trustors who saw (un-morphed) counterpart photos
to the earnings of a second group of trustors who saw no photos but played against the same
counterparts’ strategies. We found no evidence that using (un-morphed) facial information
helped trustors’ earnings.
In a second experiment, participants were incentivized to guess trustee behavior while viewing
their photos. We found no evidence that participants had this ability, as there was no correlation
whatsoever between the guesses and actual behavior. Taken together, this poses the puzzle of
why participants made systematic use of an essentially worthless cue.
5.1 Introduction
Much work has been done on how people learn from observing past behavior of others, but
economic research has little to say about how first impressions are formed in the absence of such
a history. Yet, the need to judge the trustworthiness of strangers arises frequently in one-shot
face-to-face interactions that permeate everyday life. Whether it is the stranger whose cab you
enter at the airport in an unfamiliar country, the unknown person you ask to watch your bag at
a bar while you order a drink, or the stranger you hand your car keys to who may or may not
truly be a valet, often these decisions need to be made rapidly and with no known history of
interactions.
One potential way to infer the level of trustworthiness of other people is to observe their faces.
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Psychological research suggests that facial cues permit inferences about current mental states,
such as emotions and attentional focus, but are also commonly used to infer more stable social
characteristics, such as personality traits (Olivola and Todorov, 2010; Willis and Todorov, 2006;
Zebrowitz and Montepare, 2008).
In this article, we focus on the role of facial features for trustworthiness assessments of strangers.
Facial cues are particularly interesting to study due to their pervasiveness in many interactions
that require trust, and due to the rapidity with which humans can form trustworthiness impres-
sions based on these cues (Todorov, Pakrashi, and Oosterhof, 2009).1
Our investigation is based on data from two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigate
the effect of particular facial configurations on trusting behavior. It turns out that trusting
behavior can be up- or down-regulated by manipulating the shape of a counterpart’s face in
a very subtle way. This not only confirms that particular facial configurations causally impact
trust-related responses, even when money is on the line, but also constitutes a proof of concept
that morphing technology, which is frequently used in face perception research, can be fruitfully
brought to bear also in economic research. In experiment 2, we investigate the extent to which
participants were able to guess counterpart behavior based on photographs. Guesses and actual
behavior were completely uncorrelated, which poses the puzzle of why participants would react
to photographs in a systematic fashion at all.
5.1.1 Organization of the rest of this article
Section 5.2 discusses existing literature on how facial cues are used in trustworthiness assess-
ments. Sections 5.3-5.6 discuss our empirical work. Section 5.3 discusses the creation of the
stimuli used in experiments 1 and 2. Section 5.4 discusses experiment 1, which investigates
whether and how people use facial photographs to determine their behavior in the trust game.
Section 5.5 analyzes whether using the photographs was actually useful for participants – i.e.
whether they could infer behavior from the photos and whether this resulted in them mak-
ing more money. Section 5.6 reports some additional robustness checks. Finally, section 5.7
concludes.
5.2 Motivation and theoretical background
Here, we discuss our research questions, shedding light on previous work that has addressed
them, and on what our work adds.
1 While other research (DeSteno et al., 2012) has recently investigated how body language is used to infer trustwor-
thiness judgments, such judgments require a certain duration of interaction, because these cues unfold in time.
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5.2.1 Are faces used to infer trustworthiness? What is it about the faces?
The use of faces Eckel and Petrie (2011) report research in which participants played trust
games, with three experimental conditions: (1) no pictures of counterparts were visible, (2) both
trustors and trustees saw photos of each other, and (3) both players were given the option to
purchase a picture of their counterpart for that round. They found that trustors were willing
to pay to see a photo of their counterparts’ faces, which signifies that they apparently attached
informational value to seeing them. They also found that the variance in the transfers made
by trustors was higher when they saw photos than when they did not, which is consistent
with trustors somehow conditioning their trusting behavior on the photos (though note that
this neither constitutes direct evidence, nor identifies what it is about the photos that trustors
responded to).
As to whether viewing photos was beneficial, conditional on the behavior of one’s counterpart,
Eckel and Petrie’s (2011) results were inconclusive. Although viewing trustee’s photos resulted
in slightly higher earnings for trustors, this difference was not statistically significant. Primarily,
participants appear to have benefited if their counterpart saw a photo of them, suggesting that
seeing the photos may have served as something like a coordination device on a more cooperative
outcome.
In the present study, we build on this work, with some important differences. Note that in Eckel
and Petrie’s (2011) study, observability was mutual – that is, it is not unambiguous what part of
the effect is driven by oneself seeing a photo, versus knowing that the counterpart is seeing one’s
own photo. Since we were interested primarily in the informativeness of photos themselves,
we dissociated this in our study. Our decision-makers played against photographed trust game
partners, but know that they are are not themselves seen.
How faces are used. Further, our design targeted a deeper identification of what it is about fa-
cial photographs that people use to guide their behavior. For this purpose, we used results from
psychological research on face perception. Based on participants’ ratings of large sets of faces,
such research (e.g. Stirrat and Perrett, 2010; Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008) has proposed particu-
lar facial configurations to be prototypically trustworthy- or untrustworthy-looking. Oosterhof
and Todorov (2008) had participants rate computer-generated faces on a number of dimensions
including trustworthiness. The face generating software (Modeller, 2006) permits parametri-
cally varying a large number of facial parameters. Using a principal components approach, the
authors identified facial configurations that best predicted participants’ trustworthiness ratings,
i.e., brow ridge (down/up), cheekbones (shallow/pronounced), chin (wide/thin), and nose sellion
(shallow/deep) (Todorov, Baron, and Oosterhof, 2008). This research demonstrates that stated
perceptions of trustworthiness correlate with particular aspects of facial structure, and identifies
prototypical facial configurations that are consistently rated as trustworthy or untrustworthy.
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While this research, at first glance, appears to answer the question what it is that people use
in their trustworthiness judgments, directly applying these findings or these stimuli to credible
trust games faces some challenges. First, the faces used by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) can
readily be identified as computer-generated.2 Visible artificiality of such photos would questions
the credibility of stating that a photo represents a real counterpart, if one used them in a trust
game. Yet, believing this is actually quite crucial, since hypothetical play need not be the
same as actual incentivized play, and is plausibly more vulnerable to experimenter demand
effects. Hence, it remains to be tested whether these purportedly trustworthy or non-trustworthy
facial configurations also affect trust-related behavior in credible and economically meaningful
settings. Second, if stimuli are purely computer-generated, it is not necessarily true that the
facial features that were identified this way also occur in real life. Hence, it is an open question
whether people base real-world judgments on the same features that were identified using
artificial faces.3
What our research adds. Our research brings together key elements of both the incentivized
setting from Eckel and Petrie (2011) and the psychological research on face perception. We main-
tained credibility from the perspective of participants by using real participants’ photographs
and strategies, and providing real financial incentives. In addition, to establish causally that the
facial features were indeed used in a systematic way, we used morphing technology4 to subtly
impose the facial features proposed as prototypically trustworthy or untrustworthy (Oosterhof
and Todorov, 2008) onto these existing faces, and analyzed how this affected trustor behavior.
Because we imposed these features exogenously, we can be sure of causality. Critically, the
manipulations were subtle enough for the generated photographs to have appeared realistic,
and even upon close inspection, it is demonstrably nearly impossible to tell that any form of
manipulation has taken place at all.5
We found that the exogenous face manipulation was systematically reflected in behavior. First-
movers’ likelihood to send money to their counterpart in a binary trust game was approximately
2Examples of what such computer-generated faces look like can be found in the “prototype images” on the extreme
left and right in figure 5.1 on page 106. Even less credibility, Brown and Moore (2002) used line-drawn cartoon faces,
informing participants that these “represent” their counterparts.
3Stirrat and Perrett (2010) investigate the correlation of facial width-to-height ratio with trustworthiness perceptions
and behavior in a trust game setting. Male participants with wider faces (as measured by the width-to-height ratio)
were trusted less by others, and also displayed less trustworthy behavior than males with slimmer faces. The causality
of facial width for trustworthiness assessments was tested by morphing the existing photographs of male faces to
a wider/narrower shape, and then collecting trustworthiness ratings for these images. The results demonstrate that
morphing the faces modified the trustworthiness ratings for these faces in the predicted direction. The authors conclude
that facial width-to-height is indeed used to predict trustworthiness, and these predictions are in fact valid. Stirrat and
Perrett (2010) argue that, since higher testosterone levels during adolescence cause facial width to increase, perhaps
people with wider faces are more likely to be more physically imposing in general, and thus can better afford to be
non-trustworthy, since it is more difficult to retaliate against them.
4To morph photos, we used standard morphing software (Psychomorph, see Tiddeman, Burt, and Perrett (2001)),
which is well-established in face perception research (see Bruce and Young (1998), Walker and Tanaka (2003), Calder
(1996), and Thielscher and Pessoa (2007))
5A separate group of participants were unable to identify morphed images as such above chance level – this will be
reported in more detail in section 5.6.1 (page 125) for details.
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10% higher for up- versus down-morphed counterpart images. This constitutes direct and
credible evidence (1) that faces were indeed used systematically by trustors, and (2) that trustors
used the trustworthiness/untrustworthiness features identified by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008)
systematically, even when real money was on the line.
Since these participants later also gave us ratings on trustworthiness, emotional expression and
a number of other dimensions for the same images that they had played against, we were further
able to identify what it was about the morphing that drove the behavioral effect. According to
our data, the modification impacted trust-related behavior mainly by modifying perceptions of
positive affect and the femininity of the faces.
5.2.2 Does it help to view the faces of counterparts?
As mentioned above, we found that participants responded to the features we imposed onto
faces in a systematic way. However, was viewing the photos in fact actually useful for predicting
counterpart behavior? In order to investigate this, we (1) compared earnings of trustors when
seeing versus not seeing (non-morphed) photographs and (2) incentivized a separate group of
participants to guess trustee behavior, based on their (non-morphed) photos.
(1) Earnings were not improved by seeing photos. For the first question, we contrasted
earnings between trustors who saw, versus did not see, photographs of their counterparts,6
finding no significant differences. In fact, mean earnings were slightly (though not significantly)
lower for trustors who saw photos of their counterparts.
(2) (In-)Ability to guess behavior from photos. Since, at least in principle, there may be other
(pro-social) motives for making a transfer to a trustee than just their perceived trustworthiness,
we additionally opted to measure how well trustworthiness could be assessed (from the photos)
by third parties who were not interacting with the trustees on the picture. Prior research on how
well people can infer dispositional trustworthiness from static facial photographs gives reason
to be pessimistic about the likelihood that people have this capacity (Efferson and Vogt, 2013;
Verplaetse, Vanneste, and Braeckman, 2007).
To investigate the question of guessing accuracy, we invited a separate group of participants
that was incentivized to guess the trust-game behavior of the people in our (non-morphed)
photographs as accurately as possible. We then compared the guesses to the actual behavior
of the persons in the pictures.7 If trustworthiness in our setting could validly be inferred, then
one would expect a positive correlation between the guesses and actual behavior. There was,
6Crucially, both the photo-viewing and the non-photo-viewing participants were playing against the (actual) pre-
determined choices of the same set of counterparts.
7Efferson and Vogt (2013) use a very similar method.
101
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
however, no such correlation. We thus found no evidence that people could accurately infer
anything about trust game behavior from static neutral-expression facial cues.
We also measured how certain participants were of their guesses. If people were good at
assessing their ability to infer behavior, one would expect that people guessed more accurately
when they were more certain. However, again, we found no evidence for this, suggesting that
people are overconfident in their ability to infer valid information from static facial cues such as
ours.
The result that facial photos do not apparently help with predicting trust game behavior is in
line with findings from related work (Efferson and Vogt, 2013). However, Efferson and Vogt
(2013) did not also demonstrate that people actually use the faces to guide behavior in the first
place. It is particularly the aspect of systematically using apparently ‘useless’ information that is
intriguing in our data. Nor does their work establish any systematicity in how facial characteristics
are used, which we do here.
Why use ‘useless’ information? Taken together, we thus obtain the puzzling finding that faces
were used systematically by trustors, even though they had no demonstrable informational value.
While we do not find any evidence that our participants were able to extract strategically useful
information from the photos, note that our data do not preclude that with richer stimuli (like
moving as opposed to static images, taken at the time of the decision, rather than out of context),
above-chance trustworthiness detection may actually work. However, there is evidence that
the dynamics of facial expressions matter for the perception of whether a smile is authentic
(Krumhuber et al., 2007). Further, it may matter that our photographs were not taken at the
exact time of the decision, but afterwards. There is also evidence (Verplaetse, Vanneste, and
Braeckman, 2007) that reliable detection may be possible only when the images viewed are from
the exact moment of choice. We purposefully employed static, neutral expression photographs,
taken immediately after, but outside of the actual decision context, because we wanted to ensure
that whatever we pick up can truly be attributed to stable facial features, which could at least
potentially reveal a stable, dispositional kind of trustworthiness.
If such an ability exists with richer stimuli, it is conceivable that participants simply mis-applied
this skill in a setting where these mechanisms cannot function. At the same time, even if it were
possible to correctly detect trustworthiness from richer stimuli, the question would remain why
people then mis-apply this detection apparatus also in a situation where the stimulus is not rich
enough for such inferences.
Furthermore, rich or not, out-of-context photographs are present in many ecologically valid
situations – from billboard advertisements, to print media, to job applications (at least in most
of Europe). Hence it is important to understand how and why people use such cues.
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5.3 Generating our stimuli (obtaining facial pictures and choices)
In this section, we describe how we obtained our set of facial pictures and the corresponding
behaviors.
In our preparatory sessions, we obtained trust game behavior and then facial photographs from
a group of participants for use as stimuli in the later experiment phases. Accordingly, we will
refer to these participants as the “stimulus group”.
We recruited a total of n = 84 participants (average earnings=28.67 CHF) from a participant
database using the recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Participants were mainly
students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH).
Written instructions informed participants that they would first be playing five rounds of a
“decision situation” (the trust game), followed by a lengthy survey, during which they would
be given the opportunity to participate in an additional, optional study, for which separate
consent was needed. The instructions further explained that they would be compensated by
a show-up fee of 20 CHF, plus any earnings accruing from the decision situations, and that
participation in the optional second study entailed further payments, that did not affect the
payments from the first study.
5.3.1 Obtaining pre-recorded trust game behavior
Participants were assigned the role of either a first- or second-mover in the trust game that
followed, and kept this role until the end of the experiment.
In the game, second-movers received the same endowment as first-movers (12 CHF), in order to
rule out inequality aversion as a motive to send money to second-movers. First-movers faced a
binary choice of whether to send 10 CHF or not. This amount was tripled before being passed
on to the second-mover, who could then decide how much of the amount received to send back
to the first-mover (between 0 and 30 CHF). If the second-mover received nothing, he could not
send anything back.
Importantly, behavior was recorded using the strategy method. That is, second-movers made
their decision without knowing whether their counterpart had in fact sent anything. Thus,
second-movers made a conditional decision that applied only if it later turned out that they had
in fact received 30CHF from their counterpart. Otherwise their choice became irrelevant.
Five rounds of this game were played, each time with a different random and anonymous
counterpart. In order to prevent learning effects and to rule out reputation as an incentive at
the group level, no feedback was given during the study; in particular, subjects never learned
the behavior of their counterpart in a given round. That is, participants were not told what
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their counterpart from the previous round had done before the next round. One of the five
rounds was drawn at random for payment, and subjects received their earnings at the end of
the experimental session (i.e. after the picture taking and survey parts that followed).
Both the trust game and the questionnaires that followed were run in a multi-seat computer
laboratory, using the software package z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
5.3.2 Obtaining facial pictures
Only after completing the five rounds of the trust game, participants were given consent forms
explaining that they had the option to participate in a second study. This second study would
involve us (1) taking a facial pictures and a scan of the participant’s hands and (2) obtaining
permission to use the picture, in original and edited versions, as well as the choices of the par-
ticipant during the session, with future participants. For this separate participation, volunteers
were compensated with an additional 10 CHF, and would potentially earn additional money
which accrued due to the re-use of their choices with further participants. This second study
was conducted in parallel to everyone filling in a lengthy (approximately 45 minute) survey.
Whether or not they chose to participate in the optional part of the study, they would have to
remain in the lab until everyone was done with the survey. Subjects were individually taken
to a second room to submit their consent forms and, if they chose to participate, to have their
photographs and hand scans taken. We did this to ensure that every subject left the main room
for approximately two minutes, making it difficult to infer whether others chose to participate.
We announced the details of this phase (i.e. that pictures would be taken) only after the five
rounds had been played, in order to avoid biasing the behavior of our participants in the five
rounds played initially.
In this fashion, we obtained informed consent to use the choices and facial pictures of 63
participants. One of the participants was later removed from our set of stimuli because she was
visibly much older than the rest of the participants, leaving us with 62 facial images and choices.
Table 5.1 summarizes the composition of our stimulus group.
40 
 
8 Tables 
 
 first mover second mover Total 
male 17 15 32 
female 14 16 30 
Total 31 31 62 
 
Table 1: Composition of the stimulus group, whose pictures and choices were later used against other 
participants in experiments 1 and 2. 
 
  first mover second mover Total 
male 42 40 82 
female 33 41 74 
Total 75 81 156 
 
Table 2: Participants in experiment 1 
 
 
Table 3: Factor analysis.  
Factor analysis of ratings obtained fort each face by the main group participants, after the trust game phase 
of the experiment had been completed. The table shows rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique 
F2:$“Nega*ve$aﬀect”$ F3:$“Power?”$ F4:$“Femininity”$
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness
attract 0.60 80.02 0.36 0.26 0.4365
anger 80.39 0.33 0.64 80.12 0.3086
fear 0.13 0.79 80.06 0.08 0.3526
happiness 0.83 80.05 0.03 0.07 0.3028
surprise 0.15 0.68 0.04 0.06 0.5162
disgust 80.18 0.64 0.35 80.04 0.4302
sad 80.04 0.73 0.01 80.03 0.458
dominant 80.11 80.01 0.87 80.07 0.2251
masculine 0.04 0.05 0.19 80.92 0.1042
feminine 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.89 0.12
competitive 0.19 80.02 0.78 80.05 0.3577
friendly 0.89 0.04 80.12 0.08 0.1895
warm 0.86 0.08 80.10 0.08 0.2408
F1:$“Posi*ve$aﬀect”$
Department of Economic…, 29/7/13 11:01
Comment [50]: While I like full disclosure, 
these tables are easier to read, if one suppresses 
factor loadings < 0.4 or some other reasonable 
threshold. We could include the full table in an 
appendix if requested by reviewers. 
Bastiaan Oud  29/7/13 11:01
Comment [49]: Thanks Jan, point taken – is 
there any standard way to determine the cutoff 
in a non-arbitrary way? 
Table 5.1: Composition of the stimulus group, whose pictures and choices were later used against other
participants in experiments 1 and 2.
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For each of the facial pictures, we created two very subtly morphed versions (refer to Figure 5.1
(page 106) for some sample images), with the goal of exogenously manipulating the perceived
trustworthiness of the images. The original photographs were morphed 30% in shape (but not
color and texture) towards either an “up” or a “down” prototypical face using the software
package JPsychomorph (Tiddeman, Burt, and Perrett, 2001), which has been used extensively
in psychological research on face perception (e.g. Egan and Cordan (2009), Lobmaier et al.
(2010), and Skinner and Benton (2012)). The “up” and “down” prototypes, towards which
we morphed our images, were computer-generated faces displaying a combination of facial
features that were rated in a previous study to look particularly trustworthy or untrustworthy
(taken from Oosterhof and Todorov (2008)). These stimuli have not yet been validated in an
incentivized setting, and are also not suitable for this purpose, because it is easy to see that they
are computer-generated images. Therefore it would not be credible to tell participants that “this
is an image of your counterpart” in a trust game. In contrast, the morphed images generated in
our study are not recognizably manipulated. Furthermore, the images are identity-preserving in
the sense that the person in the photo remains easily recognizable despite the morphing. When
seeing the images in isolation, it is almost impossible to tell whether an image is manipulated
or not – for a side-by-side comparison of modified and original images, please refer to Figure
5.1 (page 106).
5.4 Do people make systematic use of facial information in trust
games?
Here, we report the results of experiment 1, which was designed to test whether, by subtly
imposing the facial features proposed by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) onto existing faces,
we could influence behavior in incentivized trust games. The results show that this is indeed
feasible. We imposed these features onto existing faces by subtly morphing them in shape, and
then let a new group of participants play trust games against these subtly morphed images. A
further group of participants also played the trust game with unmorphed photos, as a baseline.
Because the same participants later rated these facial images on a number of dimensions includ-
ing emotional expression, we were also able to shed light on what the modification changed in
the images and how this affected behavior.
5.4.1 Methods
Participants We recruited N = 273 participants (140 male, 133 female, mean age 22.38 years)
from the University of Zurich’s participant pool (using ORSEE, Greiner (2004)). These par-
ticipants played the trust game against the pre-recorded strategies and pictures of the earlier
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participants. Participants were assigned either the role of trustor (first-mover) or of trustee
(second-mover), and kept this role throughout the experiment.
Instructions Participants learned about the study’s procedures and their task from written
instructions.8 The instructions explained the same trust game as described above, but informed
our participants that their counterparts had participated in an earlier experiment and had already
made their choices. In each round, while they made their decision, participants were shown a
facial photograph of their counterpart on the computer screen. After reading the instructions,
participants had to correctly complete a comprehension test in order to be able to begin with the
experiment.
Trust game against photographs Each of the participants played a trust game against each of
the pre-recorded behavior of each of the counterparts in our stimulus set, resulting in 31 rounds
of play.9 One of the rounds was going to be paid out in full, to both the participant present and
the counterpart in the picture (who received the payment in cash by mail).
Experimental conditions / morphed photos Unbeknownst to participants, the experimental
conditions differed regarding how and whether the photos were morphed – they could be either
UP-MORPHED (morphed towards a trustworthy prototype), NOT MORPHED, or DOWN-
MORPHED (morphed towards an untrustworthy prototype). To avoid deceiving participants,
they were informed in the instructions only that the image had been digitally edited, but not
precisely how it had been modified. The relevant line was phrased as follows : “You will note
that we have processed the images. For instance, we have used black oval cutouts so that only the face of
your counterpart remains visible.” The instructions hence explicitly mentioned only the black oval
cutouts, but did not preclude that other modifications may also have taken place. We believe
this formulation avoids deception of the participants, while simultaneously avoiding possible
experimenter demand effects associated with a closer description of the image morphing.
In the NOT-MORPHED sessions (N1 = 116, thereof 56 first-movers and 60 second-movers),
participants played against photos that were unmodified, apart from the black oval cutout.
In the MORPHED sessions (N2 = 157, thereof 75 first-movers and 82 second-movers), out
of the photos a given participant saw, approximately half were UP- and half were DOWN-
MORPHED. For counter-balancing, a second participant from the same session saw the same
image, but flipped for the direction of modification.10 These up- and down-morphed images
were shown in a random sequence (rather than in a blocked fashion), in order to pre-empt the
8For a copy of the original German instructions, refer to the appendix, page 154.
9The behavior from one of the five rounds that the persons in the pictures played was chosen at random.
10As there were 31 target images, the ratio was always 15:16. Since there was always a second participant who saw
the same photos with the opposite modification, this was fully counterbalanced.
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emergence of any obvious patterns or systematic sequence effects.11 Each participant saw only
one version of any given face – i.e. no participant saw multiple versions of the same face. This
was done to avoid raising suspicion as to the nature of our manipulations.
Decisions While viewing their counterpart’s morphed face, which was displayed in the left
half of the screen, participants made their decisions. Refer to page 142 for screenshots of the
decision screens.
First-movers were asked the following: “Both you and participant B receive 12 CHF to begin
with. Do you want to send 10 CHF to participant B?”. They gave their answers by clicking on
either “Yes” or “No” . Second-movers’ decisions about how much to send back, conditional on
receiving 3x10=30 CHF, were made by typing in an integer between 0 and 30 CHF. We emphasize
that the decision screen made it clear that the decision was conditional on receiving a transfer
from the first-mover. That is, the backtransfer was only going to happen if it turned out that
they had received a transfer of 3x10=30 CHF. Both the instructions and the screen also made it
clear that they could not send any money back if the other person sent nothing.
Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate what they believed their counterpart had
done. For first-movers, this meant guessing the amount that their counterpart had conditionally
transferred, by typing in a number between 0 and 30. Second-movers answered the question
“What do you estimate: how much did participant A send to you?” by clicking onto radio
buttons denoting either 0 CHF or 10 CHF. Finally, participants were asked “How sure are you of
your guess?”. Answers were given by clicking onto an 11-point Likert scale, which ranged from
“not at all” to “very certain” .
No feedback about the behavior of the persons in the photos was given during the experiment,
in order to avoid possible learning effects.
Payment Subjects received a fixed participation fee of 10 CHF (about 11 USD). They were
informed that, in addition, one of the 31 trust game rounds would be randomly selected for
payment, and that the decisions from this round were going to determine their own payoff as
well as the payoff of their counterpart from that round. Participants received their payments in
cash at the end of the study.
Rating of the faces After participants had completed all 31 trust games, the second phase of
the experiment began. In this phase, participants were again shown the same facial images
that they previously saw during the trust games, and asked to rate them on the following
11Minor structure was imposed on the randomization procedure to avoid the potential for large blocks of same-
direction morphs occurring through chance.
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dimensions: good-lookingness12, angriness, fearfulness, happiness, surprise, disgustedness,
sadness, dominance, masculinity, femininity, competitiveness, friendliness and warmth. Ratings
were given on seven-point Likert scales. The order of these dimensions was randomized between
subjects, but each given subject always saw the same order of questions on each of their rating
screens.
5.4.2 Results for first-movers (trustors)
Treatment effects
We begin by analyzing simple treatment effects, and find the following:
Result 1. The trusting behavior of first-movers was modified by the morphing. The likelihood of
transferring money to the photo was increased by up-morphing and de-creased by down-morphing,
relative to baseline. We observe a significant increase in likelihood of transferring money to up-morphed
images, relative to down-morphed images.
These findings were obtained as follows.
Descriptive results Figure 5.2 (page 110) displays the mean fraction of trials in which a transfer
was made, depending on the morphing condition of the counterpart photos. UP-MORPHED
counterparts received transfers in a larger fraction of trials (58.1%) than not morphed photos
(54.1%), and DOWN-MORPHED photos had the smallest likelihood of receiving a transfer
(47.3%).
Is this effect present only in the means, or is it present also at the individual level? Since only the
participants of the MORPHED group saw photos from different morphing conditions, we look
at this data. Figure 5.3 (page 111) plots, for each trustor, the fraction of trials in which they sent
money to up-morphed recipients (vertical axis) vs. down-morphed recipients (horizontal axis).
Thus, a dot above the 45 degree line signifies a participant who sent money more frequently
when images were up-morphed. The graph shows that out of the trustors who responded to
photographs at all, the vast majority made transfers more frequently to UP-MORPHED than to
DOWN-MORPHED trustee photos.
Statistical results We use the within-subjects power from the MORPHED sessions to run a
regression analysis. Columns 1-3 in Table 5.2 (page 112) analyze the simple treatment effect in
12We were concerned that subjects may potentially feel uncomfortable rating physical “attractiveness” of same-sex
counterparts and simply enter “not at all” on all screens. Therefore, we used the German term “gut aussehend”
(good-looking) rather than “attraktiv” (attractive) as the former does not imply sexual attraction.
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Figure 5.2: Mean fraction of trials in which trustors made transfers. NMORPHED = 75, NNOT MORPHED = 56
trustors. Error bars denote SE of the mean. To obtain independent observations, the data was collapsed
to individual means before computing the standard errors, i.e. one datapoint was one trustor’s individual
mean. Note that up- vs. down-morphed conditions were encountered within subject, such that the error
bars understate significance.
the context of a simple regression model that includes the treatment as a binary regressor, and
show unambiguously that the likelihood of sending a transfer was significantly higher (by about
11%) when participants viewed upward morphed images, regardless of specification (p < 0.001
for all three specifications, standard errors clustered by subject).13 While this effect is present
when analyzing the data across the entire sample, its magnitude is naturally even larger when
excluding all participants who chose fixed strategies – i.e. omitting those who did the exact
same thing each round of the study (columns 2 and 3).
The significant treatment effect demonstrates the attributes that vary between the “trustworthy-
looking” and “untrustworthy-looking” faces are indeed used by decision-makers in the trust
game.
This result of course makes perfect strategic sense. If first-movers are selfish profit maximizers,
they should condition their behavior on their beliefs about the trustworthiness of their counter-
part, as this determines their expected returns on trusting behavior.
13Although we include two OLS specifications (columns 1 and 2) to show the robustness of results, given the binary
dependent variable, we employ probit regressions in all following columns).
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Figure 5.3: Fraction of trials in which trustors made transfers to up- versus down-morphed counterparts,
n = 75. 27 trustors used a fixed strategy (same choice each round). Of the participants who had any
variance at all in their behavior, most sent more money to images that were morphed up than to images
that were morphed down. Each data point represents the average behavior of one participant. Points above
the 45 degree line represent participants who sent more money to up- than to down-modified counterparts.
The data in this graph was slightly jittered to reduce the occurrence of visually overlapping data points.
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Regression results: Influences on the likelihood of transfers, in the group of trustors (first 
movers) who played against morphed photos of trustees (second movers). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit 
Probit, 
male 
trustors 
only 
Probit, 
female 
trustors  
only 
Treatment: 
morphed up (d) 
0.109*** ! 
(0.000) 
0.170*** 
!(0.000) 
0.162*** 
!(0.000) 
0.0135 ! 
(0.623) 
0.0269 
!(0.332) 
0.00583 ! 
(0.870) 
0.0439 ! 
(0.316) 
        
Positive photo affect  
(Factor 1) ! ! ! 
0.122*** 
!(0.000) 
0.122*** 
!(0.000) 
0.140*** ! 
(0.000) 
0.104*** 
!(0.000) 
        
Negative photo affect  
(Factor 2) ! ! ! 
-0.0169 ! 
(0.431) 
-0.0193 
!(0.364) 
-0.00881 ! 
(0.765) 
-0.0308 ! 
(0.334) 
        
Photo power  
(Factor 3) ! ! ! 
-0.0228 ! 
(0.176) 
-0.0193 
!(0.235) 
-0.0338 ! 
(0.106) 
-0.0135 ! 
(0.583) 
        
Photo femininity 
(Factor 4) ! ! ! 
0.0444*** ! 
(0.000) 
0.00802 ! 
(0.687) 
-0.00394 
!(0.882) 
0.0227 ! 
(0.443) 
        
TRUSTOR FEMALE 
(d) ! ! ! ! 
-0.0595* 
!(0.094) ! ! 
        
TRUSTEE (PHOTO) 
FEMALE  
(d) 
! ! ! ! 0.146*** !(0.005) 
0.155** ! 
(0.011) 
0.0130 ! 
(0.854) 
        
Interaction: 
TRUSTOR FEMALE X 
TRUSTEE FEMALE 
! ! ! ! -0.113** ! (0.029) ! ! 
Regression constant 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual de-meaning via subject dummies 
via subject 
dummies 
via subject 
dummies 
via subject 
dummies 
via subject 
dummies 
via subject 
dummies 
via subject 
dummies 
Excludes participants 
w. fixed strategies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2325 1488 1488 1488 1488 775 713 
number of clusters 
(=number of trustors) 75 48 48 48 48 
25 (male 
only) 
23 (female 
only) 
BIC 1368.1 1518.3 1467.1 1369.5 1360.2 672.0 716.4 
 
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
Column 1: N=75 participants. Columns 2-5: N=48 (dropping 27 participants with fixed strategies who made the exact 
same choice in each trial of the study). Columns 6 and 7: only male / only female decision-makers. All standard errors 
clustered by participant.  
 
Table 5.2: Regression results (First-movers, Experiment 1). p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is a binary variable that is 1 if the subject made a transfer to
the cond-mover, and zero otherwise. Columns 1-3 show that upward morphed images receive transfers
significantly more frequently than downward morphed images. Column 4 shows that the effect of the
morphing is explained away by the change in image attributes (as captured by the four factors). Columns
5-7 show that the gender of subjects and recipients mattered, but that this does not explain away the effect
of the identified factors. Columns 2-7 drop the 27 participants who had fixed strategies, i.e. who made
the exact same choice in each trial of the study. Probit regressions report marginal effects dy/dx. Standard
errors were clustered by trustor in all specifications. The symbol (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables.
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Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
``Positive 
affect''
``Negative 
affect'' ``Power'' ``Femininity'' Uniqueness
good-looking 0.61 -0.06 0.32 0.28 0.44          
angry -0.42 0.34 0.59 -0.12 0.35          
fearful 0.10 0.78 -0.07 0.06 0.37          
happy 0.83 -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.31          
surprised 0.14 0.64 0.01 0.00 0.57          
disgusted -0.18 0.69 0.30 -0.04 0.40          
sad -0.10 0.72 -0.04 -0.01 0.47          
dominant -0.18 0.01 0.84 -0.09 0.26          
masculine 0.01 0.04 0.16 -0.93 0.10          
feminine 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.92 0.11          
competitive 0.08 -0.04 0.77 -0.07 0.39          
friendly 0.86 -0.01 -0.20 0.08 0.21          
warm 0.83 0.07 -0.15 0.09 0.27          
Ra
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Table 5.3: Factor analysis. We obtained ratings on a number of attributes for each face (shown here
in the rows) by the participants of experiment 1, after the trust game phase of the experiment had been
completed. Because these are highly correlated, we reduced the dimensionality using a factor analysis. The
table shows rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances, using varimax rotation, which
orthogonalizes factors. The resulting four factors are in the columns. “Uniqueness” measures fraction
of variance of the variable that is not shared with other variables. Note: for better visual clarity, factor
loadings that are (at an arbitrary cutoff of) < 0.3 in absolute value are reproduced in lighter print, leaving
only large-magnitude loadings in black print.
How did the treatment operate?
Having found that the photo morphing influenced trusting behavior, we next ask by what
channels the morphing operated. To answer this question, we used the image perception
ratings that participants gave after all choices had been made. Since many of these perceptual
dimensions are related to one another, one would expect some redundancy among these ratings.
We therefore first performed a factor analysis (principal components, orthogonalized factors
using varimax rotation) to reduce the dimensionality of the data. By imposing the standard
restriction that the minimum value of factor eigenvalues to be retained is 1, we were left with
four factors, which we labeled positive affect, negative affect, power and femininity. The factor
loadings are summarized in Table 5.3 (page 113).
When including the four factors as regressors (Table 5.2, page 112, column 4), we found that
they fully absorbed the effect of the photo morphing on trusting behavior. The coefficient of the
morphing dropped to a value that is essentially indistinguishable from zero, whereas the photo’s
positive affect (Factor 1) and femininity (Factor 4) now had significantly positive coefficients.
We interpret this to mean that the factors generated from the image ratings fully capture the
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essence of how the morphing affects transfer behavior. The key determinants appear to be the
expression of positive affect in the photo, as well as the gender of the photo.
We document this in result 2.
Result 2. The effect of the morphing is fully explained away by the rated photo attributes, as captured
by the four factors. In particular, positive photo affect and photo femininity significantly increased the
likelihood of making a transfer to the person in the photo.
Gender effects
Images that were perceived as more feminine (as captured by Factor 4) received higher transfers.
Based on this observation, one might wonder what effect gender plays in general in our sample.
It may not only matter what gender the photo is, but also what gender the trustor is. For
example, perhaps young men to wish to send more money to members of the opposite sex than
to their own (though note that since the interaction here featured full anonymity for trustors,
reputational effects should not plausibly accrue).
Specifications 5-7 in Table 5.2 investigate gender effects. Result 3 summarizes our findings:
Result 3. Feminine trustee photos were trusted significantly more than masculine ones. There is also
weak evidence that female trustors were more trusting than male trustors, but this result is sensitive
to model specification. Further, there was an interaction effect. Male trustors sent transfers to female
photographs significantly more frequently than to males.
We obtained this result in the following way. Incorporating binary regressors for trustor gender,
trustee (photo) gender, as well as their interaction into our probit regression model yielded that
all three coefficients were statistically highly significant (see table 5.2 on page 112, specification
5, for the exact magnitudes and p-values). Apparently, female trustors were, on average,
significantly less trusting than men. Furthermore, on average, female trustees were significantly
more likely to receive a transfer than male trustees. The interaction effect was also significant.
This is further illustrated in specifications 6 and 7, which show the effect of (trustee) photo
gender once for male trustors (specification 6) and once for female trustors (specification 7).
Here, we see that male trustors seem to be the driving force between the effect of photo gender:
men send transfers to female photos significantly more often than to men (p = 0.015). There is
no significant effect of this sort for female trustors (p = 0.854).14
14Note that the regressors “Factor 4 (photo femininity)” and “TRUSTEE FEMALE” are by construction highly
collinear. However, omitting factor 4 does not change the qualitative results reported here.
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5.5 The validity of beliefs based on faces
In the previous section, we documented (1) that people make use of facial information in the trust
game, and (2) that this use appears to follow systematic rules, as evidenced by our successful
manipulation. A systematic use of facial information would make sense if there was indeed
something useful to be learnt from the faces. To analyze whether this is the case, this section
examines evidence on the ability of decision-makers to make accurate / strategically useful
inferences when seeing faces. Across a number of tests, including an additional dedicated
experiment, we find no such evidence. This raises the puzzle of why participants responded so
systematically to information that was apparently essentially useless to them.
5.5.1 Did seeing photos help trustors earn more?
As discussed above, if some faces were recognizably and truthfully more trustworthy than
others, then one could use that information to trust selectively. If this were the case, then one
would expect that players who see photographs benefit and earn more than players who do not have
this information.
However, we find the following:
Result 4. We find no evidence that trustors who viewed unmodified photos earned more than trustors
who did not see photos of the same counterparts.
In order to obtain this result, we compared earnings in the five rounds of anonymous trust
game play from our stimulus group to the first five rounds of play by participants who viewed
photos in the NOT MORPHED condition (in experiment 1). Figure 5.4 (page 116) plots the
mean periodwise earnings for participants who saw (not morphed) photographs, as compared
to participants who saw no photos at all. Note that these participants played against the same
counterparts (the stimulus group trustors played against the stimulus group trustees, and the
experiment 1 participants played against the exact same pre-recorded strategies). Visually, it is
immediately apparent that there was no obvious improvement when seeing the photographs.
Descriptively, the mean payoffs in the overlapping five first periods were actually lower in the
group that viewed the photos (mean= 9.81 CHF, sd= 2.92 CHF), than in the group that did
not (mean= 10.43 CHF, sd= 2.36 CHF). This difference is, however, not statistically significant.
To obtain this result, we first computed mean earnings for each subject, in order to obtain
one independent datapoint per subject, and then performed a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
(Mann-Whitney) test (n1 = 42, n2 = 56, z = 1.092, p = 0.27, two-sided test).15 Thus we find no
15The same result is obtained when computing the mean payoffs for the photo viewing participants across all 31
periods (n1 = 42, n2 = 56, z = 0.947, p = 0.3434, two-sided test).
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of mean periodwise earnings (in Swiss Francs) between participants who saw
photos in the NOT MORPHED condition (Stimulus Group, n2 = 56), and participants who did not see
photos of their counterparts (Stimulus Group, n1 = 42). Note that the latter only played five rounds.
116
The validity of beliefs based on faces
evidence that using the facial information was strategically beneficial for trustors.
This raises a puzzle: if using the faces yielded no measurable benefit, then why did trustors
use the faces at all? Note that participants could have earned 12 Swiss Francs for sure if they
had simply chosen not to make a transfer – thus it would have been better for participants
to simply ignore the information provided in the pictures and never make a transfer. Indeed,
mean earnings within the group who saw photos were slightly higher among the subsample
who chose the same strategy each trial, thus ignoring the photos (mean= 10.51 CHF, sd= 3.03,
n = 20), than among those who displayed variance in their behavior (mean= 9.43 CHF, sd= 2.82,
n = 36).
Can we infer that the lack of higher earnings is because the faces are uninformative?
In experiment 1, we found no evidence that trustors benefitted from viewing photographs. It is
thus puzzling why they responded systematically to them in the first place. One possibility is that
participants used the faces to infer trustworthiness, but failed to extract anything meaningful.
Another is that participants did in fact make correct inferences about trustworthiness, but that
the faces also activated other additional motives that had nothing to do with trustworthiness
per se. For example, perhaps participants perceived faces that default to a smile as more likeable
and hence more deserving of a transfer even conditional on the same level of trustworthiness.
There is indeed some evidence that this is possible. Table 5.4 (page 118) repeats the two main
regressions from our discussion of first-mover behavior (labeled here as specifications 1 and 3),
and shows what changes when the trusworthiness ratings that participants gave to the photos
are added in as a regressor. Adding this regressor neither renders the effect of the morphing
insignificant (though it is diminished in magnitude) in the simplest specification (compare
columns 1 and 2), nor does it render the effects of the photo ratings for positive affect, or the
gender effects insignificant (compare columns 3 and 4). Since trustworthiness does not explain
away their effects these variables matter also in their own right, and not just through their effect
on trustworthiness.
Therefore it is possible that non-trustworthiness-related motives may have played a role in
participants’ reactions to the morphing, and we cannot, from the analysis of earnings alone,
infer that participants were unable to correctly infer trustworthiness of the photos. We thus
designed a dedicated separate experiment (experiment 2) to test whether people were able to
draw valid inferences about trust game behavior from static facial cues when they were not
actually playing the trust game themselves.
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Regression results: The role of trustworthiness ratings. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Treatment: 
morphed up (d) 
0.162*** ! 
(0.000) 
0.0781*** !
(0.000) 
0.0269 
!(0.332) 
0.0279 ! 
(0.303) 
     
Positive photo affect  
(Factor 1) ! ! 
0.122*** ! 
(0.000) 
0.0878*** !
(0.000) 
     
Negative photo 
affect  
(Factor 2) 
! ! -0.0193 !(0.364) 
-0.0216 
!(0.318) 
     
Photo power  
(Factor 3) ! ! 
-0.0193 ! 
(0.235) 
-0.0141 ! 
(0.384) 
     
Photo femininity 
(Factor 4) ! ! 
0.00802 
!(0.687) 
0.00429 
!(0.832) 
     
TRUSTEE FEMALE 
(d) ! ! 
-0.0595* ! 
(0.094) 
-0.0805** ! 
(0.029) 
     
TRUSTOR (photo) 
FEMALE  
(d) 
! ! 0.146
*** 
!(0.005) 
0.144*** 
!(0.006) 
     
Interaction: 
TRUSTOR FEMALE 
X TRUSTEE 
FEMALE 
! ! -0.113
** ! 
(0.029) 
-0.106** ! 
(0.039) 
     
Photo trustworthiness 
rating ! 
0.0785*** ! 
(0.000) ! 
0.0341*** ! 
(0.004) 
Regression constant 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual de-meaning 
via 
subject 
dummi
es 
via 
subject 
dummi
es 
via 
subject 
dummi
es 
via 
subject 
dummi
es 
Exclude participants w. 
fixed strategies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
total observations 1488 1488 1488 1488 
number of clusters 
(=number of subjects) 48 48 48 48 
BIC 1474.4 1387.8 1360.2 1358.6 
 
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
N=75 participants. (Note: 27 participants with fixed strategy dropped from analysis in the marked columns.) 
Probit regressions report marginal effects dF/dx. 
All standard errors clustered by participant. 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Regression results (First-movers, Experiment 1): the role of trustworthiness ratings. Specifica-
tions 1 and 3 correspond to the two main specifications from the main regression table (Table 5.2, page 112,
specifications 3 and 5, respectively). Specifications 2 and 4 add a regressor capturing the trustworthiness
rating the trustor later gave for the respective photo. While this absorbs some of the effects’ magnitude,
it does not explain them away completely. Thus, the morphing also modified aspects of the faces that
mattered directly, and did not just matter via its impact on trustworthiness. p-values in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is a binary variable that is 1 if the subject made a transfer
to the second-mover, and zero otherwise. All analyses drop the 27 participants who had fixed strategies,
i.e. who made the exact same choice in each trial of the study. Probit regressions report marginal effects
dy/dx. Standard errors were clustered by trustor in all specifications. The symbol (d) signifies binary
(dummy) variables. 118
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5.5.2 Motivation for experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether non-morphed facial stimuli are informative for
trustworthiness inferences.
Of course, it would be pointless to ask whether people can form accurate beliefs based on
photographs that are manipulated. Hence, participants were shown the photos from the NOT
MORPHED condition, and incentivized to guess the behavior of the people in the pictures as
accurately as possible.
Note that unlike experiment 1, this purely incentivizes belief accuracy, thus getting rid of other
possible pro-social motives for making transfers that may or may not have been present in the
trustors in experiment 1.
We found that people’s guesses were entirely uncorrelated with the actual behavior of the people
in the photographs. Furthermore, we found no evidence that people who were more certain
of their guesses were also more accurate – i.e. they were unable to accurately assess their own
ability. This suggests that possibly people are overconfident in their ability to guess behavior
from facial pictures.
5.5.3 Methods
Participants A new sample of n = 266 participants (thereof 131 female and 135 male, mean
age 22.3 years) was recruited and invited to our laboratory.
Instructions Written instructions described the trust game played by the stimulus group, and
explained participants would see photographs of these players. The instructions contained
screenshots of the decision screens that were used in the pilot and made it clear that the back
transfer decisions were conditional on first receiving 10CHF. The instructions were followed by
a comprehension test that tested whether participants had understood the game, as well as how
their own payments related to their guessing accuracy. Participants could not begin the study
until all comprehension questions had been correctly answered.16
Task Participants’ task was to guess as accurately as possible what the person in the photo-
graph had done in the trust game. While the photographs were displayed on the left, participants
entered their guesses in the right half of the screen. When viewing images of first-movers, par-
ticipants were asked to guess in what percentage of rounds played the counterpart sent 10 CHF.
They entered their response by typing in an integer between 0 and 100. For images of second-
movers, participants were asked to guess the average amount that the person in the photograph
16A copy of the original instructions, as well as the comprehension test, can be found in the appendix, page 165.
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sent back, by entering an integer between 0 and 30. For each guess, participants also answered
the question “How certain are you about this estimate?” on an 11-point Likert scale from “not
at all certain” to “completely certain”.
Payments Participants received 20 CHF for participating, plus a variable payment that de-
pended on how accurately participants guessed. At the end of the study, one round was
selected at random by the computer. The more accurately participants had guessed in this
round, the higher their payment was. The payoff for this extra payment was computed accord-
ing to the following formulae. When guessing first-mover behavior, the payoff function was
200 − 2|pactual − pguess| points, where pactual was the actual fraction of trials in which the viewed
proposer made a transfer, and pguess was the fraction guessed by the participant. The payoff
function when guessing second-mover behavior was 200− 5|xactual − xguess| , where xactual was the
average conditional back-transfer the person in the photograph actually made and xguess was
the guess about this quantity. These points were converted to Swiss Francs at a conversion rate
of 10:1 and added to the participation fee of 20 CHF. The final payments were paid out in cash
at the end of the study.
Stimuli During the computerized experiment, the left half of the screen displayed un-morphed
versions of the stimulus group members’ photographs.
In the CROPPED sessions (n1 = 174 participants, thereof 86 female and 88 male), to keep the
stimuli as similar as possible to the setup in experiment 1, we superimposed the same black oval
cutouts used in experiment 1. This left only the NOT MORPHED faces, but not the hair visible.
Participants were informed in the instructions that “You will note that we have electronically edited
the pictures of the persons you will see. We have placed a black oval cutout over the faces, so that the hair
is no longer visible and only the face remains visible. Apart from this, the images you see are unmodified
original photographs”.
The black oval cutouts from experiment 1 were designed to remove distracting elements such as
hair and clothing, such that only the faces were visible. However, prior research has found that
the facial width-to-height ratio may matter for forming accurate trustworthiness perceptions,
and has suggested that this may be a valid signal of trustworthiness (Stirrat and Perrett, 2010).
Since our oval cutouts concealed the edges of the faces, this may prevent the use of width-
to-height information. We therefore also ran the task with photos with no such cropping. In
the NO CROP sessions (n2 = 92 participants, thereof 45 female and 47 male), the original NOT
MORPHED faces were shown without the black oval cutouts. For these participants, the sentence
printed in italics above (from the instructions ) was not necessary, and hence omitted from the
instructions.17
17A copy of the original instructions from the NO CROP sessions can be found in the appendix, page 180.
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Sequence To prevent boredom, we limited the number of photographs that each participant
saw to a pseudorandom subset of eighteen to twenty-two faces, presented in two blocks. Be-
tween nine and eleven of the images were first-movers and another nine to eleven were second-
movers.18 The subsets of images shown were counterbalanced across individuals, such that
each image was ultimately seen approximately equally frequently at the group level. Within
each block, the order of faces was randomized.
Ratings After entering their guesses, participants were again shown the same sequence of
faces and were asked to rate them on the same dimensions as obtained in experiment one (basic
emotions, trustworthiness, dominance, warmth, friendliness, etc.).
Wrap-up Finally, participants received feedback about their guessing accuracy and payment.
In order to maintain the anonymity of the choices of the persons in the pictures, participants
were informed only of the payment itself, but not which of the rounds had been drawn for
payment. They then received their payments in cash and left the lab.
5.5.4 Results
We summarize the results of experiment 2 as follows:
Result 5. We neither found evidence for a correlation between participants’ guesses and the actual
behavior of the people in the photographs, nor between participants’ certainty about their guesses and
how accurate these guesses actually were.
Belief accuracy (or lack thereof)
The data show that participants were not at all good at guessing the behavior of the persons
in the photographs. The two panels of Figure 5.5 (page 122) plot third-party guesses about
behavior (horizontal axis) against the actual average behavior (vertical axis) of the persons in
the NOT MORPHED pictures. Each dot in the scatterplot signifies a participant’s guess about
one particular picture. If participants were good at guessing based on the pictures, one would
expect the majority of dots to be near the 45 degree line, or there to be at least a correlation
between guesses and actual behavior. The left panel shows this for the CROPPED condition,
where there was a black oval mask, as in experiment 1. The right panel shows it for the NO
CROP condition, where the complete faces were visible, without a black oval mask. Looking
18In order to have each photograph rated an equal number of times, we could not have all subjects see eleven
photographs. Photographs were split into seven partially overlapping sets, and each subject saw the photographs in
one set presented in random order.
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at the two distributions, it is immediately apparent that there was no correlation whatsoever
between guesses and actual behavior.
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Figure 5.5: Belief accuracy. The graph plots guesses (horizontal axis) versus actual behavior (vertical axis).
Each dot represents one trial, i.e. one photo viewed by one rater. The closer a dot is to the 45 degree line,
the more accurate it is. The left graph displays this for the CROPPED condition (n1 = 174 participants), in
which we displayed photos that were not morphed, but only cut out in an oval fashion, like in the NOT
MORPHED condition of experiment 1. The right graph displays the results for the NO CROP condition
(n2 = 92 participants). Here, we used the original photos, without black oval cutouts (such that not only
the face itself, but also the hair and neck were visible). The data were slightly jittered to reduce visual
overlap in the graph.
Accordingly, regressing actual values onto the raters’ guesses yields coefficients that are statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero (Table 5.5, page 123).
Thus, in our controlled laboratory setting, we found no evidence that people are able to explicitly
classify their counterparts’ behavior, based on stable, static facial cues.
This finding adds emphasis to the puzzling question of why people displayed a systematic
behavioral response to particular facial features in experiment 1, although in experiment 2 they
did not appear to be able to form correct beliefs based on them. We will discuss this question at
greater length in the sections below.
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Regression of the actual average back transfer of the person in the photo on back transfer as 
predicted by the raters. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  CROPPED  NO CROP  
Predicted back-
transfer 
-0.0522! 
(0.107) -0.0624!(0.141) -0.0360!(0.452) 
    
Constant 6.974
*** ! 
(0.000) 6.865
*** !(0.000) 7.210*** !(0.000) 
total observations 2748 1798 950 
number of clusters 
(=number of raters) 266 174 92 
BIC 18158.7 11822.1 6340.5 
 
 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Regression 5: 
 
Regression of back-transfer prediction mistake (absolute value) on  
self-reported belief certainty. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  CROPPED  NO CROP  
Certainty about own 
estimate  
(Likert score 1-11) 
0.117** 
!(0.027) 
0.0741 ! 
(0.267) 
0.203** ! 
(0.019) 
    
Constant 7.504*** !(0.000) 
7.822*** ! 
(0.000) 
6.866*** ! 
(0.000) 
total observations 2748 1798 950 
number of clusters 
(=number of raters) 266 174 92 
BIC 17116.8 11189.5 5936.9 
 
p-values in parentheses 
All standard errors clustered by participant. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 5.5: Regression results, Experiment 2: Belief accuracy. OLS regressions. Specification 1 pools
across conditions, while columns 2 and 3 display the results for the CROPPED and NO CROP conditions,
respectively. p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the actual
average back-transfer (conditional on receiving a transfer) by the person in the photo, in Swiss Francs.
Standard errors were clustered by rater in all specifications.
Did participants accurately assess their own (in-)ability?
A somewha skeptical reader may not be surprised that participants were unable to guess behav-
ior from photos (though it does remain puzzling, why they would then use them systematically).
However, in this case, one would expect participants to at least recognize their inability to perform
this task. In particular, if people’s beliefs about their abilities were accurate, one would expect
that (1) guessing certainty and guessing accuracy should be correlated – i.e. people should make
less errors in cases where they are sure, and (2) people should generally be quite uncertain in
this task, given their low overall accuracy.
There is, howeve , videnc for nei her of these two predictions in the data. It turns out that (1)
guessing certainty was entirely uncorrelated with guessing accuracy, and (2) participants used
the full spectrum of the certainty scale we provided. Thus, we find no evidence that raters were
aware of how (un-)accurate their guesses were.
Figure 5.6 (page 124) displays the lack of a negative correlation between certainty and accuracy
graphically, table 5.6 (page 124) documents it statistically. If anything, the correlation between
certainty and prediction error turns out to be positive in our sample (i.e. people who were more
sure were also more wrong) – though this result is statistically significant only for the NO CROP
sessions.
We thus find no evidence whatsoever that people were able to assess their lack of ability to
make correct inferences from the photos. This result is consistent with (tho not positive proof
of) overconfidence of the raters about their ability to guess behavior.
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Figure 5.6: Belief certainty (11-item Likert scale) versus accuracy of raters (absolute difference, in Swiss
Francs, between the guess and actual average behavior). There does not appear to be a correlation between
guessing confidence and guessing accuracy. Participants appear entirely unable to assess their own ability
at this task. Each dot represents one trial, i.e. one photo viewed by one rater. The left graph displays this
for the CROPPED condition (n1 = 174 participants), in which we displayed photos that were not morphed,
but only cut out in an oval fashion, like in the NOT MORPHED condition of experiment 1. The right graph
displays the results for the NO CROP condition (n2 = 92 participants). Here, we used the original photos,
without black oval cutouts (such that not only the face itself, but also the hair and neck were visible). The
data were slightly jittered to reduce visual overlap in the graph.
Regression of the actual average back transfer of the person in the photo on back transfer as 
predicted by the raters. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  CROPPED  NO CROP  
Predicted back-
transfer 
-0.0522! 
(0.107) -0.0624!(0.141) -0.0360!(0.452) 
    
Constant 6.974
*** ! 
(0.000) 6.865
*** !(0.000) 7.210*** !(0.000) 
total observations 2748 1798 950 
number of clusters 
(=number of raters) 266 174 92 
BIC 18158.7 11822.1 6340.5 
 
 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Regression 5: 
 
Regression of back-transfer prediction mistake (absolute value) on  
self-reported belief certainty. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled  CROPPED  NO CROP  
Certainty about own 
estimate  
(Likert score 1-11) 
0.117** 
!(0.027) 
0.0741! 
(0.267) 
0.203** ! 
(0.019) 
    
Constant 7.504*** !(0.000) 
7.822*** ! 
(0.000) 
6.866*** ! 
(0.000) 
total observations 2748 1798 950 
number of clusters 
(=number of raters) 266 174 92 
BIC 17116.8 11189.5 5936.9 
 
p-values in parentheses 
All standard errors clustered by participant. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 5.6: Regression results (Experiment 2): certainty vs. accuracy. OLS regressions. Specification
1 pools across conditions, while columns 2 and 3 display the results for the CROPPED and NO CROP
conditions, respectively. p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is
the absolute difference, in Swiss Francs, between the guess and the actual mean conditional back-transfer.
Standard errors were clustered by rater in all specifications.
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5.6 Robustness checks
Here, we report a few robustness checks relating to the image morphing. Section 5.6.1 (page
125) reports the results of a control session in which we checked whether the morphing was
detectable above chance levels. This does not appear to be the case – i.e. the morphing
was subtle enough not to be detectable above chance level, despite dedicated and substantial
incentivization. Hence, we do not believe the observation that we saw systematic responses
to the direction of morphing (in experiment 1) to be an artifact of a demand effect. Section
5.6.2 (page 126) analyzes whether the morphing we used in experiment 1 may have resulted
in “visibly fake” stimuli that contain features that do not normally occur in real human faces.
Again, we find no evidence that this is the case.
5.6.1 (In-)ability to identify the morphing condition of photos
If participants were able to correctly identify the nature of our manipulations, they might respond
in distorted fashion that reflects their view of what is proper or might please the experimenter,
rather than responding to the photos in a natural way.
We do not believe this is the case, for multiple reasons. First, there were real financial incentives
in our task, such that ulterior motives would either have to align with these incentives, or else
be strong enough to trump them. It is unclear why this should be the case.
Second, the morphing was implemented in a subtle way, making it unlikely that participants
noticed the morphing as such, beyond its effect on their perception of the faces.
None of our subjects in experiments 1 and 2 saw multiple versions of the same face, and none
of the experimental sessions mixed MORPHED and NOT MORPHED images. We calibrated
our morphing technology such that the morphing was subtle enough to cause only very minor
changes in the facial structure that, we would argue, are hardly perceptible unless one sees
the images side by side. In order to check whether discirimination is objectively difficult, we
devised a brief additional control session. Further, in the experiments reported above, not
one of our participants reported suspicions that images had possibly been manipulated in the
free comments. This makes it highly unlikely that our treatment effects are mere experimenter
demand effects.
To test whether the morphing is perhaps detectable when there are explicit incentives to identify
image morphing, N = 29 additional participants were presented with both the NOT MORPHED
and a MORPHED version of the 31 + 31 = 62 photographs from our stimulus set.19 Written
instructions20 informed participants that they were going to see a sequence of pairs of facial
19In addition to these 62 rounds comprised of our regular stimuli, there were a few rounds with different stimuli
that were unrelated to the current study.
20For a copy of the original instructions and comprehension questions, refer to page 191.
125
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
actually morphed actually not morphed
guess: morphed 46.66% 33.70%
guess: not morphed 53.34% 66.30%
95% CI for accuracy [42.05%, 51.27%] [61.35%, 71.24%]
Table 5.7: (In-)Ability to identify morphing. This table summarizes how frequently a separate group of
N = 29 participants correctly guessed the modification status (morphed vs. un-morphed) of our stimuli.
Correct responses marked in bold. We find no evidence that participants were able to correctly identify
morphed photos as such (left column).
photographs, and that they were going to be asked to indicate which of the two photos was
original and which was modified (apart from the black oval cutouts, which were applied to both
photos). To create substantial incentives for detection, participants were paid 4 CHF per correct
guess (zero otherwise), for a random subset of ten of their guesses.
Table 5.7 (page 126) summarizes accuracy rates for this incentivized modification guessing. We
found that the trials where morphed photos were shown, participants indicated (correctly) that
they believed them to be modified in about 46.7% of trials and (incorrectly) assessed them as
un-modified in about 53.3% of trials. The 95% confidence interval for a correct response when
viewing a modified photo comes out as [42.05%, 51.27%].
We summarize this in the following result:
Result 6. At best, participants were able to identify that a photo was morphed at approximately chance
level.
5.6.2 Was there something artificial about the morphed photos that was not
present in the un-morphed ones?
One thing that still needs to be demonstrated is that the features that participants used when
assessing the trustworthiness of the morphed images were the same features that participants
used when assessing un-morphed images. This is important because potentially, the faces in
experiment 1 were morphed, while the faces in experiment 2 were not. If there were something
“artificial” about the stimuli used in experiment 1 that simply does not show up in natural faces,
it would thus not be puzzling why we find no predictive power in experiment 2, where these
hypothetical artificialities no longer show up.
To illustrate this with an example, suppose that instead of morphing, we had painted large
pentagrams on half of our participants’ foreheads. One would expect these faces to be trusted
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less, and perhaps if someone actually had such a pentagram on their forehead, this may even
turn out to be a reliable signal also outside of the laboratory. However, this is not a naturally
occurring phenomenon and would not show up in the NOT MORPHED photographs used
in study 2. Hence, when viewing the unmodified faces (no pentagrams) in experiment 2,
the information that may have been correctly used in experiment 1 may simply no longer be
available, explaining why participants were then no longer able to guess correctly.
To check whether people use the same facial attributes for both modified and unmodified
images, we made use of the fact that the effects of the morphing are fully explained away by
factors 1-4, as obtained from the factor analysis (these factors capture the essence of the rated
photo attributes).
Our approach essentially asks whether these four factors map into trustworthiness ratings in the
same way for experiment 1, in which images were morphed, and experiment 2, in which faces
were not morphed.
We proceeded as follows.
1. Generate the four factors from our factor analysis also for NOT MORPHED images.
First, we generated the four factors F1-F4 in the same way (within sample) for MORPHED
and (out of sample) for NOT MORPHED images.
The within-sample factors F1-F4 were generated via the factor analysis of the rating data
only from experiment 1. We then applied the exact same factor loadings to the ratings
obtained for the NOT MORPHED images in experiment 2. As a result, we obtained out-
of-sample values for factors F1-F4, using the same method and structure as in experiment
1.
2. Find out how the factors map into trustworthiness, for the MORPHED photos.
Second, we regressed the trustworthiness ratings (TW) obtained in experiment 1 on these
four factors, running the following model:
Experiment 1 (morphed): TW1 = β10 + β
1
1F
1
1 + β
1
2F
1
2 + β
1
3F
1
3 + β
1
4F
1
4 + 
1
. . . where the superscript 1 denotes variables and coefficients that are based on data from
experiment 1. This yielded coefficients βˆ10 to βˆ
1
4.
As a result, we now know how the four factors (image ratings) mapped into trustworthi-
ness ratings for the MORPHED photos in experiment 1.
3. From these coefficients, predict trustworthiness ratings both (within sample) for MORPHED and
(out of sample) for NOT MORPHED photos.
Third, we used these fitted experiment 1 coefficients βˆ0 to βˆ4 to predict trustworthiness,
once within the sample (by applying them to F1-F4 from experiment 1) and once out of
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sample (by applying them to F1-F4 from experiment 2):
Experiment 1 (morphed): (T̂W)1 = βˆ10 + βˆ
1
1F
1
1 + βˆ
1
2F
1
2 + βˆ
1
3F
1
3 + βˆ
1
4F
1
4
Experiment 2 (unmorphed): (T̂W)2 = βˆ10 + βˆ
1
1F
2
1 + βˆ
1
2F
2
2 + βˆ
1
3F
2
3 + βˆ
1
4F
2
4
Note that the estimated trustworthiness T̂W was in both cases computed based on the
same coefficients βˆ0 to βˆ4, which capture the way in which the four factors mapped into
trustworthiness ratings for the MORPHED images.
As a result, we obtain
• The within-sample prediction of trustworthiness (T̂W)1 for MORPHED images.
• The out-of-sample prediction (T̂W)2, which captures what trustworthiness ratings
one might expect for the NOT MORPHED photos, if people used the information in the
faces in the same way as for MORPHED images.
4. In the final step, we compared the way in which the predicted trustworthiness T̂W and
actual trustworthiness TWactual relate, once for MORPHED and once for NOT MORPHED
photos. To analyze this, we ran the following regressions:
Experiment 1 (MORPHED): (T̂W)1 = α10 + α
1
1TW
1
actual + η
Experiment 2 (NOT MORPHED): (T̂W)2 = α20 + α
2
1TW
2
actual + η
In summary, if people used facial information differently when viewing unmorphed versus
morphed faces, one would expect α10 , α
2
0 or α
1
1 , α
2
1, or both. Instead, we find that the
coefficients in both cases are practically identical in value (Table 5.8, page 129), and statistically
indistinguishable (as can be seen in the table from the 95% intervals). This observation is
consistent with the hypothesis that our two groups of participants used similar aspects of the
faces when making trustworthiness judgments about modified versus unmodified faces.21
21Qualitatively identical results (not reported here) are obtained when running the same analysis for other dependent
variables than rated TW of the images, such as stated beliefs.
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Robustness checks
R-squared high 
in all three 
regressions, and 
similar in 
magnitude !
(btw 0.5 and 0.6)"
Coefficients for 
MORPHED and 
NOT MORPHED 
are almost 
indistinguishable"
Formally should 
test whether H0: 
beta(1)=beta(2) 
can be rejected 
(should not be) 
(not done yet)."
within-sample 
association"
Out-of-sample 
association (with 
oval cutouts)"
Out-of-sample 
association !
(no oval cutouts)"
Regression 6: 
 
Regression of calculated trustworthiness predictions, based on rated photo attributes (F1-F4),  
on actual trustworthiness ratings. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Calculated !"!
(MORPHED, 
CROPPED) 
Calculated !" 
(NOT MORPHED, 
CROPPED) 
Calculated !" 
(NOT MORPHED, 
NO CROP) 
TW: actual trustw. 
rating of photo by 
participants 
0.545***  
[0.513, 0.577] 
0.528***  
[0.503, 0.552] 
0.530***  
[0.493, 0.568] 
    
Constant 1.221
***  
[1.113, 1.329] 
1.325***  
[1.240, 1.410] 
1.446***  
[1.310, 1.582] 
Observations 4836 3596 1901 
Number of clusters 
(= number of raters) 156 174 92 
R2 0.545 0.539 0.539 
BIC 11064.9 7809.7 3720.4 
 
95% confidence intervals in brackets. 
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by subject. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 5.8: Regression to check for artificiality of the morphing. Here, we regressed calculated photo
trustworthiness T̂W on actual photo trustworthiness ratings TWactual. These regressions show that facial
attributes are used indistinguishably in the MORPHED and the NOT MORPHED conditions. To do this,
we computed a “calculated trustworthiness rating”, based on the way that the photo attributes map into
actual trustworthiness ratings in the MORPHED condition, also out of sample for the NOT MORPHED
conditions. We then check whether actual trustworthiness ratings and this computed version relate in the
three conditions. They relate practically identically in all three cases. As can be seen from the confidence
intervals, the coefficients of TW are statistically indistinguishable. 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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5.7 Discussion
In this study, we investigated the use of facial photographs trusting behavior, in a credible,
non-hypothetical setting, with real financial stakes.
We conducted a series of experiments, to answer the following questions:
• Do people use facial photographs in trust games?
1. Are facial photographs indeed used to guide trusting behavior? (→ yes)
2. Does this use follow systematic patterns? (→ yes)
• Should people use facial photographs to make trustworthiness assessments?
3. Do we find evidence that it was financially beneficial for participants to consider the
faces? (→ no)
4. Do we find evidence that facial photographs can be used to generate accurate predic-
tions of trust game behavior (→ no).
Here, we briefly review these findings in the context of our experiments, and then discuss
possible implications.
Questions (1) and (2): Do people use facial photographs in trust games? To address the first
two questions, a group of participants played the trust game while seeing facial photographs
of their counterparts, against the actual pre-recorded choices of the people in the photos. For a
subgroup of the participants, we very subtly morphed the photographs towards prototypically
trustworthy (UP prototype) or untrustworthy (DOWN prototype) faces. We found that trustors’
transfers were significantly higher when seeing UP morphed counterpart photos, than when
seeing DOWN-morphed photos.
This signifies that (1) yes, participants did indeed respond to the photographs and (2) that this
response was systematic.
The prototypically trustworthy and non-trustworthy facial prototypes obtained from non-
incentivized psychological studies thus did indeed carry through to incentivized settings.
This technology can thus demonstrably be used to manipulate trustworthiness perceptions of
existing faces, through almost imperceptibly subtle manipulations of facial structure in photos.
As such, it lends itself to field testing to demonstrate applicability outside of the laboratory,
e.g. by sending out manipulated photographs on job applications, or by manipulating facial
photographs of politicians and testing for an influence on trustworthiness perceptions etc.
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Questions (3) and (4): Should people use facial photographs to make trustworthiness assess-
ments? Having thus established that the proposed facial features did indeed have a highly
systematic influence on trust-related behavior, the question naturally follows, whether this in-
fluence was warranted. To test this, we first tested whether participants who viewed facial
photographs earned more than participants who played against the same people but saw no
photos. We find no evidence that this is the case.
Because trustors’ behavior need not necessarily be driven purely by trust, we also conducted
a second experiment in which participants were incentivized to correctly guess the trust-game
behavior of the people in the photos, based on their un-morphed photographs – thus obtaining a
purer measure of trustworthiness assessments. Raters’ guesses of the behavior of second-movers
were entirely uncorrelated with their actual behavior.
Taken together, it would therefore seem that a rational, profit-maximizing first-mover ought to
disregard the photos completely. Instead, we observe a systematic response to the facial features
of the photographs.
Puzzle: why use the ‘uninformative’ pictures? This leads us to the fundamental puzzle that
arises from our data: why did participants use the facial pictures in a systematic way in experiment
1, although this in no way improved earnings, and although we find no evidence whatsoever
that trustworthiness assessments could accurately be made from the photos? This amounts to
participants essentially using apparently uninformative stimuli in a highly systematic way.
First, we analyzed whether the observed effect may be a mere experimenter demand effect. This
might be expected if our stimuli looked “fake” in any way, i.e. if the presence and nature of the
morphing could reliably be perceived by participants. However, in a dedicated control session,
participants’ ability to identify morphed photographs was statistically indistinguishable from
chance level, making this highly unlikely (see section 5.6.1).
Another way to resolve the apparent puzzle would be if the features that are being used in
experiment 1 were simply not present in unmorphed images. Then it could be that these
cues are reliable if actually present, but that they were systematically missing, such that the
un-morphed photos were useless for making proper inferences.
We address this in two ways. First, since we found that participants could not properly distin-
guish between morphed and un-morphed photos, it appears somewhat unlikely that there is
something systematically artificial about the morphed photos. Second, we demonstrate that the
essential attributes of the faces were used indistinguishably for modified and unmodified im-
ages (section 5.6.2). Furthermore, it does not appear that the guessing failure is due to the black
oval cutouts, which may obscure the facial width-to-height information that has previously been
proposed to be a valid signal of trustworthiness (Stirrat and Perrett, 2010).
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It thus remains a jarring puzzle why such a systematic effect was observed in experiment 1 if
the facial features we imposed were not in some way useful in real life.
Would detection work more reliably with richer stimuli? It should be pointed out that our
study does not permit the conclusion that valid inferences cannot perhaps indeed be drawn
from other, richer varieties of facial stimuli. Our photographs were purposefully taken outside
of the actual decision context, in order to investigate the effects of comparatively stable facial
cues. Close real-world analogies to such stimuli may be, e.g., the photographs typically used
on job applications in many continental European countries, or photographs on professional
web pages or printed materials. Furthermore, our photographs were purposefully taken with a
neutral facial expression. Yet, we find that the factor that most powerfully appears to influence
the propensity to make a transfer to a photo is its positive affective expression (factor 1). On
the one hand, facial expressions may be seen as a state variable, as they are bound to change
across time, depending on how the decision-maker is feeling, and may thus reflect momentary
intentions. On the other, there can be a stable component to facial attributes, and some faces
may, even at neutral emotional expression, default to something that resembles a smile while
others may default to a frown.22
It is an empirical question whether the additional information conveyed by richer stimuli, like
facial dynamics and micro-expressions, may permit valid inferences on the emotional state and
perhaps even intentions of ones counterpart, particularly when recorded within the context of
the actual decision. There is, in fact, evidence that the dynamic properties of facial expressions
matter for trustworthiness judgments of computer-generated faces (Krumhuber et al., 2007).
Furthermore, consistently with the idea that transitory facial expressions play an important
role for trustworthiness inferences, Verplaetse, Vanneste, and Braeckman (2007) show that in
a prisoner’s dilemma, participants were able to identify noncooperative counterparts above
chance levels only if the photographs were taken at the time of the actual decision, and not if the
photographs were taken out of context, or during a practice period.
If this were so, one might speculate the overconfidence our participants displayed in their trust-
worthiness assessments stems from the fact that that these skills actually do work in dynamic
contexts, and participants (mis-)applied the same rules of thumb in the more restricted infor-
mational environment of static facial photos taken out of context, where facial expression do not
reflect the emotional state during the actual trust game decision.
Thus, we cannot rule out that what we observe is explained by a mis-application of a skill
or strategy that is normally valid in a particular context where it no longer is. In line with
this hypothesis, Todorov, Baron, and Oosterhof (2008, p. 120) discuss the possibility that “face
22For a more thorough discussion of how neutral-emotional-expression faces may be interpreted based on an
overgeneralization of the subtle cues that signal emotional states, see Oosterhof and Todorov (2008, p. 11091), and
references therein.
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evaluation of emotionally neutral faces is an overgeneralization of functionally adaptive systems
for detection of the emotional states of others” (see also Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008; Todorov,
2008, and references therein). If this indeed applies it would be an example of rule rationality,
which Aumann (2008, p. 1) delineates from act rationality as follows: “Rather than choosing an
act that maximizes utility among all possible acts in a given situation, people adopt rules that
maximize average utility among all applicable rules, when the same rule is applied to many
apparently similar situations.”
Would detection work more reliably when it is implicit in behavior? Finally, there is the pos-
sibility that trustworthiness detection may operate reliably, but only when it manifests implicitly
in behavior, and not if judgments are explicit, because different processes are at play (Bonne-
fon, Hopfensitz, and De Neys, 2012). This idea derives from the notion that an evolutionarily
formed trustworthiness detection module may operate and affect behavior automatically, such
that behavioral trust (as in our trust game) may make appropriate use of facial stimuli. This
may hypothetically be true even if the output of this module is not accessible to consciousness,
much like we may know whether we find somebody of the opposite sex attractive intuitively,
yet not know the reasons, and make worse judgments when forced to make such judgments in
a deliberate fashion. One may speculate that asking participants to explicitly state their beliefs
about trustworthiness (as in experiment 2) may then activate a different, conscious and deliber-
ate process, overriding the automatic implicit process, yet yielding worse results. This would
explain the pattern of our findings in the following way: in experiment 1, participants played
against counterpart images, such that trustworthiness judgments were implicitly expressed in
behavior. In experiment 2, however, judgments were asked explicitly, which, according to the
hypothesis advanced in (Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, and De Neys, 2012), may not function accord-
ing to the same process. However, if participants were able to use the information implicitly
in behavior, then one would expect them to earn more when seeing non-morphed photos than
when seeing no photo at all, which we do not find in our data.
Conclusion In conclusion, our study demonstrates unambiguously that people do indeed let
the faces of their counterparts determine their behavior in the trust game, perhaps shedding
some light on how first impressions are formed and used, when there is no information about
the prior history of a potential transaction partner’s behavior. Simultaneously, although the
information is used systematically, we find no evidence that it is in any way informative.
Further research will be needed to better identify why people make use of this apparently unin-
formative information. Our observations are consistent with the overgeneralization hypothesis
(Todorov, 2008), in that people may plausibly be over-generalizing their ability to infer emotions
and intentions from faces that actually do display emotions in naturalistic settings to neutral-
expression static stimuli. However, further research will be needed to pin the mechanism down
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unambiguously.
Finally, our work here contributes a proof of concept that morphing technology can be fruitfully
brought to bear in experimental economic research. This powerful method, borrowed from
psychological research on face perception (Tiddeman, Stirrat, and Perrett, 2005), can be used
to apply particular features to existing faces in a controlled and comparable way, where this
may be experimentally desirable, while preserving the identity of these faces, and avoiding
awareness of the nature of the manipulation on the part of participants – which is important for
minimizing the risk of experimenter demand effects.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Results for second-movers (trustees) who played against photos of
trustors.
In this section, we report results obtained for second-movers in experiment 1. These are not of
primary interest for the investigation of inferences about trustworthiness above, but we report
them here for the sake of completeness.
Treatment effects
We summarize our findings for second-movers as follows:
Result 7. Back-transfers were significantly impacted by the morphing. We observe a significant increase
the amount of money conditionally back-transferred to up-morphed images, relative to down-morphed
images.
Descriptive results Figure 5.7 (page 110) displays the mean conditional23 back-transfers, de-
pending on the morphing condition of the counterpart photos. UP-MORPHED counterparts
received larger back-transfers (5.92 CHF) than DOWN-MORPHED photos (5.18 CHF). How-
ever, strikingly, NOT MORPHED photos received the highest conditional back-transfers (8.24
CHF). In analogy to the analysis of first-mover behavior, we also look at the within-subject data
from the MORPHED sessions. Figure 5.8 shows graphically that on average, the largest group
of participants (41/82) conditionally back-transferred more to UP- than to DOWN-MORPHED
images.24 (each dot above the 45 degree line represents one trustor for whom this applies).
Statistical results We again analyze the within-subjects data from the MORPHED sessions.
Regressing conditional back-transfers on a binary variable that encodes the morphing condition,
we find that they are an average of 0.73 CHF higher for up-morphed photos, ceteris paribus
(table 5.9, page 136, column 1). This difference is statistically significantly different from zero
(p < 0.001).
Having discovered that there is, on average, an effect across the entire population, we again
restrict our attention those participants who displayed any variation at all in their behavior
(i.e. who did not always choose the exact same conditional back-transfer in every round). This
23(Conditional on receiving a transfer.)
2428 participants conditionally back-transferred the same amounts regardless of morphing, and 13 conditionally
back-transferred more in the DOWN-MORPHED condition than in the up-morphed condition.
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Influences on backtransfers, in the group of participants who played against morphed images 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
OLS, 
male 
trustees 
only 
OLS, 
female 
trustees  
only 
OLS OLS 
Treatment: 
morphed up (d) 
0.733*** ! 
(0.000) 
1.113*** 
!(0.000) 
-0.0203 
!(0.940) 
-0.00739 
!(0.978) 
-0.0583 
!(0.805) 
-0.246 ! 
(0.477) 
0.0920 
!(0.774) 
-0.0506 ! 
(0.828) 
0.415* ! 
(0.075) 
          
Positive photo affect  
(Factor 1) ! ! 
1.176*** ! 
(0.000) 
1.166*** 
!(0.000) 
0.750*** 
!(0.000) 
0.889*** 
!(0.003) 
0.658*** ! 
(0.001) 
0.568*** 
!(0.000) ! 
          
Negative photo affect  
(Factor 2) ! ! 
0.00576 ! 
(0.966) 
-0.00459 ! 
(0.974) 
0.0690 
!(0.596) 
-0.0274 ! 
(0.910) 
0.122 
!(0.431) 
0.0465 ! 
(0.718) ! 
          
Photo power  
(Factor 3) ! ! 
-0.168 ! 
(0.141) 
-0.170 
!(0.139) 
-0.0453 
!(0.636) 
0.0127 ! 
(0.947) 
-0.0544 
!(0.616) 
-0.0302 ! 
(0.746) ! 
          
Photo femininity 
(Factor 4) ! ! 
0.359*** 
!(0.003) 
0.306*** 
!(0.005) 
0.152 
!(0.151) 
0.0394 ! 
(0.842) 
0.201 
!(0.117) 
0.139 ! 
(0.184) ! 
          
TRUSTEE FEMALE 
(d) ! ! ! 
2.833*** ! 
(0.000) 
-4.673*** ! 
(0.000) ! ! 
-4.732*** 
!(0.000) ! 
          
TRUSTOR (photo) 
FEMALE  
(d) 
! ! ! 0.373 ! (0.488) 
0.170 ! 
(0.756) 
0.401 ! 
(0.430) 
-0.142 
!(0.722) 
0.166 
!(0.762) ! 
          
Interaction: 
TRUSTOR FEMALE X 
TRUSTEE FEMALE 
! ! ! -0.335 !(0.619) 
-0.168 ! 
(0.802) ! ! 
-0.180 ! 
(0.787) ! 
          
Is transfer expected 
from photo (d) ! ! ! ! 
3.112*** 
!(0.000) 
2.295*** ! 
(0.007) 
3.658*** ! 
(0.000) 
3.071*** ! 
(0.000) ! 
          
photo trustworthiness 
rating ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
0.168* ! 
(0.053) 
0.732*** ! 
(0.000) 
Regression constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual de-meaning 
via subject dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exclude participants w. 
fixed strategies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
total observations 2542 1674 1674 1674 1674 682 992 1674 1674 
number of clusters 
(=number of subjects) 82 54 54 54 54 22 32 54 54 
BIC 12972.1 9232.0 9119.8 9133.2 8926.2 3698.8 5245.6 8930.3 9128.1 
 
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
N=82 participants. (28 participants with fixed strategy dropped from analysis in all but the first column.) 
All standard errors clustered by participant. 
 
 
 
Table 5.9: Regression results (Second-movers, Experiment 1). p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: conditional back-transfers (in CHF). Columns 2-6 drop the 28 trustors
who had fixed strategies, i.e. who made the exact same choice in each trial of the study. Standard errors
were clustered by participant in all specifications. The symbol (d) signifies binary (dummy) variables.
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Full dataset, N1=N3=82, N2=60 trustees.
Error bars denote SE of the mean. For their computation, one datapoint is one trustee's mean for that treatment.
Mean back-transfer across treatments
Figure 5.7: Mean back-transfers by trustees to tr stor photos, by morphing condition. NMORPHED = 82,
NNOT MORPHED = 60 trustees. Error bars denote SE of the mean. To obtain independent observations, the
data was collapsed to individual means before computing the standard errors, i.e. one datapoint was one
trustor’s individual mean. Note that up- vs. down-morphed conditions were encountered within subject,
such that the error bars understate significance.
excludes 28 subjects, leaving 54 whose behavioral variation we can analyze. Naturally, within
these 54 subjects, back-transfers were affected more dramatically by the up-morphing (+1.11
CHF, p < 0.001) than when averaging out across all subjects.
How did the treatment operate?
Again, we find that the binary variable coding for the treatment becomes insignificant, once the
photo attributes are controlled for through the factors 1-4 (columns 2 and following).
Result 8. Again, the rated photo attributes (as summarized in the four factors) appear to explain away
the influence of the morphing. Further, it is again positive photo affect (factor 1) and photo femininity
(factor 4) that positively impacted back-transfers.
Again, we find that factors 1 (positive photo affect) and 4 (photo femininity) have significantly
positive coefficients in the regression (p < 0.000 and p = 0.003, respectively – for the complete
details, refer to table 5.9, page 136, column 3). Thus the same aspects of the photos that drive
first-mover behavior (emotional expression and gender) also appear to be driving second-mover
behavior.
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by trustees while viewing up- vs. down-morphed counterpart images
Average amount of money conditionally returned 
Figure 5.8: Most participants conditionally back-transferred more money to images that were morphed
up than to images that were morphed down. Each data point represents the average behavior of one
participant. Points above the 45 degree line represent participants who back-transferred more money to
up- than to down-modified counterparts. The data in this graph was slightly jittered to prevent data points
from overlapping.
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Gender effects
As we again find that the factor capturing rated photo femininity entered significantly into our
analysis, we analyze gender effects in the same way as for first-movers. We find that, ceteris
paribus, female participants back-transferred significantly more (see table 5.9, page 136, columns
4), while neither the gender of the receiving trustors, nor an interaction effect was statistically
significant.
Result 9. Ceteris paribus, female trustees back-transferred higher amounts than males. We find no
significant evidence that the gender of the person in the photograph mattered, nor do we find evidence
that there was an interaction effect between trustor photo gender and trustee gender.
Interestingly, once we add a regressor that captures, for each trial, whether the trustee believed
that the trustee actually made a transfer (see table 5.9, page 136, column 5), the coefficient
of TRUSTEE FEMALE becomes significantly negative (shifting from +2.83 to -4.67 CHF, both
p < 0.001), and the effect of positive photo affect decreases somewhat (from 1.17 to 0.75 CHF
per unit, both p < 0.001). While a causal interpretation would be questionable, this is at least
consistent with the interpretation that female trustees transferred more because they had a
higher expectation that trustors were going to transfer 10 CHF. However, we found that the
mean rate of anticipated transfers was quite similar between male and female trustees. To test
this, we first generated, for each of the 32 (22) female (male) trustees that displayed behavioral
variation, their individual mean expectation that a trustor made a transfer. Females anticipated
a transfer in 58.6% of trials (sd ≈ 0.22), while the male trustees expected transfers in only 57.3%
of trials (sd ≈ 0.25). A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test does not find this difference to be
significant (n = 54, z = 0.018, p = 0.9859). We thus find no evidence for this hypothesis.
A closer look at the role of beliefs
Results 7 and 8 show that trustees also responded to the morphing. This is somewhat puzzling,
because the motives why second-movers should care about the information in the photographs
are less straightforward than for first-movers. Unlike trustors, trustees have no pecuniary
incentive whatsoever to respond to the traits of the photo, since the game ends after they
make their decision, and interactions are stricly one-shot. Yet clearly, trustees did systematically
respond to the facial features of their counterparts.
One might at first glance suspect that participants might have wanted to back-transfer only
to individuals whom they received a transfer from in the first place. In this sense, one might
speculate that perhaps only “trustworthy-looking” individuals might be thought likely to make
transfers in the first place. However, this argument is precluded by design, because second-
movers made their decisions using the strategy method – that is, they were by design able to
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condition their back-transfers on whether the first-mover in the picture actually sent any money
or not. In particular, for this, it was not necessary to know what the counterpart had actually
done, rendering irrelevant any possible predictive value of the faces. In fact, this should make
not just information gleaned from faces strategically irrelevant, but potentially any form of
beliefs about the counterpart’s behavior, regardless of whether it was derived from the faces or
some other source. We will return to the role of beliefs at a later point.
As we recorded data on the beliefs of second-movers about first-movers (“How likely do you
think it is that this person sent you money?”), we can analyze whether second-movers neverthe-
less used their beliefs. Counter-intuitively, it turns out that they do – despite the conditionality
of their response. Including a binary variable that was one if the trustee expected that the trustor
actually sent a transfer, we find that this regressor is significantly positive (see table 5.9, page
136, column 5). In fact, the conditional mean backtransfer is approximately 3.11 CHF higher
when a transfer was anticipated from a photographed trustor, than when it is not.
There are several possible explanations that might underlie this pattern. First, it is possible
that it is indeed the trustworthiness that people are responding to. People would, if this
applies, use the faces to infer something about how trustworthy their counterpart is generally:
their trustworthiness “type” , and then reciprocate to this inferred general type (Levine, 1998),
regardless of how that person behaved in the particular round that they are interacting in. Hence,
people may return nothing to someone they view as generally of an untrustworthy type, even if
that person turns out to send money in the particular round where they happen to interact. A
second possibility is that the morphing of the faces changes a multitude of facial features, some
of which may also influence other perceptual properties than trustworthiness. For example, a
person may simply look more friendly or likeable in the up-morphed condition, and this may
drive results, without the necessity of recursion to trustworthiness per se.
Unfortunately, it is ultimately beyond the scope of our study to determine exactly which of
these possibilities applies. One thing that we can, however, determine from the data, is that the
morphing matters for behavior not just via trustworthiness. First, adding regressors for both the
morphing condition and an integer coding for rated photo trustworthiness (specification 9 in table
5.9, page 136) shows that the effect of the morphing regressor is not explained away (though
it shrinks in magnitude). This suggests that a component of the morphing’s effect on second-
mover behavior is not driven purely by photo trustworthiness. Second, adding rated photo
trustworthiness as a regressor to the full regression model (specification 9 in table 5.9, page
136) shows that positive photo affect continues to be significant – i.e. its effect is not explained
away by photo trustworthiiness. Taken together, this suggests that the morphing affects not
just trustworthiness, but also other aspects of facial perception, and that these aspects matter in
their own right for second-mover behavior.
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Why are non-morphed images treated differently?
The most striking result from experiment 2 is probably that (unlike the pattern for first-movers)
non-morphed photos received larger condition back-transfers than morphed photos, regardless
of the direction in which the photos were morphed. This result was unexpected, and we can
only speculate as to the reasons that underlie this phenomenon.
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Screenshot: decision of first-movers (trustors)!
Decision:"
Do you want to 
transfer 10CHF 
to participant B?!
How sure are 
you about this 
estimate?!
If you send 10, 
B receives 30. "
! How much 
do you think B 
will send back 
in this case?!
Photo of counterpart!
In the 
beginning, 
both you and 
participant B 
each receive 12 
CHF.!
Screenshot: decision of second-movers (trustees)!
Photo of counterpart!
Decision:"
If participant 
A transfers 10, 
you receive 30. "
! How much 
do you want 
to transfer 
back in this 
case?!
What do you 
think: How 
much did 
participant A 
send you (zero 
or ten)?! How sure are 
you about this 
estimate?!
In the beginning 
of the round you 
receive an 
endowment of 12 
CHF. In addition, 
you may receive a 
transfer from 
participant A.!
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5.8.2 Screenshots: experiment 1
Note: greyscale conversion for print only. The photos in the study were displayed in color.
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!
What do you estimate:!
In what percentage of rounds did 
this person send 10CHF?"
"
(Type in integer between 0 and 100)!
How certain are you 
about this estimate?!
Screenshot: guessing the behavior of first-movers!
Photo of player (not 
morphed)!
Screenshot: guessing the behavior of second-movers!
What do you estimate:!
How much did this person send back on 
average?!
How certain are 
you about this 
estimate?!
Photo of player (not 
morphed)!
Appendix
5.8.3 Screenshots: experiment 2
Note: greyscale conversion for print only. The photos in the study were displayed in color.
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!
Anleitung!"Vielen"Dank"für"Ihre"Teilnahme"an"der"heutigen"Studie!""Im"Verlauf"der"Studie"werden"Sie"zunächst"an"einigen"Entscheidungssituationen"teilnehmen,"und"im"Anschluss"einen"langen"Fragebogen"ausfüllen."Während"Sie"den"Fragebogen"ausfüllen,"werden"Sie"die"Möglichkeit"bekommen,"an"einem"optionalen"weiteren"Abschnitt"der"Studie"teilzunehmen,"der"zusätzlich"entlohnt"wird,"und"parallel"zum"Fragebogen"stattfindet.""
Ihre%Bezahlung%hängt%von%Ihren%Entscheidungen%und%denen%der%anderen%
Teilnehmer%ab.%"Bitte"lesen"Sie"den"Text"auf"den"folgenden"Seiten"gründlich"durch,"um"folgende"Dinge"zu"verstehen:"
• Die"Regeln"
• Wie"die"Entscheidungssituation"funktioniert"
• Wer"in"den"Entscheidungssituationen"Ihr"Gegenüber"sein"wird"
• Wie"Sie"in"Abhängigkeit"Ihrer"Entscheidungen"bezahlt"werden""Im"Anschluss"an"die"Anleitung"wird"es"ein"paar"Kontrollfragen"geben,"die"sicherstellen"sollen,"dass"Sie"diese"vier""Dinge"gründlich"verstanden"haben.""Allgemeine"Regeln"
Bitte%bleiben%Sie%während%der%gesamten%Studie%still%an%Ihrem%Platz%sitzen,%
und%kommunizieren%Sie%mit%niemandem.%Sollten"Sie"Sich"nicht"an"diese"Regeln"halten,"müssen"wir"Sie%bitten"die"Studie%ohne%Bezahlung%abzubrechen,""und"Sie"werden"für"die"Teilnahme"an"zukünftigen"Studien"gesperrt.%"Sollten"Sie"nach"dem"Lesen"dieser"Anleitung"oder"während"der"Studie"noch"Fragen"haben,"heben"Sie"bitte"leise"die"Hand,"und"es"wird"ein"Experimentierleiter"an"Ihren"Platz"kommen,"um"Ihnen"zu"helfen.
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
5.8.4 Stimulus group: original instructions
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1.!Beschreibung!der!Entscheidungssituation""Sie"werden"an"fünf"Runden"einer"Entscheidungssituation"teilnehmen."""
Am%Ende%der%Studie%wird%nur%eine%der%fünf%Runden%nach%dem%Zufallsprinzip%
ausgewählt.%Ihre%Bezahlung%ergibt%sich%dann%aus%Ihrer%Entscheidung,%sowie%
der%Ihres%Gegenübers%in%dieser%einen%Runde.%""Am"Anfang"der"ersten"Runde"werden"Sie"entweder%der%Rolle%A%oder%B"zugeteilt."Diese"Rolle"behalten"Sie"bis"zum"Ende"der"Studie"bei.""
Teilnehmer!A:!!
• Am"Anfang"der"jeweiligen"Runde"erhalten"beide"Teilnehmer"jeweils"einen"
Anfangsbetrag%von%12%Schweizer%Franken.""
• Entscheidung:"Nach"dem"Erhalt"des"Anfangsbetrags"muss"Teilnehmer"A"entscheiden,"wieviele"seiner"12"Franken"er"an"den"Empfänger"B"senden"möchte."Er"kann"entweder%0%oder%10%Franken%senden.""
• Der"Betrag,"den"Teilnehmer"A"schickt,"wird%verdreifacht,"bevor"er"an"Teilnehmer"B"weitergesendet"wird."B"entscheidet,"wieviel"er"vom"empfangenen"Betrag"an"A"zurück"schicken"möchte,"für"den"Fall,"dass"er"etwas"von"A"empfängt"(Details"weiter"unten).""
• Der"Verdienst"von"Teilnehmer"A"für"die"gezogene"Runde"ist"entsprechend:%12"–"(an"B"gesendeter"Betrag)"+"(Betrag,"den"B"zurücksendet)""
• Teilnehmer"A"wird"anschliessend"um"eine"Einschätzung"gebeten,"wieviel"er"denkt,"dass"B"zurücksenden"wird,"falls"er"30"Franken"erhält."Es"wird"ebenfalls"gefragt,"wie"sicher"A"sich"bei"dieser"Einschätzung"ist.""Auf"der"nächsten"Seite"sehen"Sie"einen"Screenshot"des"Entscheidungsbildschirms"von"Teilnehmer"A."
!
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Entscheidungsbildschirm"von"Teilnehmer"A:"
Entscheidung"von"Teilnehmer"A"
Einschätzung:"was"wird"B"tun?"
Wie"sicher"ist"sich"B"bei"der"Einschätzung"von"Teilnehmer"A’s"Verhalten?""
Entscheidung"bestätigen"und"fortfahren"!""(nächster"Bildschirm)"
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
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Teilnehmer!B:!
• Am"Anfang"der"Runde"erhält"Teilnehmer"B"einen"Anfangsbetrag"von"12"CHF."""
• Entscheidung:"Nach"dem"Erhalt"des"Anfangsbetrags"muss"B"sich"entscheiden,"wieviel"er"an"den"Sender"zurücksenden"möchte,"für"den"Fall,"dass"er"etwas"gesendet"bekommt."B"muss"diese"Entscheidung"fällen,"weiss%
dabei%aber%noch%nicht,%wieviel%A%senden%wird."Das"bedeutet,"B"beantwortet"die"folgende"Frage:"„Falls%A%10%Franken%sendet,%so%dass%Sie%30%Franken%
bekommen:%wieviel%möchten%Sie%an%A%zurück%senden?“""
• Falls"sich"herausstellt,"dass"A"nichts"sendet,"dann"ist"die"Entscheidung"von"B"irrelevant,"und"nichts"wird"an"A"zurück"geschickt.""
• Der"Verdienst"von"Teilnehmer"B"für"die"gezogene"Runde"ist"also:"Falls"A"null"Franken"sendet:"12"+"0""–"0"Falls"A"10"Franken"sendet:"" 12"+"30"–"(zurück"gesendeter"Betrag)""
• Teilnehmer"B"wird"auch"um"eine"Einschätzung"dessen"gebeten,"ob"er"denkt,"dass"A"zehn"oder"null"Franken"senden"wird.""Auf"der"nächsten"Seite"sehen"Sie"einen"Screenshot"des"Entscheidungsbildschirms"von"Teilnehmer"B.""
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Entscheidungsbildschirm"von"Teilnehmer"B:"
Entscheidung"von"Teilnehmer"B."
Teilnehmer"B’s"Einschätzung"darüber,"wieviel"A"senden"wird"
Wie"sicher"ist"sich"B"bei"der"Einschätzung"von"Teilnehmer"A’s"Verhalten?" Entscheidung"bestätigen"und"fortfahren"!""(nächster"Bildschirm)""
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
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Die!nächste!Runde!"Wenn"beide"Teilnehmer"ihre"Entscheidungen"getroffen"haben,"endet"die"Runde"und"beide"Teilnehmer"gehen"in"die"nächste"Runde,"mit"einem"neuen,"anonymen"Gegenüber."Dies"passiert,"ohne,"dass"Sie"erfahren,"wie"sich"Ihr"Gegenüber"entschieden"hat."In"jeder"Runde"wissen"Sie"weder,"wie"sich"ihr"altes,"noch"wie"sich"Ihr"neues"Gegenüber"in"der"Vergangenheit"verhalten"hat"–"und"umgekehrt"weiss"auch"Ihr"Gegenüber"nichts"über"Sie!""
Da%Sie%ausserdem%nicht%wissen%können,%welche%der%fünf%Runden%nach%dem%
Zufallsprinzip%für%Ihre%Zahlung%relevant%ist,%sollten%Sie%jede%Runde%separat%
und%für%sich%genommen%betrachten.%%
%Erst"ganz"zum"Schluss"erfahren"Sie"bei"der"Auszahlung,"wie"die"Entscheidung"Ihres"Gegenübers"in"der"auszahlungsrelevanten"Runde"war."Auch"dieses"Gegenüber"bleibt"aber"weiterhin"anonym."""
Bitte%betrachten%Sie%das%Beispiel%auf%der%folgenden%Seite,%um%ein%Beispiel%
dafür%zu%sehen,%wie%die%Auszahlungen%funktionieren.%
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Das"folgende"Beispiel"illustriert,"wie"die"Zahlungen"bestimmt"werden."""
%""
BEISPIEL!!
!Am"Anfang"der"Runde"bekommt"Teilnehmerin"A"12"Franken."Nehmen"wir"an,"sie"sendet"10"Franken"an"Teilnehmer"B."
""Der"Betrag"von"10"Franken"wird"nun"verdreifacht,"so"dass"Teilnehmer"B""3x10=30"Franken"erhalten"wird."""Teilnehmer"B"weiss"zum"Zeitpunkt"seiner"eigenen"Entscheidung"allerdings"noch"nicht,"ob"er"0"oder"30"erhalten"wird."Er"bekommt"ebenfalls"12"Franken"am"Anfang"der"Runde."Nehmen"wir"an,"dass"B"sich"entscheidet,"18"zurück"zu"senden,"für"den"Fall,"dass"A"den"Betrag"von"10"sendet"(falls"A"null"sendet,"kann"B"nichts"zurück"senden):""""""""""""Nun"haben"beide"Teilnehmer"ihre"Entscheidungen"getroffen."Falls"diese"Runde"für"die"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird,"ergeben"sich"die"Auszahlungen"wie"oben"beschrieben."Da"Teilnehmer"A"10"geschickt"hat,"wird"die"Entscheidung"von"B"relevant,"und"dieser"sendet"18"Franken"zurück."""Also"endet"die"Runde"mit"den"folgenden"Zahlungen:""
Teilnehmer%A:%%12"–"10"+"18"="20"
%
Teilnehmer%B:%%12"+"30"–"18"="24"""
18 
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Fragebogen!Nachdem"Sie"die"fünf"Runden"der"Entscheidungssituation"abgeschlossen"haben,"werden"Sie"gebeten,"einen"längeren"Fragebogen"auszufüllen."""
Optionale!weitere!Teilnahme!Während"Sie"den"Fragebogen"ausfüllen,"werden"Sie"Gelegenheit"bekommen,"zusätzlich"an"einem"optionalen"weiteren"Studienabschnitt"teilzunehmen,"welcher"Ihnen"dann"erklärt"wird."Diese"Teilnahme"wird"separat"entlohnt"(zusätzlich"zum"bisherigen"Verdienst),"und"findet"zeitgleich"mit"dem"Fragebogen"statt.""
!
Überblick:!Zahlungen!"
• Wie"bereits"erwähnt,"wird"eine"der"fünf"gespielten"Runden"nach"dem"Zufallsprinzip"gezogen,"und"Sie"und"Ihr"Gegenüber"erhalten"die"Zahlungen,"die"aus"Ihren"Entscheidungen"in"dieser"Runde"resultieren."
• Zusätzlich"erhalten"Sie"unabhängig"von"Ihren"Entscheidungen"in"jedem"Fall"eine"Teilnahmegebühr"von"10"Franken.""
• Falls"Sie"sich"dazu"entscheiden,"am"optionalen"Teil"der"Studie"teilzunehmen,"können"Sie"eine"zusätzliche"Zahlung"von"10CHF"erhalten"(Sie"erhalten"hierzu"nach"der"Hauptstudie"mehr"Informationen)."""
Wenn!Sie!fertig!sind…!Wenn"Sie"die"Studie"abgeschlossen"haben,%bleiben%Sie%bitte%weiterhin%still%an%
Ihrem%Platz%sitzen%und%warten%Sie%darauf,%dass%der%Experimentleiter%Sie%zur%
Auszahlung%bittet."Wenn"Sie"gerufen"werden,"bringen"Sie"bitte"alle"Ihre"Sachen"(Jacke,"Tasche"usw.)"mit"sich,"da"Sie"das"Labor"durch"den"Auszahlungsraum"verlassen"werden."
%
…noch!Fragen?!Falls"Sie"irgendwelche"Fragen"zu"dieser"Anleitung"haben,"heben"Sie"bitte"nun"die"Hand,"und"ein"Assistant"wird"an"Ihren"Platz"kommen,"um"Ihnen"zu"helfen.""
Kontrollfragen!Bitte"füllen"Sie"nun"den"kurzen"Verständnistest"auf"der"nächsten"Seite"aus,"um"sicher"zu"gehen,"dass"Sie"verstanden"haben,"wie"die"Auszahlungen"der"Entscheidungssituation"sich"zusammensetzen.""""(bitte"auf"der"nächsten"Seite"fortfahren)"
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" "Verständnistest!"Bitte"bearbeiten"Sie"die"folgenden"Beispiele,"um"das"Berechnen"der"Auszahlungen"zu"üben.""Bitte"tragen"Sie"hier"Ihre"Teilnehmernummer"ein:"________""Bitte"tragen"Sie"nun"Ihre"Antworten"handschriftlich"auf"den"angedeuteten"Linien"ein."Es"wird"dann"jemand"vorbeikommen,"um"Ihre"Antworten"zu"prüfen,"und"Ihnen"zu"helfen,"falls"es"Antworten"gibt,"die"nicht"korrekt"sind."Wenn%Sie%fertig%sind%oder%Fragen%haben,%heben%Sie%
bitte%die%Hand."
BEISPIEL!1!"Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"und"B"treffen"die"folgenden"Entscheidungen:"A:"Sendet"10"B:"Sendet"14,%falls%er%10%bekommt.""Falls"diese"Runde"zur"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird...""
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"A"für"diese"Runde?""__________""
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"B"für"diese"Runde?""__________""
BEISPIEL!2!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"und"B"treffen"die"folgenden"Entscheidungen:"A:"Sendet"10"B:"Sendet"0,%falls%er%10%bekommt"""Falls"diese"Runde"zur"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird...""
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"A"für"diese"Runde?""__________""
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"B"für"diese"Runde?""__________""
BEISPIEL!3!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"und"B"treffen"die"folgenden"Entscheidungen:"A:"Sendet"0"B:"Sendet"7,%falls%er%10%bekommt""Falls"diese"Runde"zur"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird...""
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"A"für"diese"Runde?""__________""
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"B"für"diese"Runde?""__________""
BEISPIEL!4!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"sendet"10.""Wieviel"kann"B"maximal"zurücksenden?""_____________"Wieviel"kann"B"minimal"zurücksenden?""_______________""
Können%Sie%vor%Ende%der%Studie%wissen,%welche%Runde%als%Auszahlungsrunde%gewählt%wird?%%("")ja""""("")"nein"
%
Wenn%Sie%fertig%sind%oder%Fragen%haben,%heben%Sie%bitte%die%Hand.%
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
5.8.5 Stimulus group: comprehension questions
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"
1
Verständnistest!(Lösungen,!nicht!für!Teilnehmer!)!"Bitte"bearbeiten"Sie"die"folgenden"Beispiele,"um"das"Berechnen"der"Auszahlungen"zu"üben.""Bitte"tragen"Sie"nun"Ihre"Antworten"handschriftlich"auf"den"angedeuteten"Linien"ein."Es"wird"dann"jemand"vorbeikommen,"um"Ihre"Antworten"zu"prüfen,"und"Ihnen"zu"helfen,"falls"es"Antworten"gibt,"die"nicht"korrekt"sind."Wenn%Sie%fertig%sind%oder%Fragen%haben,%heben%Sie%
bitte%die%Hand."
BEISPIEL!1!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"und"B"treffen"die"folgenden"Entscheidungen:"A:"Sendet"10"B:"Sendet"14,%falls%er%10%bekommt.""Falls"diese"Runde"zur"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird..."
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"A"für"diese"Runde?""____16_____"
SOLUTION:%12Z10+14%=%16%%(12%from%endowment,%sends%10,%receives%14%back)%
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"B"für"diese"Runde?""_____28____"
SOLUTION:%12+10*3Z14%=%28%%(12%from%endowment,%receives%10*3,%sends%14%back)%"
BEISPIEL!2!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"und"B"treffen"die"folgenden"Entscheidungen:"A:"Sendet"10"B:"Sendet"0,%falls%er%10%bekommt""Falls"diese"Runde"zur"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird..."
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"A"für"diese"Runde?""_____2_____"
SOLUTION:%12Z10+0%=%2%%(12%from%endowment,%sends%10,%receives%0%back)%
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"B"für"diese"Runde?""____42_____%
SOLUTION:%12+10*3Z0%=%42%%(12%from%endowment,%receives%10*3,%sends%0%back)%
BEISPIEL!3!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"und"B"treffen"die"folgenden"Entscheidungen:"A:"Sendet"0"B:"Sendet"7,%falls%er%10%bekommt""Falls"diese"Runde"zur"Auszahlung"gezogen"wird..."
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"A"für"diese"Runde?""____12_____%
SOLUTION:%12%(12%from%endowment,%no%transfers%because%Proposer%sends%0%and%round%ends)%
• wieviele"Franken"bekommt"B"für"diese"Runde?""____12_____"
SOLUTION:%12%(12%from%endowment,%no%transfers%because%Proposer%sends%0%and%round%ends)%
%
BEISPIEL!4!Nehmen"Sie"an,"Teilnehmer"A"sendet"10."Wieviel"kann"B"maximal"zurücksenden?""_____3x10=30________"Wieviel"kann"B"minimal"zurücksenden?""______3x0=0_________""
Können%Sie%vor%Ende%der%Studie%wissen,%welche%Runde%als%Auszahlungsrunde%gewählt%wird?%%("")ja""""("X)"nein"
%
%
%
%"""
2
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Anleitung  Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an der heutigen Studie!  Im Verlauf der Studie werden Sie zunächst an einigen Entscheidungssituationen teilnehmen, und im Anschluss einen langen Fragebogen ausfüllen.   
Ihre Bezahlung hängt von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen ab, sowie von den 
Entscheidungen einer Gruppe von Teilnehmern, die vor kurzem hier im 
Labor Ihre Entscheidungen getroffen haben.  Bitte lesen Sie den Text auf den folgenden Seiten gründlich durch, um folgende Dinge zu verstehen: 
x Die Regeln 
x Wie die Entscheidungssituation funktioniert 
x Wer in den Entscheidungssituationen Ihr Gegenüber sein wird 
x Wie Sie in Abhängigkeit Ihrer Entscheidungen bezahlt werden  Im Anschluss an die Anleitung wird es ein paar Kontrollfragen geben, die sicherstellen sollen, dass Sie diese vier  Dinge gründlich verstanden haben.  Allgemeine Regeln 
Bitte bleiben Sie während der gesamten Studie still an Ihrem Platz sitzen, 
und kommunizieren Sie mit niemandem. Sollten Sie Sich nicht an diese Regeln halten, müssen wir Sie bitten die Studie ohne Bezahlung abzubrechen,  und Sie werden für die Teilnahme an zukünftigen Studien gesperrt.  Sollten Sie nach dem Lesen dieser Anleitung oder während der Studie noch Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand, und es wird ein Experimentleiter an Ihren Platz kommen, um Ihnen zu helfen.
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
5.8.7 Experiment 1: original instructions
154
2/10  
Grundsätzliches Sie werden an 31 Runden einer Entscheidungssituation teilnehmen.   
x Am Anfang der ersten Runde werden Sie entweder der Rolle A oder der 
Rolle B zugeteilt. Diese Rolle behalten Sie bis zum Ende der Studie bei.   
x In jeder der 31 Runden bekommen Sie per Zufall ein neues Gegenüber zugeteilt, das die jeweils andere Rolle übernimmt.  
x Am Ende der Studie wird nur eine der 31 Runden nach dem 
Zufallsprinzip ausgewählt.   
x Ihre Bezahlung resultiert aus Ihrer Entscheidung, sowie der 
Entscheidung Ihres Gegenübers in dieser einen Runde.  
Wer sind Ihre Gegenüber?  
x Ihre Gegenüber sind reale Personen, die aber heute nicht im Labor 
anwesend sind. Alle 31 Ihrer heutigen Gegenüber haben vor kurzem hier im Labor Ihre Entscheidungen gefällt und diese sind von uns aufgezeichnet worden. Fuer diese Teilnehmer galten die gleichen Regeln, die auch für Sie heute gelten (Details weiter unten). Im Anschluss wurden Fotos dieser Teilnehmer gemacht, welche Sie heute waehrend des Experimentes zu sehen bekommen. Alle Teilnehmer, die Sie heute sehen werden, haben uns Ihr Einverständnis zur Verwendung der Fotos und Entscheidungen gegeben.  
x Während Sie Ihre Entscheidung treffen,  werden Sie auf der linken Bildschirmhälfte ein Foto Ihres momentanen Gegenübers sehen. Dieser Teilnehmer hat die Entscheidung getroffen, die Ihre Auszahlung in dieser Runde beeinflussen wird, falls diese Runde auszahlungsrelevant ist.  
x Sie werden feststellen, dass wir die Fotos bearbeitet haben: z.B. haben wir die Bilder mit Hilfe einer schwarzen Umrandung so ausgeschnitten, dass Sie nur das Gesicht Ihres Gegenübers sehen werden. 
 
x Ihr Gegenüber hat bei der Aufzeichnung seiner/ihrer 
Entscheidungen kein Foto gesehen, so dass Sie für Ihr Gegenüber 
anonym sind.  
x Ihr Gegenüber wird, ebenso wie Sie, auf Basis Ihrer Entscheidungen heute bezahlt. Wir lassen Ihrem Gegenüber seine/ihre Verdienste im 
Anschluss an die Studie in Bar zukommen.     (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
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2. Beschreibung der Entscheidungssituation Im Folgenden finden Sie eine Beschreibung der Entscheidungssituation, die Sie heute 31x durchlaufen werden. 
Teilnehmer A:  
x Am Anfang der jeweiligen Runde erhalten A und B jeweils einen 
Anfangsbetrag von CHF 12.  
x Entscheidung: Nach dem Erhalt des Anfangsbetrags muss Teilnehmer A entscheiden, wieviele seiner CHF 12 er an den Empfänger B senden möchte. Er kann entweder CHF 0 oder CHF 10 senden.  
x Der Betrag, den Teilnehmer A schickt, wird verdreifacht, bevor er an Teilnehmer B weitergesendet wird.   
x B hat bereits in der Vergangenheit entschieden, wieviel er / sie vom empfangenen Betrag an A zurück schicken möchte, für den Fall, dass er 
etwas von A empfängt.   
x Der Verdienst von Teilnehmer A für die gezogene Runde ist entsprechend: 12 – (an B gesendeter Betrag) + (Betrag, den B zurücksendet)  
x Teilnehmer A wird anschliessend um eine Einschätzung gebeten, wieviel er denkt, dass B zurücksenden würde, für den Fall, dass er CHF 30 erhielte. (Dies muss auch dann eingeschätzt werden, falls A nichts sendet.) Es wird ebenfalls gefragt, wie sicher A sich bei dieser Einschätzung ist.  Auf der nächsten Seite sehen Sie einen Screenshot des Entscheidungsbildschirms von Teilnehmer A. 
 (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
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Entscheidungsbildschirm von Teilnehmer A: 
 
 
 
                                    (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
Entschei-
dung von Teilnehmer A 
Restzeit für die Runde 
Teilnehmer A’s Einschätzung darüber, wieviel B zurücksenden wird Wie sicher ist A sich bei dieser Schätzung? 
Foto Ihres Gegenübers für diese Runde 
Entscheidung bestätigen und fortfahren Î  (nächster Bildschirm)  
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Teilnehmer B: 
x Am Anfang der Runde erhält Teilnehmer B einen Anfangsbetrag von CHF 12.   
x Entscheidung: Nach dem Erhalt des Anfangsbetrags muss B sich entscheiden, wieviel er an A zurücksenden möchte, für den Fall, dass er 
etwas gesendet bekommt. B muss diese Entscheidung fällen, weiss dabei 
aber noch nicht, wieviel A gesendet hat. Das bedeutet, B beantwortet die folgende Frage: „Falls A CHF 10 sendet, so dass Sie 30 Franken 
bekommen: wieviel möchten Sie an A zurück senden?“ (Zahl 
zwischen 0 und 30)  
x Falls sich später herausstellt, dass A nichts gesendet hat, dann erhalten beide Teilnehmer lediglich Ihr Startguthaben.  
x Der Verdienst von Teilnehmer B für die gezogene Runde ist also: Falls A CHF 0   gesendet hat: 12 + 0  – 0 Falls A CHF 10 gesendet hat:  12 + 30 – (zurück gesendeter Betrag)  
x Teilnehmer B wird auch um eine Einschätzung dessen gebeten, ob er denkt, dass A zehn oder null Franken gesendet hat. Es wird ebenfalls gefragt, wie sicher B sich bei dieser Einschätzung ist.  Auf der nächsten Seite sehen Sie einen Screenshot des Entscheidungsbildschirms von Teilnehmer B.    (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
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Entscheidungsbildschirm von Teilnehmer B:                     
 (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
Entschei-
dung von Teilnehmer B. 
Wie sicher ist sich B bei der 
Einschätzung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A’s	  Verhalten? Entscheidung bestätigen und fortfahren Î  (nächster Bildschirm)  
Teilnehmer	  B’s	  Einschätzung darüber, wieviel A senden wird 
Foto des Gegenübers für die Runde 
Restzeit für die Runde 
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Die nächste Runde  Wenn Sie Ihre Entscheidung getroffen haben, endet die Runde und Sie kommen in die nächste Runde, mit einem neuen Gegenüber. Sie bekommen hierbei keine Rückmeldung darüber, wie sich Ihr Gegenüber in der vergangenen Runde entschieden hat.  
Da Sie ausserdem nicht wissen können, welche der 31 Runden nach dem 
Zufallsprinzip für Ihre Zahlung relevant ist, sollten Sie jede Runde separat 
und für sich genommen betrachten.  
 Erst am Ende des Experimentes wird die auszahlungsrelevante Runde nach dem Zufallsprinzip bestimmt und Sie werden darüber informiert wie sich Ihr Gegenüber in dieser Runde entschieden hat. Sie erfahren aber nicht, um welche Runde es sich gehandelt hat. Das bedeutet, sie werden nicht erfahren, welches Ihrer Gegenüber diese Entscheidung getroffen hat. Dies stellt sicher, dass die Entscheidungen Ihrer Gegenüber anonym bleiben, obwohl Sie deren Gesichter sehen.  
Bitte betrachten Sie das Beispiel auf der folgenden Seite, um ein Beispiel 
dafür zu sehen, wie die Auszahlungen funktionieren.         (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
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Das folgende Beispiel illustriert, wie die Zahlungen bestimmt werden.   
   (bitte auf nächster Seite fortfahren)
BEISPIEL  
 Am Anfang der Runde bekommt Teilnehmerin A 12 Franken. Nehmen wir an, sie sendet 10 Franken an Teilnehmer B. 
  Der Betrag von 10 Franken wird nun verdreifacht, so dass Teilnehmer B  3x10=30 Franken erhalten wird.   Teilnehmer B weiss zum Zeitpunkt seiner eigenen Entscheidung allerdings noch nicht, ob er 0 oder 30 erhalten wird. Er bekommt ebenfalls 12 Franken am Anfang der Runde. Nehmen wir an, dass B sich entscheidet, 18 zurück zu senden, für den Fall, dass A den Betrag von 10 sendet (falls A null sendet, kann B nichts zurück senden):            Nun haben beide Teilnehmer ihre Entscheidungen getroffen. Falls diese Runde für die Auszahlung gezogen wird, ergeben sich die Auszahlungen wie oben beschrieben. Da Teilnehmer A 10 geschickt hat, wird die Entscheidung von B relevant, und dieser sendet 18 Franken zurück.   Also endet die Runde mit den folgenden Zahlungen:  
Teilnehmer A:  12 – 10 + 18 = 20 
 
Teilnehmer B:  12 + 30 – 18 = 24   
18 
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Fragebogen Nachdem Sie die 31 Runden der Entscheidungssituation abgeschlossen haben, werden Sie gebeten, einen längeren Fragebogen auszufüllen.  
 
Überblick: Zahlungen  
x Unabhängig von Ihren heutigen Entscheidungen erhalten Sie in jedem Fall eine Teilnahmegebühr von CHF 10.  
x Wie bereits erwähnt, wird eine der 31 gespielten Runden nach dem Zufallsprinzip gezogen, und Sie und Ihr Gegenüber erhalten die Zahlungen, die aus Ihren Entscheidungen in dieser Runde resultieren. Ihrem Gegenüber stellen wir die erwirtschafteten Beträge nach der Studie ebenfalls in Bar zu.  
Wenn  Sie  fertig  sind… Wenn Sie die Studie abgeschlossen haben, bleiben Sie bitte weiterhin still an 
Ihrem Platz sitzen und warten Sie darauf, dass der Experimentleiter Sie zur 
Auszahlung bittet. Wenn Sie gerufen werden, bringen Sie bitte alle Ihre Sachen (Jacke, Tasche usw.) mit sich, da Sie das Labor durch den Auszahlungsraum verlassen werden. 
 
…noch  Fragen? Falls Sie irgendwelche Fragen zu dieser Anleitung haben, heben Sie bitte nun die Hand, und ein Assistent wird an Ihren Platz kommen, um Ihnen zu helfen.  
Kontrollfragen Bitte füllen Sie nun den kurzen Verständnistest auf der nächsten Seite aus, um sicher zu gehen, dass Sie verstanden haben, wie die Auszahlungen der Entscheidungssituation sich zusammensetzen.    (bitte auf der nächsten Seite fortfahren) 
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 Verständnistest Bitte bearbeiten Sie die folgenden Beispiele, um das Berechnen der Auszahlungen zu üben.  Bitte tragen Sie hier Ihre Teilnehmernummer ein: ________  Bitte tragen Sie nun Ihre Antworten handschriftlich auf den angedeuteten Linien ein. Es wird dann jemand vorbeikommen, um Ihre Antworten zu prüfen, und Ihnen zu helfen, falls es Antworten gibt, die nicht korrekt sind. 
Wenn Sie fertig sind oder Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. 
BEISPIEL 1  Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A und B treffen die folgenden Entscheidungen: A: Sendet 10 B: Sendet 14, falls er 10 bekommt.  Falls diese Runde zur Auszahlung gezogen wird... 
x wieviele Franken bekommt A für diese Runde?  __________ 
x wieviele Franken bekommt B für diese Runde?  __________  
BEISPIEL 2 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A und B treffen die folgenden Entscheidungen: A: Sendet 10 B: Sendet 0, falls er 10 bekommt  Falls diese Runde zur Auszahlung gezogen wird... 
x wieviele Franken bekommt A für diese Runde?  __________ 
x wieviele Franken bekommt B für diese Runde?  __________  
BEISPIEL 3 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A und B treffen die folgenden Entscheidungen: A: Sendet 0 B: Sendet 7, falls er 10 bekommt  Falls diese Runde zur Auszahlung gezogen wird... 
x wieviele Franken bekommt A für diese Runde?  __________ 
x wieviele Franken bekommt B für diese Runde?  __________  
BEISPIEL 4 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A sendet 10.  Wieviel kann B maximal zurücksenden?  _____________ Wieviel kann B minimal zurücksenden?  _______________  
Werden Sie wissen, welche der 31 Runden als Auszahlungsrunde gewählt wird?  (  )ja    (  ) nein 
 
Werden Sie nach der Studie wissen, wie sich welches Ihrer Gegenüber entschieden hat? (  )ja    (  ) nein 
 
Bekommen Ihre Gegenüber Ihre Auszahlung ebenfalls zugestellt? (  )ja    (  ) nein 
 
 
 
Wenn Sie fertig sind oder Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. 
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 Verständnistest (Lösungen, nicht für Teilnehmer!)  Bitte bearbeiten Sie die folgenden Beispiele, um das Berechnen der Auszahlungen zu üben.  Bitte tragen Sie nun Ihre Antworten handschriftlich auf den angedeuteten Linien ein. Es wird dann jemand vorbeikommen, um Ihre Antworten zu prüfen, und Ihnen zu helfen, falls es Antworten gibt, die nicht korrekt sind. Wenn Sie fertig sind oder Fragen haben, heben Sie 
bitte die Hand. 
BEISPIEL 1 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A und B treffen die folgenden Entscheidungen: A: Sendet 10 B: Sendet 14, falls er 10 bekommt.  Falls diese Runde zur Auszahlung gezogen wird... 
x wieviele Franken bekommt A für diese Runde?  ____16_____ 
SOLUTION: 12-10+14 = 16  (12 from endowment, sends 10, receives 14 back) 
x wieviele Franken bekommt B für diese Runde?  _____28____ 
SOLUTION: 12+10*3-14 = 28  (12 from endowment, receives 10*3, sends 14 back)  
BEISPIEL 2 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A und B treffen die folgenden Entscheidungen: A: Sendet 10 B: Sendet 0, falls er 10 bekommt  Falls diese Runde zur Auszahlung gezogen wird... 
x wieviele Franken bekommt A für diese Runde?  _____2_____ 
SOLUTION: 12-10+0 = 2  (12 from endowment, sends 10, receives 0 back) 
x wieviele Franken bekommt B für diese Runde?  ____42_____ 
SOLUTION: 12+10*3-0 = 42  (12 from endowment, receives 10*3, sends 0 back) 
BEISPIEL 3 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A und B treffen die folgenden Entscheidungen: A: Sendet 0 B: Sendet 7, falls er 10 bekommt  Falls diese Runde zur Auszahlung gezogen wird... 
x wieviele Franken bekommt A für diese Runde?  ____12_____ 
SOLUTION: 12 (12 from endowment, no transfers because Proposer sends 0 and round ends) 
x wieviele Franken bekommt B für diese Runde?  ____12_____ 
SOLUTION: 12 (12 from endowment, no transfers because Proposer sends 0 and round ends) 
 
BEISPIEL 4 Nehmen Sie an, Teilnehmer A sendet 10. Wieviel kann B maximal zurücksenden?  _____3x10=30________ Wieviel kann B minimal zurücksenden?  ______3x0=0_________  
Werden Sie wissen, welche Runde als Auszahlungsrunde gewählt wird?  (  )ja    ( X) nein 
Dies wird erst am Ende nach dem Zufallsprinzip bestimmt. Sie  
 
Werden Sie nach der Studie wissen, wie sich welches Ihrer Gegenüber entschieden hat? (  )ja    ( X) nein 
Sie bekommen keine Information darüber, wie sich Ihre Gegenüber entschieden haben. Da Sie zudem 
nicht erfahren werden, welche Runde zahlungsrelevant war, können Sie auch aus Ihrer Auszahlung nicht 
rückschliessen, wie sich welcher Teilnehmer verhalten hat. 
 
Bekommen Ihre Gegenüber Ihre Auszahlung ebenfalls zugestellt? ( X)ja    (  ) nein 
Es handelt sich um reale Personen, denen wir ihren Geldbetrag zuschicken! 
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Anleitung)!Vielen!Dank!für!Ihre!Teilnahme!an!der!heutigen!Studie!!!Im!Verlauf!der!heutigen!Studie!werden!Sie!die!Gesichter!von!Personen!sehen,!die!vor!einigen!Wochen!an!einer!Studie!hier!im!Labor!teilgenommen!haben.!Ihre!Aufgabe!wird!es!sein,!zu!erraten,!wie!die!Personen!auf!den!Bildern!sich!in!
der!Studie!verhalten!haben.!Im!Anschluss!an!diese!Phase!der!Studie!wird!es!einen!Fragebogen!geben.!!Am!Ende!der!Studie!werden!Sie!in!bar!bezahlt.!Zum!einen!erhalten!Sie!eine!fixe!Teilnahmegebühr!iHv!20CHF.!Zum!anderen!erhalten!Sie!eine!Bezahlung!(bis!
zu!20CHF!zusätzlich!zur!Teilnahmegebühr),!deren!Höhe!sich!danach!richtet,!
wie!präzise!Sie!das!Verhalten!der!Personen!auf!den!Fotos!erraten!haben.!!Bitte!lesen!Sie!den!Text!auf!den!folgenden!Seiten!gründlich!durch,!um!folgende!Dinge!zu!verstehen:!
• Die!Regeln!der!heutigen!Studie!
• Wie!die!Entscheidungssituation!funktioniert,!an!der!die!Personen!in!den!Bildern!teilgenommen!haben!
• Wie!Sie!für!die!Genauigkeit!Ihrer!Einschätzungen!bezahlt!werden!!Im!Anschluss!an!die!Anleitung!wird!es!ein!paar!Kontrollfragen!geben,!die!sicherstellen!sollen,!dass!Sie!diese!drei!Dinge!gründlich!verstanden!haben.!!Allgemeine!Regeln!
Bitte!bleiben!Sie!während!der!gesamten!Studie!still!an!Ihrem!Platz!sitzen,!
und!kommunizieren!Sie!mit!niemandem.!Sollten!Sie!Sich!nicht!an!diese!Regeln!halten,!müssen!wir!Sie!bitten!die!Studie!ohne!Bezahlung!abzubrechen,!!und!Sie!werden!für!die!Teilnahme!an!zukünftigen!Studien!gesperrt.!!Fragen?!Sollten!Sie!nach!dem!Lesen!dieser!Anleitung!oder!während!der!Studie!noch!Fragen!haben,!heben!Sie!bitte!leise!die!Hand,!und!es!wird!ein!Experimentleiter!an!Ihren!Platz!kommen,!um!Ihnen!zu!helfen.
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1.)Wer)sind)die)Personen)auf)den)Fotos?!!Vor!ein!paar!Wochen!haben!wir!eine!Studie!hier!im!Labor!durchgeführt,!bei!der!eine!Gruppe!von!Personen!an!einer!Entscheidungssituation!teilgenommen!hat.!!Im!Anschluss!wurden!sie!fotografiert.!!!
• Alle!Personen,!die!Sie!heute!sehen!werden,!haben!uns!ihre!Erlaubnis!erteilt,!dass!wir!ihre!Entscheidungen!und!Ihre!Fotos!in!weiteren!Studien!in!anonymer!Form!verwenden!dürfen.!
• Sie!werden!feststellen,!dass!wir!die!Fotos!der!Personen!elektronisch!bearbeitet!haben!ZZ!wir!haben!eine!ovale!schwarze!Schablone!über!das!Gesicht!gelegt,!so!dass!die!Haare!nicht!mehr!sichtbar!sind!und!nur!das!Gesicht!sichtbar!bleibt.!Es!handelt!sich!abgesehen!hiervon!um!unveränderte!Originalfotos!dieser!Personen.!!
2.)Beschreibung)der)Entscheidungssituation,)an)der)die)Personen)
teilgenommen)haben)!
• Die!Personen!haben!mehrere!Runden!lang!!an!einer!Entscheidungssituation!teilgenommen,!die!weiter!unten!beschrieben!wird.!!
• Sie!wurden!dabei!zu!Anfangs!jeweils!einer!von!zwei!Rollen!zugeteilt:!entweder!Rolle!A!oder!Rolle!B.!Diese!Rolle!wurde!am!Anfang!festgelegt!und!bis!zum!Schluss!beibehalten.!
• In!jeder!Runde!der!Studie!wurde!eine!Person!der!Rolle!A!jeweils!einer!Person!der!Rolle!B!zugeordnet.!Wer!wem!zugeordnet!wurde,!wurde!jede!Runde!geändert.!!
• Die!Personen!wussten!dabei!nicht,!wer!ihr!Gegenüber!ist!–!sie!haben!auch!kein!Foto!ihres!Gegenübers!gesehen,!sondern!nur!einen!anonymen!Entscheidungsbildschirm.!
• In!jeder!Runde!mussten!die!Teilnehmer!eine!Entscheidung!fällen.!Diese!wird!auf!den!folgenden!Seiten!beschrieben.!
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
166
! ! Version:05/09/2011!14:08!!
! 3!!
2a))Beschreibung)der)Entscheidungssituation)von)Teilnehmer)A:))
• Am!Anfang!der!jeweiligen!Runde!erhalten!A!und!B!jeweils!einen!
Anfangsbetrag!von!12!Schweizer!Franken.!!
• Entscheidung:!Nach!dem!Erhalt!des!Anfangsbetrags!muss!Teilnehmer!A!entscheiden,!wieviele!seiner!12!Franken!er!an!den!zugeteilten!Teilnehmer!B!senden!möchte.!Er!kann!entweder!0!oder!10!Franken!senden.!!
• Der!Betrag,!den!Teilnehmer!A!schickt,!wird!verdreifacht,!bevor!er!an!Teilnehmer!B!weitergesendet!wird.!Bei!B!kommen!also!entweder!3*0=0!oder!3*10=30!Franken!an.!!
• B!entscheidet!dann,!ohne%zu%wissen,%ob%A%etwas%gesendet%hat,!wieviel!er!vom!empfangenen!Betrag!an!A!zurück!schicken!möchte,!für%den%Fall,%dass%
er%etwas%von%A%empfängt.!!!
• Der!Verdienst!von!Teilnehmer!A!für!die!Runde!ist:!12!–!(an!B!gesendeter!Betrag)!+!(Betrag,!den!B!zurücksendet)!!!Hier!sehen!Sie!einen!Screenshot!des!Entscheidungsbildschirms!von!Teilnehmer!A:!
)!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!
Entscheidung!von!Teilnehmer!A.!
Appendix
167
! ! Version:05/09/2011!14:08!!
! 4!!
2b))Beschreibung)Entscheidungssituation)von)Teilnehmer)B:)
• Am!Anfang!der!Runde!erhält!Teilnehmer!B!einen!Anfangsbetrag!von!12!CHF.!!!
• Entscheidung:!Nach!dem!Erhalt!des!Anfangsbetrags!muss!B!sich!entscheiden,!wieviel!er!an!A!zurücksenden!möchte,!für%den%Fall,%dass%er%
etwas%gesendet%bekommt.!!!
• B!muss!diese!Entscheidung!fällen,!weiss%dabei%aber%noch%nicht,%wieviel%A%
gesendet%hat.!Das!bedeutet,!B!beantwortet!die!folgende!Frage:!„Falls!A!10!
Franken!sendet,!so!dass!Sie!30!Franken!bekommen:!wieviel!möchten!
Sie!an!A!zurück!senden?“!B!kann!hierbei!jeden!Betrag!zwischen!(einschliesslich)!0!und!30!Franken!zurückschicken.!!
• Falls!sich!später!herausstellt,!dass!A!nichts!gesendet!hat,!dann!ist!die!Entscheidung!von!B!irrelevant,!und!es!wird!nichts!an!A!zurück!geschickt.!!
• Der!Verdienst!von!Teilnehmer!B!ist!also:!Falls!A!null!Franken!gesendet!hat:! 12!+!0!!–!0!!=!12!Falls!A!10!Franken!gesendet!hat:!! 12!+!30!–!(zurück!gesendeter!Betrag)!!!Hier!sehen!Sie!einen!Screenshot!des!Entscheidungsbildschirms!von!Teilnehmer!B:!!Sobald!beide!Teilnehmer!Ihre!Entscheidungen!gefällt!hatten,!begann!für!die!Teilnehmer!die!nächste!Runde,!mit!einem!neuen!Gegenüber.!!!!!!!
Entscheidung!von!Teilnehmer!B.!(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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Das!folgende!Beispiel!illustriert,!wie!die!Zahlungen!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!in!der!vergangenen!Studie!bestimmt!wurden.!!!
!!!
BEISPIEL))
)Am!Anfang!der!Runde!bekommt!Teilnehmer!A!12!Franken.!Nehmen!wir!an,!er!sendet!10!Franken!an!Teilnehmer!B.!
!!Der!Betrag!von!10!Franken!wird!nun!verdreifacht,!so!dass!Teilnehmer!B!!3x10=30!Franken!erhalten!wird.!!!Teilnehmer!B!weiss!zum!Zeitpunkt!seiner!eigenen!Entscheidung!allerdings!noch!nicht,!ob!er!0!oder!30!erhalten!wird.!Er!bekommt!ebenfalls!12!Franken!am!Anfang!der!Runde.!Nehmen!wir!an,!dass!B!sich!entscheidet,!18!zurück!zu!senden,!für!den!Fall,!dass!A!den!Betrag!von!10!sendet!(falls!A!null!sendet,!kann!B!nichts!zurück!senden):!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Nun!haben!beide!Teilnehmer!ihre!Entscheidungen!getroffen.!Falls!diese!Runde!für!die!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird,!ergeben!sich!die!Auszahlungen!wie!oben!beschrieben.!Da!Teilnehmer!A!10!geschickt!hat,!wird!die!Entscheidung!von!B!relevant,!und!dieser!sendet!18!Franken!zurück.!!!Also!endet!die!Runde!mit!den!folgenden!Zahlungen:!!
Teilnehmer!A:!!12!–!10!+!18!=!20!
!
Teilnehmer!B:!!12!+!30!–!18!=!24!!!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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3.)Ihre)Aufgabe)und)Ihre)Zahlung,)in)Abhängigkeit)der)Genauigkeit)
Ihrer)Schätzungen)!Ihre!Aufgabe!ist!es,!so!genau!wie!möglich!einzuschätzen,!was!die!jeweilige!
Person!auf!dem!Foto!in!der!oben!beschriebenen!Entscheidungssituation!
getan!hat.!!!
• Sie!werden!darum!gebeten,!für!jeweils!30!Teilnehmer!A!und!30!Teilnehmer!B!solche!Einschätzungen!zu!treffen.!!
• Am!Ende!der!Studie!wird!nur!eine!dieser!Personen!zufällig!
ausgewählt,!und!Sie!werden!danach!bezahlt,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Einschätzung!über!die!Entscheidungen!dieser!Person!war.!Da!nur!eine!
Ihrer!Einschätzungen!ausbezahlt!wird,!sollten!Sie!jede!Person!
separat!und!aufmerksam!für!sich!genommen!betrachten.!!
• Erst!ganz!zum!Schluss!der!Studie,!nachdem!Sie!alle!Ihre!Einschätzungen!getroffen!haben!und!den!Fragebogen!ausgefüllt!haben,!werden!Sie!Rückmeldung!darüber!bekommen,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Schätzungen!in!der!zufällig!gezogenen!Runde!waren,!und!wieviel!Sie!dabei!verdient!haben.!Sie!werden!allerdings!keine%Rückmeldung!darüber!bekommen,!um!welche!Runde,!bzw.!welche!dieser!Personen!es!sich!gehandelt!hat,!da!wir!die!Anonymität!der!Entscheidungen!unserer!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!wahren!müssen.!!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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3a))Einschätzungen)bezüglich)Teilnehmer)A:))Falls!die!Person,!die!Sie!sehen,!ein!Teilnehmer!A!war,!wird!Ihr!Bildschirm!wie!folgt!aussehen:!
!!Wie!Sie!sehen,!werden!Sie!gebeten,!zwei!Dinge!einzugeben:!
• In!wieviel!Prozent!der!Runden!hat!diese!Person!0!vs.!10!an!Teilnehmer!B!gesendet?!
• Wie!sicher!sind!Sie!sich!bei!dieser!Einschätzung?!!!
Bezahlung)für)die)Einschätzung)von)Teilnehmer)A:)Ihre!Bezahlung!hängt!davon!ab,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Einschätzung!ist.!Sie!werden!mit!einem!Anfangsbetrag!von!200!Punkten!beginnen.!Für!jeden!Prozentpunkt,!mit!dem!Ihre!Antwort!von!dem!tatsächlichen!Verhalten!des!Teilnehmers!abweicht,!bekommen!Sie!einen!Punkt!abgezogen:!!
Punkte!=!200V2*(absoluter!Fehlerbetrag!A)!
!
Das!bedeutet,!je!näher!Ihre!Einschätzung!an!der!korrekten!Antwort!ist,!!
desto!höher!wird!Ihre!Bezahlung!sein.!!
Sie!bekommen!zum!Schluss!die!erzielten!Punkte!in!Franken!umgerechnet,!
mit!dem!Wechselkurs!1:10!(10!Punkte!=!1!CHF)!
!Auf!der!folgenden!Seite!finden!Sie!ein!Beispiel,!um!dies!besser!nachvollziehen!zu!können.!
!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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BEISPIEL)(Bezahlung)für)Einschätzung)über)einen)Teilnehmer)A))!Nehmen!wir!an,!Sie!hätten!die!Schätzungen!in!der!zweiten!Spalte!abgegeben,!und!die!korrekten!Einschätzungen!wären!die!in!der!dritten!Spalte.!Wie!berechnet!sich!nun!Ihre!Bezahlung?!!
Ihre!Schätzung:!!
in!wieviel!%!der!
Runden!hat!diese!
Person!den!Betrag!
10!gesendet?!
!
Tatsächliches!
Verhalten!der!Person!
Abweichung!
(Tatsächlich!
–!
Schätzung)!!
Absolutwert!der!!
Abweichung!!
(Vorzeichen%positiv%machen)%
50%! 40%! Z10! 10!
! ! ! Abs.!Fehlbetrag!A=10!!In!diesem!Beispiel!ist!der!absolute!Fehlerbetrag!A!=!10,!also!würden!Sie!200V2*10=180!Punkte!erhalten,!sofern!diese!Runde!zur!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird.!!Hierfür!würden!Sie!also!eine!Bezahlung!erhalten!von!180/10=18,Z!CHF,!welche!auf!Ihre!Teilnahmegebühr!von!20CHF!aufgeschlagen!würden.!Sie!würden!in!diesem!Beispiel!also!insgesamt!38,Z!CHF!verdienen.!
)
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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3b))Einschätzungen)bezüglich)Teilnehmern)B:)Falls!die!Person,!die!Sie!sehen,!ein!Teilnehmer!B!war,!wird!Ihr!Bildschirm!wie!folgt!aussehen:!
!!Wie!Sie!sehen!können,!werden!Sie!für!Teilnehmer!B!darum!gebeten,!eine!Einschätzung!zu!geben!für!den!durchschnittlichen%Betrag,!den!die!Person!entschieden!hat!zurück%zu%schicken,!für%den%Fall,%dass%Teilnehmer%A%10%sendet!(und!somit!30CHF!bei!B!ankommen).!!!
Bezahlung)für)die)Einschätzung)von)Teilnehmer)B:)Auch!hier!gilt!wieder,!dass!Ihre!Bezahlung!davon!abhängt!,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Einschätzung!ist.!Sie!werden!wiederum!mit!einem!Anfangsbetrag!von!200!Punkten!beginnen.!Für!jeden!Franken,!den!Sie!daneben!liegen,!werden!Ihnen!fünf!Punkte!abgezogen:!!Punkte!=!200Z5*(absoluter!Fehlerbetrag!B)!!
Das!bedeutet,!je!näher!Ihre!Einschätzung!an!der!korrekten!Antwort!ist,!
desto!höher!wird!Ihre!Bezahlung!sein.!
!
Sie!bekommen!zum!Schluss!die!erzielten!Punkte!in!Franken!umgerechnet,!
mit!dem!Wechselkurs!1:10!(10!Punkte!=!1!CHF)!
!Auf!der!folgenden!Seite!finden!Sie!ein!Beispiel,!um!dies!besser!nachvollziehen!zu!können.!!!(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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!
BEISPIEL)(Bezahlung)für)die)Einschätzung)von)Teilnehmer)Bs)Verhalten))!Nehmen!wir!an,!Sie!hätten!die!Schätzungen!in!der!zweiten!Spalte!abgegeben,!und!die!tatsächlichen!Entscheidungen!seien!in!der!dritten!Spalte.!Wie!berechnet!sich!nun!Ihre!Bezahlung?!!
Ihre!Schätzung:!wieviel!
hat!diese!Person!
durchschnittlich!
zurückgeschickt,!falls!
sie!3*10=30CHF!
erhalten!hat?!
Tatsächliche!
Entscheidung!der!
Person!
Abweichung!
(Tatsächlich!–!
Schätzung)!!
Absolutwert!der!
Abweichung!
(Vorzeichen%positiv%
machen)!
15! 8! 8Z15=Z7! 7!
! ! ! Abs.!Fehlerbetrag!B=!
7!!In!diesem!Beispiel!ware!der!absolute!Fehlerbetrag!B=!7,!so!dass!Sie!200V7*5=165!
Punkte!erhalten!würden,!falls!diese!Runde!für!die!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird.!
!Dies!entspräche!165/10=16,50!CHF,!welche!auf!Ihre!Teilnahmegebühr!von!20CHF!aufgeschlagen!würden.!Sie!würden!in!diesem!Beispiel!also!insgesamt!36,50CHF!verdienen.!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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4.)Im)Anschluss:)ein)Fragebogen…)!Wenn!Sie!das!Verhalten!aller!Teilnehmer!A!und!Teilnehmer!B!geschätzt!haben,!werden!Sie!gebeten,!am!Bildschirm!einen!längeren!Fragebogen!auszufüllen.!!
5.)Wenn)Sie)fertig)sind…)Wenn!Sie!die!Studie!abgeschlossen!haben,!bleiben!Sie!bitte!weiterhin!still!an!
Ihrem!Platz!sitzen!und!warten!Sie!darauf,!dass!der!Experimentleiter!Sie!zur!
Auszahlung!bittet.!Wenn!Sie!gerufen!werden,!bringen!Sie!bitte!alle!Ihre!Sachen!(Jacke,!Tasche!usw.)!mit!sich,!da!Sie!das!Labor!durch!den!Auszahlungsraum!verlassen!werden.!!
Überblick:)Ihre)Zahlungen)Um!Ihnen!einen!zusammenfassenden!Überblick!zu!geben:!insgesamt!werden!Sie!folgende!Zahlungen!erhalten:!! 1. In!jedem!Fall!erhalten!Sie!mindestens!eine!Teilnahmegebühr!von!20!CHF.!!2. Zusätzlich!erhalten!Sie!eine!Bezahlung!Ihrer!Einschätzungen!aus!einer!zufällig!gezogenen!Runde!!
• Falls!ein!Teilnehmer!A!gezogen!wird:!200F2*(abs.%Fehlerbetrag%A)%!
• Falls!ein!Teilnehmer!B!gezogen!wird:!200F5*(abs.%Fehlerbetrag%B)!
• Die!Punkte!werden!mit!einem!Wechselkurs!von!1:10!in!Franken!umgerechnet!(10!Punkte!=!1CHF).!Falls!Sie!perfekt!schätzen,!bekommen!Sie!also!200/10=20CHF!für!Ihre!Schätzung.!
• Um!die!Anonymität!der!Entscheidungen!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!zu!wahren,!!bekommen!Sie!keine%Information,%welche%der%Runden!zur!Zahlung!gezogen!wurde.!!
!
…noch)Fragen?)Falls!Sie!Fragen!zu!dieser!Anleitung!haben,!heben!Sie!bitte!nun!die!Hand,!und!ein!Assistent!wird!an!Ihren!Platz!kommen,!um!Ihnen!zu!helfen.!
Verständnisfragen)Bitte!füllen!Sie!nun!den!Verständnistest!auf!den!nächsten!Seiten!aus,!um!sicher!zu!gehen,!dass!Sie!verstanden!haben,!wie!die!Entscheidungssituation!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!aussah,!und!wie!Ihre!Bezahlung!von!Ihren!Einschätzungen!abhängt.!!!!
(bitte%auf%nächster%Seite%fortfahren)%
%
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Verständnistest*zur*Entscheidungssituation*von*Teilnehmern*A*und*B*!Bitte!bearbeiten!Sie!die!folgenden!Beispiele,!um!das!Berechnen!der!Auszahlungen!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!zu!üben.!!Bitte!tragen!Sie!hier!Ihre!Platznummer!ein:!________!!Bitte!tragen!Sie!nun!Ihre!Antworten!handschriftlich!auf!den!angedeuteten!Linien!ein.!Es!wird!dann!jemand!vorbeikommen,!um!Ihre!Antworten!zu!prüfen,!und!Ihnen!zu!helfen,!falls!es!Antworten!gibt,!die!nicht!korrekt!sind.!Wenn$Sie$mit$allem$fertig$sind$oder$Fragen$haben,$
heben$Sie$bitte$die$Hand.$Es$wird$dann$jemand$vorbeikommen,$um$Ihre$Antworten$zu$
kontrollieren.!
BEISPIEL*1*!Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!hätten!die!folgenden!Entscheidungen!getroffen:!A:!Sendet!10!B:!Sendet!14,%falls%er%10*3%bekommt.!!
• wieviele!Franken!hätte!A!für!diese!Runde!bekommen?!!__________!!
• wieviele!Franken!hätte!B!für!diese!Runde!bekommen?!!__________!!
BEISPIEL*2*Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!hätten!die!folgenden!Entscheidungen!getroffen:!A:!Sendet!10!B:!Sendet!0,%falls%er%10*3%bekommt!!
• wieviele!Franken!hätte!A!für!diese!Runde!bekommen?!!__________!!
• wieviele!Franken!hätte!B!für!diese!Runde!bekommen?!!__________!!
BEISPIEL*3*Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!hätten!die!folgenden!Entscheidungen!getroffen:!A:!Sendet!0!B:!Sendet!7,%falls%er%10*3%bekommt!!
• wieviele!Franken!hätte!A!für!diese!Runde!bekommen?!!__________!!
• wieviele!Franken!hätte!B!für!diese!Runde!bekommen?!!__________!!
BEISPIEL*4*Nehmen!Sie!an,!A!hätte!10!gesendet.!!Wieviel!hätte!B!dann!maximal!zurücksenden!können?!!_____________!Wieviel!kann!B!dann!minimal!zurücksenden!können?!!!_____________!!
$
(bitte%auf%nächster%Seite%fortfahren)%
%
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Kontrollfragen*zu*Ihrer*eigenen*Bezahlung*!Diese!Fragen!helfen!Ihnen,!zu!verstehen,!wie!Ihre!eigene!Bezahlung!funktioniert.!Bitte!versuchen!Sie,!die!Lücken!in!den!Tabellen!und!die!Kontrollfragen!auszufüllen.!!
Beispiel*4*(Schätzung*des*Verhaltens*eines*Teilnehmers*A)*!Bitte!vervollständigen!Sie!die!folgende!Tabelle:!!
Ihre$Schätzung:$$
in$wieviel$%$der$Runden$
hat$diese$Person$den$
Betrag$10$gesendet?$
$
Tatsächliches$
Verhalten$der$
Person$
Abweichung$$ Absolutwert+der+
Abweichung+(Vorzeichen%
positiv%machen)$
20%! 55%! __________! ____________!! ! $ Abs.$Fehlerbetrag$A:$
_________$!!
!!Wieviele!Punkte!bekämen!Sie!in!diesem!Fall?! ! !!!
Hinweis:%Sie%bekommen%200E2*(abs.%Fehlerbetrag%A)%Punkte.%
%
!%Wieviel%CHF%bekämen%Sie%(inkl.%Teilnahmegebühr),%falls%diese%Runde%zur%Zahlung%gezogen%
würde?%___________%!
Beispiel*5*(Schätzung*des*Verhaltens*eines*Teilnehmers*B)*!Bitte!vervollständigen!Sie!die!folgende!Tabelle:!!
Ihre$Schätzung:$wieviel$
hat$diese$Person$
durchschnittlich$
zurückgeschickt,$falls$sie$
30CHF$erhalten$hat?$
Tatsächliche$
Entscheidung$der$
Person$
Abweichung$$ Absolute$
Abweichung$
22! _________! [9! _________!
$ $ $ Abs.$Fehlerbetrag$
B=$_______$!
!!Wieviele!Punkte!bekämen!Sie!in!diesem!Fall?! ! !!!
Hinweis:%Sie%bekommen%200E5*(abs.%Fehlerbetrag%B)%Punkte.%
%
!!Wieviel!CHF!bekämen!Sie!(inkl.!Teilnahmegebühr),!falls!diese!Runde!zur!Zahlung!gezogen!würde?!___________!
%
%
Werden%Sie%erfahren,%welche%Runde%zur%Zahlung%gezogen%wurde?%
O%ja%
O%nein%
%
Wenn+Sie+fertig+sind,+oder+Fragen+haben+heben+Sie+bitte+die+Hand.+Es+kommt+dann+jemand+an+
Ihren+Platz,+um+Ihre+Antworten+zu+kontrollieren+und+Ihnen+bei+Fragen+zu+helfen.+!
!!
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Verständnistest*(Lösungen,*nicht*für*Teilnehmer!)*!Bitte!bearbeiten!Sie!die!folgenden!Beispiele,!um!das!Berechnen!der!Auszahlungen!zu!üben.!!Bitte!tragen!Sie!nun!Ihre!Antworten!handschriftlich!auf!den!angedeuteten!Linien!ein.!Es!wird!dann!jemand!vorbeikommen,!um!Ihre!Antworten!zu!prüfen,!und!Ihnen!zu!helfen,!falls!es!Antworten!gibt,!die!nicht!korrekt!sind.!Wenn$Sie$fertig$sind$oder$Fragen$haben,$heben$Sie$
bitte$die$Hand.!
BEISPIEL*1*Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!treffen!die!folgenden!Entscheidungen:!A:!Sendet!10!B:!Sendet!14,%falls%er%3*10%bekommt.!!Falls!diese!Runde!zur!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird...!
• wieviele!Franken!bekommt!A!für!diese!Runde?!!____16_____!
SOLUTION:$12>10+14$=$16$$(12$from$endowment,$sends$10,$receives$14$back)$
• wieviele!Franken!bekommt!B!für!diese!Runde?!!_____28____!
SOLUTION:$12+10*3>14$=$28$$(12$from$endowment,$receives$10*3,$sends$14$back)$!
BEISPIEL*2*Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!treffen!die!folgenden!Entscheidungen:!A:!Sendet!10!B:!Sendet!0,%falls%er%3*10%bekommt!!Falls!diese!Runde!zur!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird...!
• wieviele!Franken!bekommt!A!für!diese!Runde?!!_____2_____!
SOLUTION:$12>10+0$=$2$$(12$from$endowment,$sends$10,$receives$0$back)$
• wieviele!Franken!bekommt!B!für!diese!Runde?!!____42_____$
SOLUTION:$12+10*3>0$=$42$$(12$from$endowment,$receives$10*3,$sends$0$back)$
BEISPIEL*3*Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!treffen!die!folgenden!Entscheidungen:!A:!Sendet!0!B:!Sendet!7,%falls%er%3*10%bekommt!!Falls!diese!Runde!zur!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird...!
• wieviele!Franken!bekommt!A!für!diese!Runde?!!____12_____$
SOLUTION:$12$(12$from$endowment,$no$transfers$because$Proposer$sends$0$and$round$ends)$
• wieviele!Franken!bekommt!B!für!diese!Runde?!!____12_____!
SOLUTION:$12$(12$from$endowment,$no$transfers$because$Proposer$sends$0$and$round$ends)$
$
BEISPIEL*4*Nehmen!Sie!an,!Teilnehmer!A!sendet!10.!Wieviel!kann!B!maximal!zurücksenden?!!_____3x10=30________!Wieviel!kann!B!minimal!zurücksenden?!!______3x0=0_________!!
$
$
$!!!!
First Impressions: Facial Cues and Trusting Behavior
5.8.12 Experiment 2: solutions to comprehension questions
178
! ! Version:05/09/2011!14:08!!
! 15!!
!
SOLUTIONS*TO*COMPREHENSION*TEST*(nicht*für*Teilnehmer!)*!
EXAMPLE*1*(Guessing*accuracy*about*a*proposer)*!Suppose!you!made!estimates!and!the!person!in!the!picture!made!choices!as!recorded!in!the!table!below:!!
Your$estimate$ Actual$choices$of$
person$in$the$picture$
Difference$$
(actual$–$estimate)$
Abs.$Difference$
(make$diff$positive)$
20%! 55%$ 35%$ 35%$
! ! $ Abs.$Error$A:$
35%$!! What!is!your!variable!payment!in!this!example?! 200>2*35=130!!!
Hint:%Recall%that%your%payment%equals%200@2*(Abs.%error%B)%!! Your!total!payment!incl!showup!fee!in!CHF!is:!!130/10$+$20$=$33,>$CHF$
EXAMPLE*2*(guessing*accuracy*about*a*responder)*!
Your$estimate:$
Average'amount$sent$
back$if$this$person$
received$30?$
Actual$choices$of$
person$in$the$picture$
Difference$
(actual$–$estimate)$
Abs.$Difference$
(make$diff$positive)$
22! 13$ >9$ 9$
$ $ $ Abs.$Error$B:$
9$! What!is!your!payment!in!this!example?! 200>5*(9)=155!!
Hint:%Recall%that%your%payment%equals%200@5*(Abs.%error%B)%!! Your!total!payment!incl.!showupfee!!in!CHF!is:!155/10$+$20$=$35,50$CHF!!!
Werden%Sie%erfahren,%welche%Runde%zur%Zahlung%gezogen%wurde?%
O%ja%
X%nein%%%!%denn%Anonymität%der%Entscheidungen%der%Personen%auf%den%Fotos%muss%gewahrt%
bleiben.!
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Anleitung)!Vielen!Dank!für!Ihre!Teilnahme!an!der!heutigen!Studie!!!Im!Verlauf!der!heutigen!Studie!werden!Sie!die!Gesichter!von!Personen!sehen,!die!vor!einigen!Wochen!an!einer!Studie!hier!im!Labor!teilgenommen!haben.!Ihre!Aufgabe!wird!es!sein,!zu!erraten,!wie!die!Personen!auf!den!Bildern!sich!in!
der!Studie!verhalten!haben.!Im!Anschluss!an!diese!Phase!der!Studie!wird!es!einen!Fragebogen!geben.!!Am!Ende!der!Studie!werden!Sie!in!bar!bezahlt.!Zum!einen!erhalten!Sie!eine!fixe!Teilnahmegebühr!iHv!20CHF.!Zum!anderen!erhalten!Sie!eine!Bezahlung!(bis!
zu!20CHF!zusätzlich!zur!Teilnahmegebühr),!deren!Höhe!sich!danach!richtet,!
wie!präzise!Sie!das!Verhalten!der!Personen!auf!den!Fotos!erraten!haben.!!Bitte!lesen!Sie!den!Text!auf!den!folgenden!Seiten!gründlich!durch,!um!folgende!Dinge!zu!verstehen:!
• Die!Regeln!der!heutigen!Studie!
• Wie!die!Entscheidungssituation!funktioniert,!an!der!die!Personen!in!den!Bildern!teilgenommen!haben!
• Wie!Sie!für!die!Genauigkeit!Ihrer!Einschätzungen!bezahlt!werden!!Im!Anschluss!an!die!Anleitung!wird!es!ein!paar!Kontrollfragen!geben,!die!sicherstellen!sollen,!dass!Sie!diese!drei!Dinge!gründlich!verstanden!haben.!!Allgemeine!Regeln!
Bitte!bleiben!Sie!während!der!gesamten!Studie!still!an!Ihrem!Platz!sitzen,!
und!kommunizieren!Sie!mit!niemandem.!Sollten!Sie!Sich!nicht!an!diese!Regeln!halten,!müssen!wir!Sie!bitten!die!Studie!ohne!Bezahlung!abzubrechen,!!und!Sie!werden!für!die!Teilnahme!an!zukünftigen!Studien!gesperrt.!!Fragen?!Sollten!Sie!nach!dem!Lesen!dieser!Anleitung!oder!während!der!Studie!noch!Fragen!haben,!heben!Sie!bitte!leise!die!Hand,!und!es!wird!ein!Experimentleiter!an!Ihren!Platz!kommen,!um!Ihnen!zu!helfen.
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1.)Wer)sind)die)Personen)auf)den)Fotos?!!Vor!ein!paar!Wochen!haben!wir!eine!Studie!hier!im!Labor!durchgeführt,!bei!der!eine!Gruppe!von!Personen!an!einer!Entscheidungssituation!teilgenommen!hat.!!Im!Anschluss!wurden!sie!fotografiert.!!!
• Alle!Personen,!die!Sie!heute!sehen!werden,!haben!uns!ihre!Erlaubnis!erteilt,!dass!wir!ihre!Entscheidungen!und!Ihre!Fotos!in!weiteren!Studien!in!anonymer!Form!verwenden!dürfen.!!
2.)Beschreibung)der)Entscheidungssituation,)an)der)die)Personen)
teilgenommen)haben)!
• Die!Personen!haben!mehrere!Runden!lang!!an!einer!Entscheidungssituation!teilgenommen,!die!weiter!unten!beschrieben!wird.!!
• Sie!wurden!dabei!zu!Anfangs!jeweils!einer!von!zwei!Rollen!zugeteilt:!entweder!Rolle!A!oder!Rolle!B.!Diese!Rolle!wurde!am!Anfang!festgelegt!und!bis!zum!Schluss!beibehalten.!
• In!jeder!Runde!der!Studie!wurde!eine!Person!der!Rolle!A!jeweils!einer!Person!der!Rolle!B!zugeordnet.!Wer!wem!zugeordnet!wurde,!wurde!jede!Runde!geändert.!!
• Die!Personen!wussten!dabei!nicht,!wer!ihr!Gegenüber!ist!–!sie!haben!auch!kein!Foto!ihres!Gegenübers!gesehen,!sondern!nur!einen!anonymen!Entscheidungsbildschirm.!
• In!jeder!Runde!mussten!die!Teilnehmer!eine!Entscheidung!fällen.!Diese!wird!auf!den!folgenden!Seiten!beschrieben.!
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2a))Beschreibung)der)Entscheidungssituation)von)Teilnehmer)A:))
• Am!Anfang!der!jeweiligen!Runde!erhalten!A!und!B!jeweils!einen!
Anfangsbetrag!von!12!Schweizer!Franken.!!
• Entscheidung:!Nach!dem!Erhalt!des!Anfangsbetrags!muss!Teilnehmer!A!entscheiden,!wieviele!seiner!12!Franken!er!an!den!zugeteilten!Teilnehmer!B!senden!möchte.!Er!kann!entweder!0!oder!10!Franken!senden.!!
• Der!Betrag,!den!Teilnehmer!A!schickt,!wird!verdreifacht,!bevor!er!an!Teilnehmer!B!weitergesendet!wird.!Bei!B!kommen!also!entweder!3*0=0!oder!3*10=30!Franken!an.!!
• B!entscheidet!dann,!ohne%zu%wissen,%ob%A%etwas%gesendet%hat,!wieviel!er!vom!empfangenen!Betrag!an!A!zurück!schicken!möchte,!für%den%Fall,%dass%
er%etwas%von%A%empfängt.!!!
• Der!Verdienst!von!Teilnehmer!A!für!die!Runde!ist:!12!–!(an!B!gesendeter!Betrag)!+!(Betrag,!den!B!zurücksendet)!!!Hier!sehen!Sie!einen!Screenshot!des!Entscheidungsbildschirms!von!Teilnehmer!A:!
)!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!
Entscheidung!von!Teilnehmer!A.!
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2b))Beschreibung)Entscheidungssituation)von)Teilnehmer)B:)
• Am!Anfang!der!Runde!erhält!Teilnehmer!B!einen!Anfangsbetrag!von!12!CHF.!!!
• Entscheidung:!Nach!dem!Erhalt!des!Anfangsbetrags!muss!B!sich!entscheiden,!wieviel!er!an!A!zurücksenden!möchte,!für%den%Fall,%dass%er%
etwas%gesendet%bekommt.!!!
• B!muss!diese!Entscheidung!fällen,!weiss%dabei%aber%noch%nicht,%wieviel%A%
gesendet%hat.!Das!bedeutet,!B!beantwortet!die!folgende!Frage:!„Falls!A!10!
Franken!sendet,!so!dass!Sie!30!Franken!bekommen:!wieviel!möchten!
Sie!an!A!zurück!senden?“!B!kann!hierbei!jeden!Betrag!zwischen!(einschliesslich)!0!und!30!Franken!zurückschicken.!!
• Falls!sich!später!herausstellt,!dass!A!nichts!gesendet!hat,!dann!ist!die!Entscheidung!von!B!irrelevant,!und!es!wird!nichts!an!A!zurück!geschickt.!!
• Der!Verdienst!von!Teilnehmer!B!ist!also:!Falls!A!null!Franken!gesendet!hat:! 12!+!0!!–!0!!=!12!Falls!A!10!Franken!gesendet!hat:!! 12!+!30!–!(zurück!gesendeter!Betrag)!!!Hier!sehen!Sie!einen!Screenshot!des!Entscheidungsbildschirms!von!Teilnehmer!B:!!Sobald!beide!Teilnehmer!Ihre!Entscheidungen!gefällt!hatten,!begann!für!die!Teilnehmer!die!nächste!Runde,!mit!einem!neuen!Gegenüber.!!!!!!!
Entscheidung!von!Teilnehmer!B.!(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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Das!folgende!Beispiel!illustriert,!wie!die!Zahlungen!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!in!der!vergangenen!Studie!bestimmt!wurden.!!!
!!!
BEISPIEL))
)Am!Anfang!der!Runde!bekommt!Teilnehmer!A!12!Franken.!Nehmen!wir!an,!er!sendet!10!Franken!an!Teilnehmer!B.!
!!Der!Betrag!von!10!Franken!wird!nun!verdreifacht,!so!dass!Teilnehmer!B!!3x10=30!Franken!erhalten!wird.!!!Teilnehmer!B!weiss!zum!Zeitpunkt!seiner!eigenen!Entscheidung!allerdings!noch!nicht,!ob!er!0!oder!30!erhalten!wird.!Er!bekommt!ebenfalls!12!Franken!am!Anfang!der!Runde.!Nehmen!wir!an,!dass!B!sich!entscheidet,!18!zurück!zu!senden,!für!den!Fall,!dass!A!den!Betrag!von!10!sendet!(falls!A!null!sendet,!kann!B!nichts!zurück!senden):!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Nun!haben!beide!Teilnehmer!ihre!Entscheidungen!getroffen.!Falls!diese!Runde!für!die!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird,!ergeben!sich!die!Auszahlungen!wie!oben!beschrieben.!Da!Teilnehmer!A!10!geschickt!hat,!wird!die!Entscheidung!von!B!relevant,!und!dieser!sendet!18!Franken!zurück.!!!Also!endet!die!Runde!mit!den!folgenden!Zahlungen:!!
Teilnehmer!A:!!12!–!10!+!18!=!20!
!
Teilnehmer!B:!!12!+!30!–!18!=!24!!!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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3.)Ihre)Aufgabe)und)Ihre)Zahlung,)in)Abhängigkeit)der)Genauigkeit)
Ihrer)Schätzungen)!Ihre!Aufgabe!ist!es,!so!genau!wie!möglich!einzuschätzen,!was!die!jeweilige!
Person!auf!dem!Foto!in!der!oben!beschriebenen!Entscheidungssituation!
getan!hat.!!!
• Sie!werden!darum!gebeten,!für!jeweils!30!Teilnehmer!A!und!30!Teilnehmer!B!solche!Einschätzungen!zu!treffen.!!
• Am!Ende!der!Studie!wird!nur!eine!dieser!Personen!zufällig!
ausgewählt,!und!Sie!werden!danach!bezahlt,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Einschätzung!über!die!Entscheidungen!dieser!Person!war.!Da!nur!eine!
Ihrer!Einschätzungen!ausbezahlt!wird,!sollten!Sie!jede!Person!
separat!und!aufmerksam!für!sich!genommen!betrachten.!!
• Erst!ganz!zum!Schluss!der!Studie,!nachdem!Sie!alle!Ihre!Einschätzungen!getroffen!haben!und!den!Fragebogen!ausgefüllt!haben,!werden!Sie!Rückmeldung!darüber!bekommen,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Schätzungen!in!der!zufällig!gezogenen!Runde!waren,!und!wieviel!Sie!dabei!verdient!haben.!Sie!werden!allerdings!keine%Rückmeldung!darüber!bekommen,!um!welche!Runde,!bzw.!welche!dieser!Personen!es!sich!gehandelt!hat,!da!wir!die!Anonymität!der!Entscheidungen!unserer!Teilnehmer!A!und!B!wahren!müssen.!!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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3a))Einschätzungen)bezüglich)Teilnehmer)A:))Falls!die!Person,!die!Sie!sehen,!ein!Teilnehmer!A!war,!wird!Ihr!Bildschirm!wie!folgt!aussehen:!
!!Wie!Sie!sehen,!werden!Sie!gebeten,!zwei!Dinge!einzugeben:!
• In!wieviel!Prozent!der!Runden!hat!diese!Person!0!vs.!10!an!Teilnehmer!B!gesendet?!
• Wie!sicher!sind!Sie!sich!bei!dieser!Einschätzung?!!!
Bezahlung)für)die)Einschätzung)von)Teilnehmer)A:)Ihre!Bezahlung!hängt!davon!ab,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Einschätzung!ist.!Sie!werden!mit!einem!Anfangsbetrag!von!200!Punkten!beginnen.!Für!jeden!Prozentpunkt,!mit!dem!Ihre!Antwort!von!dem!tatsächlichen!Verhalten!des!Teilnehmers!abweicht,!bekommen!Sie!einen!Punkt!abgezogen:!!
Punkte!=!200V2*(absoluter!Fehlerbetrag!A)!
!
Das!bedeutet,!je!näher!Ihre!Einschätzung!an!der!korrekten!Antwort!ist,!!
desto!höher!wird!Ihre!Bezahlung!sein.!!
Sie!bekommen!zum!Schluss!die!erzielten!Punkte!in!Franken!umgerechnet,!
mit!dem!Wechselkurs!1:10!(10!Punkte!=!1!CHF)!
!Auf!der!folgenden!Seite!finden!Sie!ein!Beispiel,!um!dies!besser!nachvollziehen!zu!können.!
!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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BEISPIEL)(Bezahlung)für)Einschätzung)über)einen)Teilnehmer)A))!Nehmen!wir!an,!Sie!hätten!die!Schätzungen!in!der!zweiten!Spalte!abgegeben,!und!die!korrekten!Einschätzungen!wären!die!in!der!dritten!Spalte.!Wie!berechnet!sich!nun!Ihre!Bezahlung?!!
Ihre!Schätzung:!!
in!wieviel!%!der!
Runden!hat!diese!
Person!den!Betrag!
10!gesendet?!
!
Tatsächliches!
Verhalten!der!Person!
Abweichung!
(Tatsächlich!
–!
Schätzung)!!
Absolutwert!der!!
Abweichung!!
(Vorzeichen%positiv%machen)%
50%! 40%! h10! 10!
! ! ! Abs.!Fehlbetrag!A=10!!In!diesem!Beispiel!ist!der!absolute!Fehlerbetrag!A!=!10,!also!würden!Sie!200V2*10=180!Punkte!erhalten,!sofern!diese!Runde!zur!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird.!!Hierfür!würden!Sie!also!eine!Bezahlung!erhalten!von!180/10=18,h!CHF,!welche!auf!Ihre!Teilnahmegebühr!von!20CHF!aufgeschlagen!würden.!Sie!würden!in!diesem!Beispiel!also!insgesamt!38,h!CHF!verdienen.!
)
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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3b))Einschätzungen)bezüglich)Teilnehmern)B:)Falls!die!Person,!die!Sie!sehen,!ein!Teilnehmer!B!war,!wird!Ihr!Bildschirm!wie!folgt!aussehen:!
!!Wie!Sie!sehen!können,!werden!Sie!für!Teilnehmer!B!darum!gebeten,!eine!Einschätzung!zu!geben!für!den!durchschnittlichen%Betrag,!den!die!Person!entschieden!hat!zurück%zu%schicken,!für%den%Fall,%dass%Teilnehmer%A%10%sendet!(und!somit!30CHF!bei!B!ankommen).!!!
Bezahlung)für)die)Einschätzung)von)Teilnehmer)B:)Auch!hier!gilt!wieder,!dass!Ihre!Bezahlung!davon!abhängt!,!wie!präzise!Ihre!Einschätzung!ist.!Sie!werden!wiederum!mit!einem!Anfangsbetrag!von!200!Punkten!beginnen.!Für!jeden!Franken,!den!Sie!daneben!liegen,!werden!Ihnen!fünf!Punkte!abgezogen:!!Punkte!=!200h5*(absoluter!Fehlerbetrag!B)!!
Das!bedeutet,!je!näher!Ihre!Einschätzung!an!der!korrekten!Antwort!ist,!
desto!höher!wird!Ihre!Bezahlung!sein.!
!
Sie!bekommen!zum!Schluss!die!erzielten!Punkte!in!Franken!umgerechnet,!
mit!dem!Wechselkurs!1:10!(10!Punkte!=!1!CHF)!
!Auf!der!folgenden!Seite!finden!Sie!ein!Beispiel,!um!dies!besser!nachvollziehen!zu!können.!!!(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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!
BEISPIEL)(Bezahlung)für)die)Einschätzung)von)Teilnehmer)Bs)Verhalten))!Nehmen!wir!an,!Sie!hätten!die!Schätzungen!in!der!zweiten!Spalte!abgegeben,!und!die!tatsächlichen!Entscheidungen!seien!in!der!dritten!Spalte.!Wie!berechnet!sich!nun!Ihre!Bezahlung?!!
Ihre!Schätzung:!wieviel!
hat!diese!Person!
durchschnittlich!
zurückgeschickt,!falls!
sie!3*10=30CHF!
erhalten!hat?!
Tatsächliche!
Entscheidung!der!
Person!
Abweichung!
(Tatsächlich!–!
Schätzung)!!
Absolutwert!der!
Abweichung!
(Vorzeichen%positiv%
machen)!
15! 8! 8h15=h7! 7!
! ! ! Abs.!Fehlerbetrag!B=!
7!!In!diesem!Beispiel!ware!der!absolute!Fehlerbetrag!B=!7,!so!dass!Sie!200V7*5=165!
Punkte!erhalten!würden,!falls!diese!Runde!für!die!Auszahlung!gezogen!wird.!
!Dies!entspräche!165/10=16,50!CHF,!welche!auf!Ihre!Teilnahmegebühr!von!20CHF!aufgeschlagen!würden.!Sie!würden!in!diesem!Beispiel!also!insgesamt!36,50CHF!verdienen.!
(bitte!auf!nächster!Seite!fortfahren)!!
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4.)Im)Anschluss:)ein)Fragebogen…)!Wenn!Sie!das!Verhalten!aller!Teilnehmer!A!und!Teilnehmer!B!geschätzt!haben,!werden!Sie!gebeten,!am!Bildschirm!einen!längeren!Fragebogen!auszufüllen.!!
5.)Wenn)Sie)fertig)sind…)Wenn!Sie!die!Studie!abgeschlossen!haben,!bleiben!Sie!bitte!weiterhin!still!an!
Ihrem!Platz!sitzen!und!warten!Sie!darauf,!dass!der!Experimentleiter!Sie!zur!
Auszahlung!bittet.!Wenn!Sie!gerufen!werden,!bringen!Sie!bitte!alle!Ihre!Sachen!(Jacke,!Tasche!usw.)!mit!sich,!da!Sie!das!Labor!durch!den!Auszahlungsraum!verlassen!werden.!!
Überblick:)Ihre)Zahlungen)Um!Ihnen!einen!zusammenfassenden!Überblick!zu!geben:!insgesamt!werden!Sie!folgende!Zahlungen!erhalten:!! 1. In!jedem!Fall!erhalten!Sie!mindestens!eine!Teilnahmegebühr!von!20!CHF.!!2. Zusätzlich!erhalten!Sie!eine!Bezahlung!Ihrer!Einschätzungen!aus!einer!zufällig!gezogenen!Runde!!
• Falls!ein!Teilnehmer!A!gezogen!wird:!200F2*(abs.%Fehlerbetrag%A)%!
• Falls!ein!Teilnehmer!B!gezogen!wird:!200F5*(abs.%Fehlerbetrag%B)!
• Die!Punkte!werden!mit!einem!Wechselkurs!von!1:10!in!Franken!umgerechnet!(10!Punkte!=!1CHF).!Falls!Sie!perfekt!schätzen,!bekommen!Sie!also!200/10=20CHF!für!Ihre!Schätzung.!
• Um!die!Anonymität!der!Entscheidungen!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!zu!wahren,!!bekommen!Sie!keine%Information,%welche%der%Runden!zur!Zahlung!gezogen!wurde.!!
!
…noch)Fragen?)Falls!Sie!Fragen!zu!dieser!Anleitung!haben,!heben!Sie!bitte!nun!die!Hand,!und!ein!Assistent!wird!an!Ihren!Platz!kommen,!um!Ihnen!zu!helfen.!
Verständnisfragen)Bitte!füllen!Sie!nun!den!Verständnistest!auf!den!nächsten!Seiten!aus,!um!sicher!zu!gehen,!dass!Sie!verstanden!haben,!wie!die!Entscheidungssituation!von!Teilnehmern!A!und!B!aussah,!und!wie!Ihre!Bezahlung!von!Ihren!Einschätzungen!abhängt.!!!!
(bitte%auf%nächster%Seite%fortfahren)%
%
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 Bitte fahren Sie auf der nächsten Seite fort. 1 
Informationen zur heutigen Studie 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an der heutigen Studie! 
 
Bitte lesen Sie diese Studienanleitung gründlich durch. Sie enthalten Informationen über Regeln 
und Ablauf der heutigen Studie, sowie über Ihre Bezahlung. 
 
Im Anhang finden Sie des Weiteren ein paar Verständnisfragen, welche sicher stellen sollen, 
dass Sie diese Anleitung gründlich verstanden haben. Bitte füllen Sie diese direkt nach dem Lesen 
der Anleitung aus. 
 
Allgemeine Regeln 
• Bitte bleiben Sie während der gesamten Studie still an Ihrem Platz sitzen, und 
kommunizieren Sie mit niemandem.  
• Bitte schalten Sie für die Dauer der Studie alle elektronischen Geräte ab, die Sie ggf. 
dabei haben (Mobiltelefon, iPod, etc.). 
• Bitte verwenden Sie den Computer ausschliesslich zur Bearbeitung der Studie (nicht 
surfen, das Programm wechseln, etc.). 
 
Sollten Sie Sich nicht an diese Regeln halten, müssen wir Sie bitten die Studie ohne Bezahlung 
abzubrechen, und Sie können für die Teilnahme an zukünftigen Studien an unserem Institut 
gesperrt werden. Sie können die Studie jederzeit abbrechen. Jedoch erhalten Sie dann keine 
Bezahlung. Sie erhalten nur dann eine Bezahlung, wenn Sie vollständig an der Studie teilnehmen. 
 
Inhalt der Studie:  
In der heutigen Studie werden Sie nacheinander 140 Fotos von Gesichtern am Computer gezeigt 
bekommen.  
 
Bei manchen der gezeigten Fotos handelt es sich (abgesehen davon, wie das Foto zugeschnitten 
wurde) um Originalfotos, während andere Fotos noch weiteren, zusätzlichen 
Bearbeitungsschritten unterzogen wurden. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, zu erkennen, welche der Fotos 
Originalfotos sind, und welche nicht. Dies wird weiter unten noch genauer erläutert. 
 
Ihre Bezahlung 
Ihre Bezahlung wird sich aus zwei Teilen zusammensetzen. Sie erhalten Ihre Bezahlung am Ende 
der Studie in bar ausgehändigt. 
• Fixe Komponente:   
für die Teilnahme an der Studie werden Sie mit 10 CHF bezahlt. 
• Leistungsabhängige Komponente:  
dies ist eine zusätzliche Zahlung, deren Höhe davon abhängt, ob Ihre Einschätzungen 
davon, ob es sich um Originalfotos handelt oder nicht, korrekt sind: 
o am Ende der Studie werden zehn der 140 Runden nach dem Zufallsprinzip 
ausgewählt, welche für Ihre Bezahlung relevant sein werden  
o Die zahlungsrelevanten Runden können aus jedem der beiden Abschnitte der 
heutigen Studie stammen (nur Abschnitt 1 oder nur Abschnitt 2 oder eine 
Mischung).  
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 Bitte fahren Sie auf der nächsten Seite fort. 2 
o In jeder dieser Runden bestimmt der Computer, ob Sie recht hatten oder nicht 
mit ihrer Einschätzung, ob das gezeigte Gesicht verändert worden ist oder nicht. 
o Für jede dieser zehn Einschätzungen, bei der Sie richtig gelegen haben, 
erhalten Sie zusätzlich 4.00 CHF. 
o Da Sie nicht wissen werden, welche der Runden zählen werden, sollten Sie bei 
jeder Ihrer Einschätzungen davon ausgehen, dass diese Runde zahlungsrelevant 
sein könnte. 
 
Wie bereits angedeutet, wird die Studie in zwei Abschnitte gegliedert sein. Diese werden im 
Folgenden genauer erläutert. 
 
Abschnitt 1 der Studie: 
Die Fotos in Abschnitt 1 sind mit Hilfe einer ovalen schwarzen Umrandung so ausgeschnitten 
worden, dass Sie nur das Gesicht sehen werden, nicht jedoch Haare und Kleidung.  
 
Manche der Gesichter sind nur ausgeschnitten worden, während andere noch weiteren 
Bearbeitungsschritten untezogen wurden. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, zu erkennen, welche der Gesichter 
(zusätzlich zum Ausschneiden) noch weiteren Bearbeitungsschritten unterzogen wurden. 
 
Der Bildschirm wird wie folgt aussehen: 
 
 
 
  
Bitte klicken Sie zum Fortfahren auf „ok“. 
Erst wenn alle Teilnehmer in einer Runde 
auf “ok” geklickt haben, beginnt die 
nächste Runde. 
 
Hier wird die Restzeit 
für diese Runde (in 
Sekunden) angezeigt.  
 
 
Hier geben Sie an, ob Sie glauben, dass es sich um ein Originalfoto 
handelt, oder nicht.  
• Wenn Sie glauben, dass ein Gesicht nur schwarz 
ausgeschnitten worden ist, es sich aber abgesehen davon um 
ein Originalfoto handelt, klicken Sie bitte auf „Ja“. 
• Wenn Sie glauben, dass ein Gesicht noch zusätzliche 
Bearbeitungsschritte erfahren hat (d.h. nicht nur schwarz 
ausgeschnitten wurde), klicken Sie bitte auf „Nein“. 
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Hinweis: Erst wenn alle Teilnehmer in einer Runde auf “ok” geklickt haben, beginnt die nächste Runde.  
 
Abschnitt 2 der Studie 
Der zweite Teil der Studie wird ähnlich zum ersten Abschnitt ablaufen. Der Unterschied besteht 
darin, dass die Gesichter in Abschnitt 2 nicht zuvor schwarz ausgeschnitten worden sind (so 
dass Haar und Kleidung sichtbar bleiben).  
 
Wie in Abschnitt 1 sind manche der Gesichter per Bildverarbeitungssoftware verändert worden, 
und manche nicht. Ihre Aufgabe ist es wieder, einzuschätzen, welche Gesichter verändert wurden 
und welche nicht. 
 
Für jede Person, die Sie sehen, werden Sie wiederum gefragt: 
• Handelt es sich um ein Originalfoto dieses Gesichtes?  
o Wenn Sie glauben, dass das Gesicht nicht weiter bearbeitet worden ist, klicken Sie 
bitte auf „Ja“. 
o Wenn Sie hingegen glauben, dass das Gesicht per Software verändert worden ist, 
klicken Sie bitte auf „Nein“ 
 
• Wie sicher sind Sie sich bei dieser Einschätzung? 
o Ihre Antwort geben Sie auf einer Skala von „gar nicht sicher“ bis „vollkommen 
sicher“ ein. 
 
Bitte clicken Sie wiederum zum Fortfahren auf „ok“. Wie in Abschnitt 1 beginnt die nächste 
Runde erst dann, wenn alle Teilnehmer in einer Runde auf “ok” geklickt haben.  
 
Der Bildschirmaufbau ist identisch mit dem ersten Abschnitt der Studie. 
 
 
  
 
Bitte fahren Sie nun mit den Verständnisfragen auf der nächsten Seite fort. 
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Verständnisfragen: 
 
1. Welche der folgenden Aussagen über Ihre Bezahlung sind korrekt?  
(mehrere korrekte Antworten möglich) 
a. Für jede Runde, in der ich richtig liege, bekomme ich 4 CHF gutgeschrieben. 
b. Für jede zahlungsrelevante Runde, in der ich richtig liege, bekomme ich 4 CHF 
gutgeschrieben. 
c. Es werden genau 10 Runden zahlungsrelevant sein, aber ich werde nicht wissen, 
welche Runden dies sind. 
 
 
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen über die Auswahl der zahlungsrelevanten Runden sind 
korrekt? 
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Nur Runden aus Abschnitt 1 können zahlungsrelevant sein. 
b. Nur Runden aus Abschnitt 2 können zahlungsrelevant sein. 
c. Die zahlungsrelevanten Runden stammen entweder aus Teil 1 oder Teil 2, aber 
keinesfalls aus beiden Teilen. 
d. Es ist möglich, dass ein Teil der 10 zahlungsrelevanten Runden aus Abschnitt 1 
und ein anderer Teil aus Abschnitt 2 stammt. 
 
 
3. Wie unterscheiden sich Abschnitte 1 und 2 der Studie?  
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Die beiden Abschnitte sind identisch. 
b. In Abschnitt 1 werden alle Gesichter oval ausgeschnitten sein, in Abschnitt 2 
nicht. 
 
 
4. Was ist Ihre Aufgabe in Abschnitt 1 der Studie? 
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Es geht darum, die Frisur der Teilnehmer zu beurteilen. 
b. Es geht darum, zu erkennen, ob die Gesichter ausgeschnitten worden sind oder 
nicht. 
c. In Abschnitt 1 sind alle Gesichter oval ausgeschnitten. Die Aufgabe ist es, zu 
erkennen, ob es zusätzlich noch weitere softwaretechnische Bearbeitungsschritte der 
Gesichter gegeben hat, oder ob es sich ansonsten um ein Originalfoto handelt. 
 
 
5. Was ist Ihre Aufgabe in Abschnitt 2 der Studie? 
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Es geht darum, die Frisur der Teilnehmer zu beurteilen. 
b. Es geht darum, zu erkennen, ob die Kleidung der Teilnehmer per Software 
bearbeitet worden ist. 
c. Es geht darum, zu erkennen, ob das Gesicht der Teilnehmer per Software 
bearbeitet worden ist (oder ob es sich um ein Originalfoto des Gesichts 
handelt). 
 
 
Wenn Sie die Fragen fertig bearbeitet haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand.  
 
Wir kommen dann an Ihren Platz, prüfen Ihre Antworten, und helfen Ihnen weiter, sofern 
Sie noch Fragen haben. Sobald dies für alle Teilnehmer abgeschlossen ist, wird die Studie am 
Computer beginnen. 
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Solutions to comprehension test: 
 
1. Welche der folgenden Aussagen über Ihre Bezahlung sind korrekt?  
(mehrere korrekte Antworten möglich) 
a. Für jede Runde, in der ich richtig liege, bekomme ich 4 CHF 
gutgeschrieben. 
b. Für jede zahlungsrelevante Runde, in der ich richtig liege, 
bekomme ich 4 CHF gutgeschrieben. 
c. Es werden genau 10 Runden zahlungsrelevant sein, aber ich werde 
nicht wissen, welche Runden dies sind. 
 
 
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen über die Auswahl der zahlungsrelevanten 
Runden sind korrekt? 
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Nur Runden aus Abschnitt 1 können zahlungsrelevant sein. 
b. Nur Runden aus Abschnitt 2 können zahlungsrelevant sein. 
c. Die zahlungsrelevanten Runden stammen entweder aus Teil 1 oder Teil 
2, aber keinesfalls aus beiden Teilen. 
d. Es ist möglich, dass ein Teil der 10 zahlungsrelevanten Runden aus 
Abschnitt 1 und ein anderer Teil aus Abschnitt 2 stammt. 
 
 
3. Wie unterscheiden sich Abschnitte 1 und 2 der Studie?  
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Die beiden Abschnitte sind identisch. 
b. In Abschnitt 1 werden alle Gesichter oval ausgeschnitten sein, in 
Abschnitt 2 nicht. 
 
 
4. Was ist Ihre Aufgabe in Abschnitt 1 der Studie? 
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Es geht darum, die Frisur der Teilnehmer zu beurteilen. 
b. Es geht darum, zu erkennen, ob die Gesichter ausgeschnitten worden 
sind oder nicht. 
c. In Abschnitt 1 sind alle Gesichter oval ausgeschnitten. Die Aufgabe 
ist es, zu erkennen, ob es zusätzl i ch  noch wei tere  so f twaretechnische 
Bearbei tungsschr i t t e  der Gesichter gegeben hat, oder ob es sich 
ansonsten um ein Originalfoto handelt. 
 
 
5. Was ist Ihre Aufgabe in Abschnitt 2 der Studie? 
(nur eine korrekte Antwort) 
a. Es geht darum, die Frisur der Teilnehmer zu beurteilen. 
b. Es geht darum, zu erkennen, ob die Kleidung der Teilnehmer per 
Software bearbeitet worden ist. 
c. Es geht darum, zu erkennen, ob das Gesicht der Teilnehmer per 
Software bearbeitet worden ist (oder ob es sich um ein Originalfoto 
des Gesichts handelt). 
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